Materials presented in chronological order.
Blanton, Tom. "Seeking Secrecy Where There Was Sunshine." Washington Post, 19 Jul. 2000, A23. [http://washingtonpost.com]
In this Op-Ed piece, the author notes that the Senate has voted to exempt the DIA's "operational files" from the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). The DIA has claimed that these files are "so highly classified" that they are "'always exempt from release.' But thousands of declassified documents from these same files testify to the contrary."
Lakely, James G. "Official Rebuts Story of Iraq Intelligence Shortcomings." Washington Times, 7 Jun. 2003. [http://www.washingtontimes.com]
Emerging from a classified intelligence briefing to the Senate Armed Services Committee on 6 June 2003, DIA Director Adm. Lowell Jacoby "said earlier press reports suggesting the United States had no reliable evidence of Iraq's chemical and biological weapons program were wrong and based on a 'single sentence' in a DIA report that 'was not intended to ... [ellipses in original] summarize the program.'"
Ackerman, Robert K. "Defense Intelligence Seeks Triple-Threat Transformation." Signal, Oct. 2003. [http://www.afcea.org/signal/]
DIA Director Vice Adm. Lowell E. "Jake" Jacoby sees the DIA "facing a multifaceted tasking that leaves little room for error. It must retool core aspects of military intelligence without lessening its effectiveness to guard against existing threats to the United States.... Jacoby offers that the defense intelligence community is being asked to do two tasks simultaneously -- to address and defeat current threats while identifying future challenges and positioning to deal with them.... One process that already is underway is the increased emphasis on human intelligence assets at all levels from collection to processing and dissemination."
Andriani, Michael Robert. "The Impact of Transformation on National Intelligence Support Planning." Defense Intelligence Journal 14, no. 1 (2005): 115-120.
The author argues that the DIA should establsih "full-time planning sections" in each of its directorates in order to "horizontally integrate its planning efforts."
New York Times. "Military Spy Chief to Retire on Jan. 1 ." 21 Jun. 2005. [http://www.nytimes.com]
DIA Director Vice Adm. Lowell E. Jacoby announced on 20 June 2005 that he will retire on 1 January 2006.
Schmitt, Eric. "Bush Selects General to Run Spy Agency." New York Times, 27 Sep., 2005.
On 26 September 2005, President Bush nominated Army Maj. Gen. Michael D. Maples to be DIA director, "the first time in decades that someone who is not a career intelligence officer has been picked to lead the agency." Maples would succeed Vice Adm. Lowell E. Jacoby, "who is stepping down in November after heading the agency for more than three years."
Pincus, Walter. "Request for Domestic Covert Role Is Defended." Washington Post, 8 Oct. 2005, A4. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]
DIA General Counsel George Peirce said in an interview on 7 October 2005 that as part of the Pentagon's counterterrorism role, DIA "covert operatives need to be able to approach potential sources in the United States without identifying themselves as government agents." Peirce was defending "legislative language approved last week" by the SSCI. "The House's intelligence authorization bill ... does not include the provision."
Gertz, Bill. "Intelligence Intransigence." Washington Times, 5 Feb. 2006. [http://www.washingtontimes.com]
Military "intelligence-gathering and counterintelligence have been frustrated by legal restrictions and conflicting missions.... [T]he Pentagon's Counterintelligence Field Activity [CIFA] ... still lacks the authority to take a direct role in the activities of the military counterintelligence units.... The DIA is focused more on process changes, which include improving information-sharing and analysis, and less on changing the structure. The DIA was singled out for criticism by the WMD commission for its handling of an Iraqi informant known as 'Curveball,' who provided bogus information to U.S. intelligence agencies that ended up reaching the highest levels of the government." DIA has improved its "system of checking the validity of sources, but continues to believe that collectors should provide as much information as possible to analysts and other intelligence officials."
Waterman, Shaun. "Analysis: Clapper's record at DIA." United Press International, 15 Jan. 2007. [http://www.upi.com]
The man expected to be named as the next undersecretary of defense for intelligence, retired U.S. Air Force Gen. James Clapper, "instituted a controversial and ultimately failed reorganization" at DIA in the 1990's. More recently, Clapper left his post as head of the NGA in June 2006, "several months earlier than he had wanted, after clashing with [Defense Secretary Donald] Rumsfeld over his support for the idea" that the DNI "should have authority over the five major U.S. intelligence agencies inside the Department of Defense....
"Retired Army Col. Pat Lang, who was a senior official at the agency at the time, and left after clashing with Clapper over the reorganization, called it 'disastrous ... extremely destructive.'" Lang added that "Clapper 'had no interest whatsoever in the (agency's) national-level role in developing strategic intelligence for policy-makers.'" Instead, he "organized analysts 'strictly to support the military-technical side of things,' like assessing the capabilities of weapons systems."
Ackerman, Robert K. "Defense Intelligence Assumes More Diverse Missions." Signal, Apr. 2007. [http://www.afcea.org/signal/]
DIA Director Lt. Gen. Michael D. Maples is also "the director of the Defense Joint Intelligence Operations Center (DJIOC), the defense human intelligence (HUMINT) manager, and the commander of the Joint Functional Component Command for Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (JFCCISR) for the U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM). These diverse roles parallel the multifaceted nature of defense intelligence in the post-9/11 era."
Pincus, Walter. "Defense Agency Proposes Outsourcing More Spying: Contracts Worth $1 Billion Would Set Record." Washington Post, 19 Aug. 2007, A3. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]
The DIA "is preparing to pay private contractors up to $1 billion to conduct core intelligence tasks of analysis and collection over the next five years.... The proposed contracts, outlined in a recent early notice of the DIA's plans, reflect a continuing expansion of the Defense Department's intelligence-related work.... The DIA is the country's major manager and producer of foreign military intelligence, with more than 11,000 military and civilian employees worldwide and a budget of nearly $1 billion."
DIA Director Michael D. Maples [LTGEN/USA], "Consolidating Our Intelligence Contracts," Washington Post, 24 Aug. 2007, A14, calls this story "inaccurate and misleading." He states that "[t]he proposal is a consolidation of more than 30 existing contracts into a single contract vehicle that can be more effectively managed." In addition, "[c]ontrary to assertions in the article, the Defense Intelligence Agency does not outsource analysis. DIA senior analysts and leaders rigorously review all analytic products. Government managers are fully in charge of this process."
Rossmiller, A.J. Still Broken: A Recruit's Inside Account of Intelligence Failures, From Baghdad to the Pentagon. New York: Ballantine, 2008.
According to Peake, Studies 52.3 (Sep. 2008) and Intelligencer 16.2 (Fall 2008), the author spent less than two years working as an analyst for the DIA in Washington and Iraq, concluded that the system was broken, and left the government to enlighten the rest of us with his views. The reviewer concludes that this book "is little more than the biased, sour-grapes rant of someone unwilling to pay his dues. It does not deserve serious professional attention."
Zackrison, IJI&C 22.3 (Fall 2009), finds that this "first-hand account of how things work" in the DIA "and how it cooperates with other intelligence entities and with the DoD is fascinating." Although the author has "failed to provide sufficient evidence to support his two main reasons for asserting that the IC is still broken,... [h]is impressions are dead accurate, even if some of his analysis is not."
Aftergood, Steven. "A Reorganization of Defense Intelligence." Secrecy News, 30 Jul. 2008. [http://www.fas.org/blog/secrecy]
"A new Defense Counterintelligence and Human Intelligence Center (DCHC) is being established at the Defense Intelligence Agency to manage, develop and execute DoD counterintelligence and human intelligence activities worldwide. It will take over many of the functions and authorities of the Counterintelligence Field Activity (CIFA), which drew criticism for its unauthorized domestic surveillance activities.... CIFA will be terminated effective August 3.... The new organization was described in a July 22 memorandum from the Deputy Secretary of Defense," which is available at: http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/dchc.pdf.
Steven Aftergood, "DIA Takes on Offensive Counterintelligence." Secrecy News, 12 Aug. 2008, adds: With the establishment of the DCHC, "the Defense Intelligence Agency now has new authority to engage in offensive counterintelligence operations that seek to thwart foreign intelligence activities."
Transcript of a 5 August 2008 "Media Roundtable about the Establishment of the Defense Counterintelligence and Human Intelligence Center" is available at: http://www.fas.org/irp/news/2008/08/dia-dchc.pdf.
Hess, Pamela. "DIA's New Mission Adds to Intel Arsenal." Associated Press, 5 Aug. 2008. [http://www.ap.com]
With the establishment of the Defense Counterintelligence and Human Intelligence Center (DCHC), the "DIA joins just three other military organizations authorized to carry out offensive counterintelligence operations -- the Army Counterintelligence office, the Navy Criminal Investigative Service and the Air Force Office of Special Investigations."
Bennett, John T. "DIA Official Defends Russia-Georgia Reporting." Defense News, 2 Sep. 2008. [http://www.defensenews.com]
DIA Deputy Director of Analysis Robert Cardillo "says the U.S. agency provided Bush administration officials with ample warning that the simmering tensions between Georgia and Russia could erupt in fighting."
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