MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

U.S. Naval Intelligence

2000s

M - Z

MacKrell, Eileen F. [CAPT/USN] "Network-Centric Intelligence Works." U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 127, no. 7 (Jul. 2003): 44-48. "Net-Centric Intelligence Works!" Naval Intelligence Professionals Quarterly 19, no. 3 (Sep. 2003): 5-8.

The author was intelligence officer for the USS Carl Vinson (CVN-70) Battle Group during Operation Enduring Freedom. She states that "the main benefit to moving to a network-centric info flow was the dramatic increase in shared awareness throughout the battle group.... Information was available all the time,... and to everyone who wanted it." See also Pete Majeranowski, [LT/USN], "Knowledge Web Plays Big in Transformation," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 127, no. 7 (Jul. 2003): 43-48.

Majeranowski, Pete [LT/USN]. "Knowledge Web Plays Big in Transformation." U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 127, no. 7 (Jul. 2003): 43-48.

"Among members of the Carl Vinson (CVN 70) Battle Group during Operation Enduring Freedom, information had to be transmitted with near-real-time speed. 'The Web is the brief' -- the mantra of Battle Group Commander Rear Admiral Thomas E. Zelibor... -- helped drive the knowledge-web culture through the ranks of the battle group and battle force, connecting people with information as never before." See also Eileen F. MacKrell [CAPT/USN], "Network-Centric Intelligence Works," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 127, no. 7 (Jul. 2003): 44-48.

Manzelmann, James [RADM/USNR].

Commander, Naval Reserve Intelligence Command.

1. "Filling a Critical Need: Intel Reservists Mobilized in Support of Operation Enduring Freedom." Naval Intelligence Professionals Quarterly 18, no. 1 (Jan. 2002): 7-8.

2. "Naval Reserve Intelligence Professionals Meet the Challenge of Terror." Naval Intelligence Professionals Quarterly 19, nos. 1 & 2 (Jun. 2003): 7.

The author writes that the past year demonstrates "the continuing and ever-increasing value of the Naval Reserve Intelligence community to the active Navy's intelligence efforts, and to those of the joint services in support of our national interests."

Marx, Paul H. "Proficient Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence Analysts Are Expedititonary Warfare Necessities." U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 130, no. 2 (Feb. 2004): 44-45. Naval Intelligence Professionals Quarterly 20, no. 1 (Feb. 2004): 9-10.

"Within the Marine Corps and Navy,... there is a chronic scarcity of proficient, highly trained intelligence analysts to support an increasing operational tempo around the world.... The best way to train our intelligence analysts to decipher, interpret, identify, and reasonably predict the capabilities (and intentions) of potential adversaries is through improved education."

Myers, Steven Lee. "Panel on Cole Attack Urges Increased Spending on Intelligence." New York Times, 10 Jan. 2001. [http://www.nytimes.com]

In a report released at the Pentagon on 9 January 2001, the commission "created by Defense Secretary William S. Cohen in the wake of the Cole attack[] recommended a series of steps to tighten security for American forces around the world.... Among them are increasing spending on intelligence, assigning security experts to traveling ships and making training against terrorism as high a priority as training for combat."

Naval Intelligence Professionals Quarterly. Editors. "Cothron Becomes Sixty-Second DNI." 22, no. 4 (Sep. 2006): 7.

Clark comment: RADM Tony Cothron took over as DNI on 8 July 2006. His predecessor, VADM Murrett, is now Director/National Geospatial Intelligence Agency. This article gives career and personal information on Cothron. Duly noted is his graduation from Middle Tennessee State University in 1977.

Ona, Mario I. [LT/USN] "Overhaul Naval Intel to Support the War Fighters." U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 131, no. 2 (Feb. 2005): 38-40. Naval Intelligence Professionals Quarterly 21, no. 1 (Mar. 2005): 10-12.

"For naval intelligence to reach the highest levels of effectiveness and efficiency, a more symbiotic relationship must be fostered between the theater intelligence centers, the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), and its operators."

Paterson, Pat [LTCMR/USN]. "Into Africa: A New Frontier in the War on Terror." U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 132, no. 5 (May 2006): 32-36.

"[T]he biggest political and military concern in Africa is terrorism.... [D]ire conditions -- border disputes, ethnic conflicts, corruption and mismanagement, famine, HIV -- make Africa a fertile breeding ground for Muslim extremism and terrorist recruitment." Side note: "The Navy and Marine Corps established its presence in Africa with a base at Camp Lemonier, Djibouti."

Polmar, Norman. "The ASDS Is Sailing Rough Seas." U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 132, no. 1 (Jan. 2006): 88-89.

On 30 November 2005, U.S. Special Operations Command announced that it was cancelling "plans to acquire a fleet" of the Advanced SEAL Delivery System (ASDS) submersibles. The sole ASDS, delivered to the Navy in 2003, has been plagued with troubles throughout its trials. At present, "there is no schedule for the construction of additional submersibles."

Porterfield, Richard B. [RADM/USN (Ret.)] "Naval Intelligence: Transforming to Meet the Threat." U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 132, no. 9 (Sep. 2005): 12-16. Naval Intelligence Professionals Quarterly 22, no. 1 (Jan. 2006): 8-11.

This is an extremely illuminating article by the recently retired DNI (August 2000-April 2005 -- the longest tenure in the position in the Navy's history). Porterfield states his essential thesis early in this article: Naval intelligence "is stretched thin as it balances enduring, traditional missions while transforming to support a Navy faced with emerging global threats." He argues that naval intelligence is "a low-density intelligence force that is now more involved in naval and joint operations than at any time in recent history -- and in ways never envisioned until recently." While proud of the accomplishments of naval intelligence, he sends a cautionary message: "[T]he role of naval intelligence has grown so significantly that our people may soon reach a breaking point."

Rielage, Dale [LCDR/USN] "Before the Green Table." Naval Intelligence Professionals Quarterly 19, no. 4 (Dec. 2003): 10-11.

The author identifies what he views as significant structural problems in the way Navy terrorism and foreign intelligence analysis are configured. He argues against the current separation of the Navy's "key provider of terrorist threat warning, counter-intelligence, and force protection information [the Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS)] from both its foreign intelligence structure and its operational forces."

Stein, Larry [CDR/USN]. "GBS IP Receiver Decoder: What's All the Buzz About?" Naval Intelligence Professionals Quarterly 21, no. 2 (Jun. 2005): 13-14.

The author discusses "some lessons learned during USS HARRY S. TRUMAN's 2004-2005 combat deployment in support of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM while employing the Joint Service Imagery Processing System-Navy (JSIPS-N) Concentrator Architecture (JCA), Buzzlite, and multiple communications paths."

Studeman, Mike [LTCDR/USN]. "Pacific Faces Crisis in Intel Analysis." U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 129, no. 1 (Jan. 2003): 64-67. "Intelligence in the Pacific: A Crisis in Analysis for the Fleet." Naval Intelligence Professionals Quarterly 19, nos. 1 & 2 (Jun. 2003): 16-19.

Winner, 2002 Naval Intelligence Essay Contest.

Studeman, Mike [CDR/USN]. "7 Myths of Intelligence." U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 135, no. 2 (Feb. 2009): 64-69.

The author argues that "[t]he Navy cannot afford to harbor myths about America's intelligence community at a time when awareness and decision superiority are so critical." He discusses the following myths: (1) intelligence is of marginal value unless it is actionable; (2) intelligence is basically secret information; (3) intelligence is produced exclusively from classified sources; (4) all I need from intelligence is a smart box; men-in-the-loop only impede and delay access to intelligence; (5) intelligence experiences more failures than successes; (6) ONI is more focused on national rather that Fleet interests; (7) successful operations-intelligence integration primarily involves intelligence getting in tune with warfighters.

Wheeler, Warren C. [CDR/USN]

1. "Naval Intel Must (Re)Acquire Core Skills." U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Feb. 2004, 42-47.

Winner, 2003 Naval Intelligence Essay Contest. Naval intelligence officers lack "commonly accepted, clearly articulated core competencies -- specific, measurable, verifiable skills all members are expected to perform at a consistently high level." During the Cold War, "providing operational intelligence to war fighters" was the consistent focus of naval intelligence; but "[t]he rationale for a global operational intelligence effort faded with the Soviet threat." A new central organizing purpose and associated core competencies should be built on the basis of the ongoing communications revolution and on the role of precision strikes in the new warfighting mode.

2. "Transforming Naval Intelligence Means (Re-)Acquiring Core Competencies." Naval Intelligence Professionals Quarterly 20, no. 1 (Feb. 2004): 3-7.

This is "a slightly expanded version" of the article published above. NIPQ 20.1 also carries "Comments on Winning Essay" from Keith Dunbar (LTCDR/USN), pp. 7-8; and Lawrie Smith, p. 8.

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