Black, Bruce A. [RADM/USNR] "Reserve Intelligence Comes of Age." Naval Intelligence Professionals Quarterly 10, no. 1 (Winter 1994): 3-5.
Brock, Tony [LT/USN]. "Special Operations Require Special Intelligence Officers." U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 125, no.12 (Dec. 1999): 71-73.
"[T]he intelligence billets within the Naval Special Warfare (NSW) community are manned today by a passing parade of new officers who, regardless of rank, lack formal training and experience in special operations."
Brooks, Thomas A. [Director of Naval Intelligence] "Naval Intelligence in the Nineties." American Intelligence Journal 11, no. 3 (1990): 9-10.
Brooks, Tom [Thomas A.] [RADM/USN (Ret)], and Bill Manthorpe [CAPT/USN (Ret)]. "Setting the Record Straight: A Critical Review of Fall from Glory." Naval Intelligence Professionals Quarterly 12, no. 2 (Apr. 1996): 1-2.
This is a review of Gregory L. Vistica, Fall from Glory (1995): "In his rush to tar the entire Navy with the brush of ineptitude, intellectual dishonesty and 'institutional corruption,' [Vistica] is too busy fabricating 'intelligence failures' (they usually help sell books) to pick up on what was probably the biggest story -- how good intelligence, well-analyzed and well-applied ... enabled the US Navy to devise a strategy ... which would have helped ensure victory, should we have had to fight a war with the USSR.... Vistica mixes fact with fabrication, history with self-serving and mean-spirited gossip, half-truth with personal prejudice." The authors of the review were DNI and Deputy DNI, respectively. See also, Brooks' letter, Proceedings 122.5 (May 1996): 16-17, which makes many of the same points.
Canfield, Jeffrey L. "Gerbil Redux: What Course Ahead for Naval Intelligence?" International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 6, no. 3 (Fall 1993): 271-295.
"The question to be resolved is what percentage of the [naval intelligence] community should be assigned at any time to the National Maritime Intelligence Center (NMIC), to other national agencies, to joint commands, and to the naval tactical unit level?" Bates, NIPQ 10.2, notes that "Gerbil refers to one of the many derogatory terms used by operators to identify intelligence officers." Canfield's article "has a number of important observations and recommendations worth your attention."
Friedman, Norman. "World Naval Developments: Satellite Reconnaissance Upgraded." U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 121, no. 12 (Dec. 1995): 91-92.
This article essentially declares victory for the tactical intelligence side in the tactical-strategic dichotomy that existed through the Cold War years in the design of U.S. reconnaissance satellites. "The next-generation U.S. photo-reconnaissance satellite, to be launched later this decade, will be modified -- given somewhat less resolution and a higher area-coverage rate -- to provide near real-time battlefield information. The change is the culmination of almost two decades of change, led by the U.S. Navy." An interesting admission by this author of The Naval Institute Guide to World Naval Weapons Systems, is that the Tomahawk cruise missile was bought for ship vs. ship use in the absence of an effective targeting system.
Fulghum, David A. "Navy Spying Masked By Patrol Aircraft." Aviation Week & Space Technology, 8 Mar. 1999, 32.
Navy P-3 patrol aircraft "packed with a multitude of classified sensors" operate out of "two special operations units -- VPU-1 "Old Buzzards" stationed at NAS Brunswick, Maine, and VPU-2 "Wizards," stationed at NAS Barbers Point, Hawaii." Two aircraft in each squadron of three "carry sophisticated communications (including satcom), long-range electro-optical cameras, infrared sensors, chemical detectors, power measurement devices and other sensors that can detect, record and analyze emissions across a wide swath of the electromagnetic spectrum."
Hone, Thomas C. "Combine Strategy and Intelligence." U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 119, no. 6 (Jun. 1993): 59-60.
Jacoby, L.E. [RADM/USN] "Operational Intelligence: Lessons from the Cold War." U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 125, no. 9 (Sep. 1999): 102-104.
Discusses September 1998 conference of active-duty and retired Naval Intelligence professionals at the Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence Training Center, Dam Neck, VA. Operational intelligence is defined as "the art of providing near-real-time information concerning the location, activity, and likely intentions of potential adversaries."
1. Brave Men -- Dark Waters: The Untold Story of the Navy SEALs. Novato, CA: Presidio, 1992. New York: Pocket, 2003. [pb]
Surveillant 2.6 identifies Kelly as a veteran defense correspondent who has worked for the Washington Star and U.S. News and World Report. Among other things, this work discusses the Marchinko case (see Marchinko and Wiseman, Rogue Warrior) and looks at the past and possible future mission of the SEALs.
According to Yang, FILS 12.5, this work "highlights several intelligence facets of the SEAL story." They "would gather their own intelligence and then act on it.... '[T]he SEALs found they were able to penetrate deep into VC sanctuaries where more conventional forces didn't know enough, or didn't dare, to go.' (p. 136) This ability was tapped" by the CIA, which used "the SEALs special talents through the Provincial Reconnaissance Unit and the Phoenix/Phung Hoang Programs." The book has an "unmistakable air of authenticity." While it "cannot be considered definitive," it is "better than anything else that examines SEAL history before and since the Vietnam War."
2. Never Fight Fair! Navy SEALS' Stories of Combat and Adventure. Novato, CA: Presidio, 1995. Never Fight Fair! Inside the Legendary U.S. Navy Seals. New York: Pocket, 1996. [pb]
This book is primarily interviews/oral history with former (and some active) Navy SEALS.
Return to MI - Navy Table of Contents