Allen, Craig H. "The Limits of Intelligence in Maritime Counterproliferation Operations." Naval War College Review 60, no. 1 (Winter 2007): 35-52. Allen, Craig H. "The Limits of Intelligence in Maritime Counterproliferation Operations." Naval War College Review 60, no. 1 (Winter 2007): 35-52.
"The long-term practical and political success of the Proliferation Security Initiative will be determined in large measure by the availability of timely and accurate intelligence, and by whether decision makers and operators are more willing to err on the side of safety or caution."
Associated Press. "Navy Commissions Super-Spy Submarine." Washingbton Post, 20 Feb. 2005, A15. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]
On 19 February 2005, "[t]he USS Jimmy Carter entered the Navy's fleet ... as the most heavily armed submarine ever built and as the last of the Seawolf class of attack subs." Analysts say that the "100-foot hull extension to the Jimmy Carter equips it to replace the USS Parche, one of the fleet's premier spy subs."
Balano, Randy Carol. "Operation Iraqi Freedom: The Role of the Office of Naval Intelligence." Naval Intelligence Professionals Quarterly 19, no. 3 (Sep. 2003): 9-10.
"ONI's initial contributions included intelligence preparation of the battle space and the establishment of a 24 by 7 analysis and production operation.... In addition, teams of specially-trained ONI reservists provided critical support to HUMINT collection efforts and the exploitation of captured enemy material."
Barr, David [LT/USN]. "Where's Waldo? Intelligence Support to Personnel Recovery." Naval intelligence Professional Quarterly 24, no. 1 (Jan. 2008): 32-35.
This is the second-place winner of the Naval Intelligence Foundation/Naval Institute essay contest for 2006. It seeks "to capture some of the analytic methodology while describing the political and personal nature of intelligence support to personnel recovery (PR) operations."
Berke. Rory [LCDR/USN] "Training for the Wrong Fight." U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 134, no. 1 (Jan. 2008): 56-60. Naval Intelligence Professionals Quarterly 24, no. 2 (Apr. 2008):35-27, 39.
This article was the "2007 Naval Intelligence Essay Contest winner." The author suggests that Naval "afloat intelligence teams are better suited to confront Cold War-era navies than to deal with today's stateless, unconventional fighters." He argues for "the most realistic, challenging, and adaptive training possible."
Bott, Chris [CAPT/USN], Jim Fanell [LCDR/USN], and Joseph Smith [LCDR/USN]. "Tsunami of Targeting -- A Vision for Naval Intelligence's Role in Shaping the Future of Naval Power Projection." Naval Intelligence Professionals Quarterly 18, no. 1 (Jan. 2002): 9-11.
Davis, Chris [LTCDR/USN]. "Preparing the Battlefield." U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 132, no. 1 (Jan. 2006): 77-79.
The author argues that "[t]he Navy needs a formal intelligence preparation of the battlespace doctrine."
Dobbs, Michael J. [CDR/USN (Ret.)] "Hype, Hope & Hard Facts: Getting a Fix on SSGN SOF Capabilities." U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 134, no. 2 (Feb. 2008): 28-32.
"The obstacles to the SSGN [converted Ohio-class SSBNs] living up to its advertised capability for SOF operations include material, operational, and training.... The advanced SEAL delivery system is the biggest question mark for the SSGN program, because it is esstential to the submarine's SOF capability."
Dorsett, David J. ("Jack") [RADM/USN]
1. "Transforming Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance." Naval Intelligence Professionals Quarterly 19, nos. 1 & 2 (Jun. 2003): 20-23.
"America's intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities are undergoing a profound transformation. Within the U.S. Navy nothing less than a revolution in ISR is underway."
2. "Dominating the Battlespace with World Class Intelligence: The Evolution of Pacific Theater Intelligence." Naval Intelligence Professionals Quarterly 20, no. 4 (Dec. 2004): 15-18.
Dunbar, J. Keith [LT/USN]. "The True Threat." Naval Intelligence Professionals Quarterly 18, no. 1 (Jan. 2002): 12-13.
The Intelligence Community's "ability to warn is dependent upon a relatively small cadre of analysts whose goal is to turn fragmentary pieces of information into warning.... Naval Intelligence must shift focus to ensure analytic skills are given the same priority as collection and targeting as it prepares for the future,"
Fein, Geoff. "Navt Stands up Deep Red Cell ro Study Enemy's Ability to Disrupt Operations." Naval Intelligence Professionals Quarterly 22, no. 2 (Apr. 2006): 28.
Interview from Defense Daily (20 Jan. 2006) with David Cattler, deputy assistant director of Naval Intelligence for Intelligence Support and director of Deep Red. "The Navy has established [in June 2005] Deep Red, an intelligence group that will offer a 'devil's advocate' perspective to ensure warfare commanders make more accurate decisions and to examine how adversaries might use available technologies, in non-traditional ways, to disrupt operations."
Flink, John [LTJG/USNR]. "Intelligence Engagement in Africa." Naval Intelligence Professionals Quarterly 14, no. 1 (Jan. 2008): 20-21.
"Intelligence is part of the comprehensive package of military specialties being taken to the continent in the run-up to next year's full-fledged debut of United States Africa Command, or AFRICOM, a new combatant command that achieved interim operating status in Stuttgart in October" 2007.
Friedman, Norman. "World Naval Developments: Back in the Surveillance Game." U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 133, no. 1 (Jan. 2007): 90-91.
The detection of a surfaced Chinese diesel-powered attack submarine reportedly within torpedo range of the aircraft carrier USS Kitty Hawk "can be read" as a "wake-up call" for U.S. antisubmarine warfare and "as proof that this capability has stagnated since the end of the Soviet threat."
Greer, Mark [CAPT/USN]. "ONI Uses Advanced Information Technology in Support of Warfighters." Naval Intelligence Professionals Quarterly 19, nos. 1 & 2 (Jun. 2003): 12-13.
ONI "has become a community leader in leveraging information technology (IT) in support of the Naval Intelligence mission. The IT Directorate (ONI-4) ... has implemented a number of cutting edge solutions over the last 3-4 years, in addition to its more traditional missions of providing the IT infrastructure at ONI."
Griffin, Jim [LTCDR/USN]. "Naval Intelligence Needs a High-Low Mix." U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 132, no. 1 (jan. 2006): 66-70.
This article was the 2005 Naval Intelligence Essay Contest 1st Prize winner. The author argues that "[t]he first priority of Naval Intelligence must be the ability to answer any question a commander may ask about a potential adversary. To successfully do that, the community must organize and evaluate itself based on its knowledge of the threat.... A mix of intelligence capabilities to meet the diverging threats of the post-9/11 world is needed." This mix would include both conventional (high-end) capabilities and unconventional (low-end) capabilities.
Hines. Jason [CDR/USN]. "Restore the Foundation of Naval Intelligence." U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 131, no. 2 (Feb. 2005): 36-40. NIPQ 21, no. 1 (Mar. 2005): 6-9.
"The lack of focus on a single unifying skill has led the naval intelligence community away from supporting the fleet. The community has been so focused on developing specialty skills it has stopped addressing the fleet's basic need: actionable intelligence."
Holliday, Guy [CAPT/USN]. "Naval Intelligence and the Revolution in Training." Naval Intelligence Professionals Quarterly 19, no. 4 (Dec. 2003): 24-26.
The author is Commander, Center for Naval Intelligence, and Commanding Officer, Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence Training Center.
Intelligenceonline. "US Navy Bolsters its Intelligence Footprint." 1 Sep. 2008. [http://www.intelligenceonline.com]
"Two new organizations have been formed with a mandate to inject fresh impetus into the US Navy’s intelligence effort." The Secretary of the Navy Advisory Panel was created by the Navy Secretary last year "to mull a shake-up in intelligence and changes in the way the U.S. Navy buys its equipment." Also, the Navy has "announced the creation of an Irregular Warfare Office tasked with defining a doctrine and beefing up the service’s capacity to wage asymmetric warfare and conduct intelligence and psychological operations."
Lambert, Mike [CAPT/USN]. "The Navy's Cryptologic Community -- A Transformational Phoenix?" U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 132, no. 10 (Oct. 2005): 74-75. Naval Intelligence Professionals Quarterly 22, no. 1 (Jan. 2006): 32-33.
"Rising from the ashes of decline, the Naval Security Group (the Navy's cryptologic community) is seeing the benefits of its transformation from a legacy signals intelligence (SIGINT) collection, analysis, and reporting organization to a truly multi-faceted 'information operations' organization."
Jacoby, "From the Chairman," Naval Intelligence Professionals Quarterly 22, no. 3 (Jun. 2006): 3, takes issue with some of Lambert's commentary. Jacoby argues that "[t]he need [for change] can be stated in more positive terms.... The case might be better made by talking about relevance and integration of Navy's SIGINT and Information Warfare capabilities into the broader mosaic that is absolutely essential to dealing with the very difficult intelligence challenges of today's war."
LeVitre, Rose [RADM/USN] Part 1 of 2. "'J2!' -- More than a Letter and a Number." Naval Intelligence Professionals Quarterly 19, no. 4 (Dec. 2003): 7-9. Part 2 of 2. Naval Intelligence Professionals Quarterly 20, no. 1 (Feb. 2004): 16-19.
The author discusses her assignment as Pacific Command J2.
Loescher,
Michael S. "Navy Cryptology Is Broken." U.S. Naval Institute
Proceedings 126, no. 2 (Feb. 2000): 112.
"[O]ver the past ten years -- lost in organizational nostalgia and shackled by a myopic vision of the past and future -- the Naval Security Group Command (NavSecGruCom) has become a costly burden to the Navy.... The simple truth is that although the Navy must retain its cryptologic talent, it does not need NavSecGruCom."
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