Burns, Richard D. "Inspection of the Mandates, 1919-1941." Pacific Historical Review 37 (Nov. 1968): 445-462. [Petersen]
Capelotti, P.J. Our Man in the Crimea: Commander Hugo Koehler and the Russian Civil War. Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1991.
Surveillant 1.6: "During the winter of 1919-1920 the U.S. State Department sent a small U.S. Navy intelligence mission, led by RADM Newton McCully, to south Russia to join the Whites and report on the strength of the Bolsheviks and their potential threat. To gather his field intelligence reports, McCully chose a mysterious junior officer, Lt. Commander Hugo Koehler."
Dorwart, Jeffrey M. Conflict of Duty: The U.S. Navy's Intelligence Dilemma, 1919-1945. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1983.
For Petersen, this is a "[c]ontroversial account emphasizing alleged questionable activities, some of which purportedly originated with President Roosevelt." Pforzheimer notes that Dorwart's "intelligence dilemma" is the Office of Naval Intelligence's dual "roles in both positive and counter-intelligence." His view is that "the latter interferes with the former which [he] feels is ONI's 'primary obligation.'" This "purported imbalance is well supported."
Gade, John A. All My Born Days: Experiences of a Naval Intelligence Officer in Europe. New York: Scribner's, 1942.
Petersen: "Attaché in Belgium, the Netherlands and Portugal during the 1930s."
Mahnken, Thomas G. "Gazing at the Sun: The Office of Naval Intelligence and Japanese Naval Innovation, 1918-1941." Intelligence and National Security 11, no. 3 (Jul. 1996): 424-441.
"Scholars have as a group been critical of the performance of US intelligence in the years prior to World War II.... The charge historians most frequently level is that racial stereotypes ... blinded the US Navy to the growth of Japanese power.... If racial bias was pervasive..., then one would expect to find a consistent pattern of underestimation of Japanese capabilities.... [N]o such pattern is apparent. Rather the record is one of relatively accurate assessment during the 1920s and early 1930s, followed by ... generally less detailed reporting beginning in the mid-1930s.... [S]uch a pattern was the result not of ... distorted racial stereotypes, but of the failure of both analytical constructs and preconceived beliefs about war to accommodate the development of new weapons and concepts by Japan."
Mahnken, Thomas G. Uncovering Ways of War: U.S. Intelligence and Foreign Military Innovation, 1918-1941. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002.
According to Bacevich, FA 82.1 (Jan.-Feb. 2003), the author reassesses the performance of the U.S. Army's MID and the Navy's ONI during the interwar period. Mahnken "finds that those two largely neglected institutions performed with considerable effectiveness" in that time. He "also explores why authorities in Washington -- skeptical of evidence that departed from their own conception of warfare -- failed in too many instances" to give intelligence about the innovations that would prove decisive when war came "the credence that it deserved."
Campbell, NIPQ 18.2/3, sees this as a "work of first-rate scholarship.... Mahnken concludes that American military intelligence during the Interwar period succeeded to obtain information on established ways of war -- such as tank warfare, airplanes, and amphibious warfare -- but failed to grasp the emerging ways of war, such as carrier strikes, radar and rockets."
For Mercado, IJI&C 16.3, the author's "historical review and subsequent conclusions are based on solid archival research and on extensive reading of secondary sources.... Uncovering Ways of War thoughtfully revises the conventional view of interwar military intelligence." Avant, Journal of Cold War Studies 6 (2004), says that the author "provides excellent case studies, telling us what the [U.S. military and naval] attachés actually did and how they contributed to U.S. preparations, and will be a great resource for future scholars."
Peake, Studies 46.4, finds that Mahnken "examines the primary sources and evaluates nine cases of 'innovation,' wherein Army and Navy intelligence elements tried to do, and in several instances accomplished, just what they were supposed to do.... This is a very valuable study. Conventional wisdom has been refuted and some practical guidance for the future provided." To Hanyok, I&NS 18.3, this work "is an important step in evaluating the effectiveness of intelligence." Mahnken "considers the entire context of how the intelligence was gathered," and "[h]is arguments and discussions are clear and comprehensive."
Maurer, Alfred. "A Delicate Mission: Aerial Reconnaissance of Japanese Islands before World War II." Military Affairs 26, no. 2 (Summer 1962): 66-75.
McDonald, Dick [CAPT/USN (Ret.)], and Jim Fanell [CDR/USN]. "The Origins of OPINTEL and Its Successes in the Pacific in World War II." Naval Intelligence Professionals Quarterly.
Each section includes narrative and photos from the Pacific Naval Intelligence panels at CINCPACFLT Headquarters.
Part I: 17, no. 4 (Oct. 2001): 3-5.
Part II [completes the display section titled "1930 to December 1941 -- The Road to War"]: 18, no. 1 (Jan. 2002): 24-25.
Part III [covers the period from 7 December 1941 through the Battle of Coral Sea, 7-8 May 1942]: 18, no. 2/3 (Aug. 2002): 28-30.
Part IV [focuses on the 30-day period culminating in the Battle of Midway]: 18, no. 4 (Oct. 2002): 24-25.
Part V ["sketches the establishment and growth of the JICPOA"]: 19, no. 3 (Sep. 2003): 29-31.
Part VI ["highlights the contributions of two special groups of people who served in the JICPOA"]: 20, no. 1 (Feb. 2004): 22-24.
Part VII ["The Heroes of Radio Intelligence," "Radio Intelligence Units," "Yamamoto Shootdown"]: 20, no. 3 (Sep. 2004): 8-10.
Part VIII ["features the enormous intelligence production effort of the JICPOA"]: 20, no. 4 (Dec. 2004): 21-23.
Part IX [concluding article]: 21, no. 2 (Jun. 2005): 10-12.
McGinnis, George P. U.S. Naval Cryptologic Veterans Association (NCVA) History Book. Paducah, KY: Turner Publishing, 1996.
Kruh, Cryptologia 21.3, is impressed by both the physical appearance and content of this book. Among other things, it provides "a comprehensive history of naval cryptology from World War I to modern times." The book includes some articles that have not previously been published.
McNamee, Luke. "Naval Intelligence." U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 50 (Sep. 1924): 1444.
Noble, Dennis L. "Operations in Another Time: A US Naval Intelligence Mission to China in the 1930s." Studies in Intelligence 50, no. 2 (2006): 27-32.
The focus here is the intelligence operation undertaken from 1935 to 1936 by Maj. (later, Maj. Gen.) William A. Worton, USMC. "His mission was to recruit and run agents from Shanghai into Japan" for ONI. Commander Ellis M. Zacharias was his immediate superior and all orders were verbal. He traveled to China under cover "as a disgruntled officer leaving the Corps to establish a business in the International Settlement in Shanghai."
Parker, Frederick D. Pearl Harbor Revisited: United States Communications Intelligence, 1924-1941. Ft. George Gordon Meade, MD: Center for Cryptologic History, National Security Agency, 1994.
According to Sexton, this is a "[v]aluable history of the evolution of Army and Navy Comint agencies" in the interwar years. Kruh, Cryptologia 19.1, says that "[t]his excellent work" provides a "detailed examination and analysis of the U.S. Navy's communications intelligence (COMINT) efforts" in the interwar years. For Wilford, Northern Mariner 12.1/22, "Parker's work constitutes one of the most meticulous examinations" of intercepted JN-25 messages.
Safford, Laurance F.
1. "From the Archives: 'The Functions and Duties of the Cryptography Section, Naval Communications.'" Cryptologia 16, no. 3 (Jul. 1992): 265-281.
2. And J.N. Wenger. U.S. Naval Communications Intelligence Activities. Laguna Hills, CA: Aegean Park Press, 1993.
Surveillant 3.6: This is a "reprint of five now declassified documents in the National Archives."
Setzenkorn, Eric. "Open Source Information and the Office of Naval Intelligence in Japan, 1905-1920." International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 27, no. 2 (Summer 2014): 368-386.
"The final agreement of the Washington Naval Conference stands as further testimony to the accurate reporting of the ONI's naval attachés."
Showers, D. M. [RADM/USN (Ret.)] "The 'Y1' Story: Opintel in the Post WWI Navy." Naval Intelligence Professionals Quarterly 5, no. 3 (Mar. 1989): 1-5.
Wilhelm, Maria. The Man Who Watched the Rising Sun: The Story of Admiral Ellis M. Zacharias. New York: Watts, 1967.
See also Ellis M. Zacharias, Secret Missions: The Story of an Intelligence Officer (New York: Putnam, 1946).
Zacharias, Ellis M. Secret Missions: The Story of an Intelligence Officer. New York: Putnam, 1946. New York: Paperback Library, 1961. [pb] Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2003.
Clark comment: Zacharias was a 23-year-old ensign when the Navy sent him to Japan in 1920 to become one of the few U.S. officers trained in the Japanese language.
Pforzheimer notes that the "book includes discussion of pre-WWII espionage activities and of the U.S. Navy's psychological warfare campaign against Japan." To Kruh, Cryptologia 30.2 (Apr. 2006), this story by "a remarkable man ... will keep you turning the pages." Constantinides calls the book "an indispensable record of ONI for the period he was associated with it and for the cryptologic and CI history of the prewar effort against Japan."
See also Maria Wilhelm, The Man Who Watched the Rising Sun: The Story of Admiral Ellis M. Zacharias (New York: Watts, 1967).
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