
Carter, Dan. "Marine Corps Counterintelligence in Somalia and Beyond." Defense Intelligence Journal 4, no. 1 (Spring 1995): 83-89.
In the Marine Corps, "all CI training and activities are oriented totally toward the tactical environment.... Additionally, Marine Corps CI has a distinctive tactical human intelligence (HUMINT) mission.... Marine Corps CI conducts ... HUMINT collection operations ... [to] assist the tactical intelligence collection effort in determining the enemy's order of battle ... and intentions.... Marine Corps CI is now expanding and defining its role in deception operations, information warfare, psychological operations and operational security."
Cartwright, Jeffrey S. [SSGT/USMC] "Aviation Intel Isn't Ops." U.S. Naval Institute
Proceedings, Nov. 1996, 45-46.
The author opposes the proposed integration of Marine Corps aviation intelligence personnel and weapons and tactics instructors into a single department.
Clubb,
Timothy L. "Tactical Deception and Helicopter Operations." Marine
Corps Gazette 78 (May 1994): 48-49. [Seymour]
Davis, Norman C. [LTCOL/USMC]
"Intelligence and Operational Maneuver from the Sea: Organizing for
the Future." Marine Corps Gazette, Oct. 1999, 48-51.
The intelligence structure needed to meet the challenges of the operational maneuver from the sea (OMFTS) concept includes "an organic intelligence capability" within the Marine expeditionary force and at the major subordinate command level, "along with a G-2 intelligence section at each echelon to coordinate the overall intelligence effort."
Grant, Andrew F. [1STLT/USMC] "Mission Essential Training for Ground Intelligence." Marine
Corps Gazette, Dec. 1998, 16-17.
Argues for a Marine Corps-unique entry-level intelligence course for officers (vice the Army's Military Intelligence Officers Basic Course [MIOBC]).
Gray, Alfred M. "Global
Intelligence Challenges in the 1990s." American Intelligence Journal
11, no. 1 (Winter 1989-1990): 3-7.
Commandant, USMC.
Guenther, John. "Marine Corps Intelligence: Transformed by War." Naval Intelligence Professionals Quarterly 20, no. 3 (Sep. 2004): 6-7, 34..
Significant deficiencies in Marine Corps intelligence were identified in the first Gulf War. "By mid-1991, the Marine Corps had initiated several internal reviews and studies to address the identified intelligence deficiencies and to examine the totality of Marine Corps intelligence capabilities." The new AC/S, C4I, Maj. Gen. Paul Van Riper, became "the driving force behind the successful revamping, reorganization, and reinvigoration of Marine Corps intelligence."
Hisey, Braden W. [CAPT/USMC]
"Producing a More Practical Tactical Intelligence Officer." Marine
Corps Gazette, Dec. 1998, 13-15.
In 1993, the Marine Corps began a "major overhaul of how it prepares and assigns officers to serve in the intelligence field." The author finds that improvements have occurred, but additional changes -- improvements -- are still needed.
Jones, Harry E., Jr.
"Closing the Intelligence Gap in the OMFTS Concept." Marine
Corps Gazette, Oct. 1999, 52-54.
OMFTS = operational maneuver from the sea.
LeHockey,
John D. Strategic and Operational Military Deception: U.S. Marines and
the Next Twenty Years. Washington, DC: U.S. Marine Corps, 1990. [Seymour]
Lewis, Christopher
J. "Sustaining the Marine Corps Intelligence Force." U.S. Naval
Institute Proceedings 126, no. 6 (Jun. 1995): 67-68.
Operation Desert Storm exposed the "neglected condition" of the Marine Corps' intelligence capabilities. The DoD Inspector General "documented the lack of an institutional Marine Corps commitment to tactical intelligence." The author identifies the "most important problem" as the situation where "senior positions in Marine Corps intelligence have too frequently been staffed with officers having no experience in the intelligence field.... [T]his happens because there is no professional MOS for [Marine Corps] intelligence officers at the rank of colonel.... The IG also pointed out that ... 'no intelligence officer has ever achieved general rank.'... Unless ... implementation [of the Marine Corps Intelligence Plan] results in a net gain in manning and a substantial increase in funding,... it will only be another in a long history of HQMC intelligence plans that failed to live up to expectations."
Livingston, Robert W. [LTCOL/USMC]. "Marine Corps Intelligence Activity: Excellence in Expeditionary Intelligence." American Intelligence Journal 17,
no. 1/2 (1996): 29-33.
The author details "the organizational structure, product line and support provided" by the Marine Corps Intelligence Activity (MCIA).
Peters, Mark W. [CAPT/USMC], and Brian L. Gilman [CAPT/USMC]. "Refocusing the Effort: Another Perspective on 0203 Training." Marine Corps Gazette, Mar. 1999, 47-48.
"[T]he Corps needs its own military occupational specialty-producing ground intelligence officer's basic course."
Polk, Morgan M. [CAPT/USMC]
"Intelligent Life on the Planet MOOTW." Marine Corps Gazette,
Apr. 1998, 43-45.
"The time has come to revamp basic information gathering techniques in order to better support the Corps' expanding role in MOOTW [military operations other than war]."
Rababy,
David A. [MAJ/USMC] "Marine Corps Intelligence: Officer Training in
the Future." Military Intelligence 21, no. 4 (Oct.-Dec. 1995):
33-35.
Robb, Stephen C. [LTCOL/USMC].
"Marine Corps Signals Intelligence: 'The Warfighter's Force Multiplier."
American Intelligence Journal 15, no. 1 (Spring/Summer 1994): 25-29.
"Approximately two-thirds of all Marine Corps SIGINT assets reside within the Fleet Marine Force."
Sadler, Lori M. [COL/USMC]
"Improving National Intelligence Support to Marine Corps Expeditionary
Forces." American Intelligence Journal 13, no. 3 (Summer 1992):
49-51.
Shelton, Paul A. "Frontline Intelligence for the 21st Century." Marine Corps Gazette, Sep. 1996, 30ff.
Shortsleeve, Brian
J. [1LT/USMC] "Realtime Imagery for Ground Commanders in Bosnia-Herzegovina."
Marine Corps Gazette, Apr. 1998, 34-35.
Discusses the use of mobile remote receive stations (RRSs) to downlink live imagery from Navy P-3C Orions to remotely situated troops, and suggests that the same configuration would be an asset to Marine expeditionary unit (MEU) operations in littoral areas where P-3Cs are operating.
Strauss, Herbert M.
[LTCOL/USMC]. "Marine Corps Intelligence in an Expeditionary Era: Meeting
the Challenge of Change." American Intelligence Journal 14,
no. 3 (Autumn/Winter 1993/1994): 25-28.
Not enlightening.
Von Hassell, Agostino.
Strike Force: U.S. Marine Corps Special Operations. Charlottesville,
VA: Howell Press, 1991. [Gibish]
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