Ackerman, Robert K. "Communications Links Vital to Managing Defense Intelligence." Signal, Sep. 1995, 25 ff. [http://www.afcea.org/signal/]
Banford, Harry C.
1. "Intelligence Communications in a Changing World." American Intelligence Journal 11, no. 3 (1990): 19-22.
2. and Paul L. High, Jr. "Intelligence Communications in the Age of Information Warfare." American Intelligence Journal 15, no. 2 (Autumn-Winter 1994): 52-57.
The focus here is on the work of the Intelligence and Communications Architecture (INCA) Project Office, where Banford served as Director from the mid-1980s until January 1995.
Bowen, D.G., and Banjamin V. Cox. "Tactical Communication to Support Intelligence." Signal 42 (Jun. 1988): 185-188 ff. [Petersen]
Brewin, Bob. "Satellite Development Delays Cost DOD $1B." Federal Computer Week, 26 Jan. 2007. [http://www.fcw.com]
"The Defense Department will launch a new generation of communications satellites to serve mobile users in 2009, even though it has no funds for satellite receivers.... DOD is spending $1 billion a year on commercial broadband satellite service because of schedule delays in developing advanced military broadband satellite systems. Air Force Maj. Gen. William Lord said he is considering the use of high-tech balloons and unmanned aerial vehicles as communications relays to help bridge the satellite gap. Lord and other top DOD officials spoke at the 2007 SpaceComm Conference, sponsored by the Rocky Mountain chapter of AFCEA International."
Cowan, William V. "Melting the Snowman: Communications and the Counternarcotic Threat." Signal 44, no. 4 (1989): 27-32. [Petersen]
Gertz, Bill, and Rowan Scarborough. "Inside the Ring: Spy News." Washington Times, 27 Aug. 1999.
According to a report to Congress by DCI George Tenet, "[t]he Pentagon has upgraded its Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System hardware and video teleconferencing capabilities." The DIA "also upgraded its HUMINT Operational Control Network that is part of [its] Defense Attache Worldwide Network, or DAWN, used to help military spies share information."
Hansen, James H. "RX: Intelligence Communications -- Use Acronyms, Allegories, and Metaphors Only as Directed." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 2, no. 1 (Spring 1988): 21-26.
Loeb, Vernon. "Preparing for 'Network-Centric' Warfare." Washington Post, 27 Aug. 2001, A13. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]
After less than a month on the job, John P. Stenbit, assistant secretary of defense for command, control, communications and intelligence, has said "that his top priority will be using data networks to bridge the divide between 'sensors' and 'shooters.' ... Stenbit ... called it 'network-centric' warfare."
Meyer, John J., III. "Joint Task Force Communications for Command, Control, and Intelligence." American Intelligence Journal 14, nos. 2 & 3 (Spring-Summer 1993): 73-76.
Myers, Russell E. "Challenges to the Defense Intelligence Information System Professional." American Intelligence Journal 15, no. 2 (Autumn-Winter 1994): 42-51.
Rip, Michael Russell, and David P. Lusch.
1. "The Precision Revolution: The Navstar Global Positioning System in the Second Gulf War." Intelligence and National Security 9, no. 2 (Apr. 1994): 167-241.
"[T]he Navstar Global Positioning System (GPS) [footnote omitted] and thermal night vision devices ... enabled Coalition forces to exploit the desert terrain with 24-hour-a-day freedom of maneuverability in all weather conditions, regardless of the lack of distinctive features and good roads." The article includes technical details of the system (pp. 179-194), and looks at use in aerial operations (fixed-wing and helicopter) (pp. 195- 201), air-breathing missiles (cruise and air-to-surface) (pp. 201-206), ground forces (pp. 206-216), and maritime operations (p. 216), as well as future military and civilian uses.
2. "The Navstar Global Positioning System in Operation Desert Storm." Intelligence and National Security 10, no. 2 (Apr. 1995): 327-335.
This is a follow-up article, drawing on additional information. The authors conclude: "In the future, with the rapid reliance on GPS-guided precision weaponry, the efficacy of the US military's precision strike capability could well be dependent on the integrity of the 24-satellite Navstar Global Positioning System."
Schanzer, Steven T. "INTELINK: An Information Strategy." American Intelligence Journal 15, no. 2 (Autumn-Winter 1994): 37-41.
The effort to develop an information strategy began with the creation of the Intelligence Systems Board (ISB), which spanned both DoD and non-DoD organizations and was responsible for resolving interoperability issues within the intelligence community. The Board is supported by a "full-time action arm": the Intelligence Systems Secretariat (ISS). The ISS has established an Information Management Policy Working Group (IMPWG) comprised of senior technical representatives from intelligence organizations. The testbed architectural framework developed was INTELINK, designed to be "a worldwide intelligence information service." Early tests were successful, and follow-on issues are being addressed.
Scheips, Paul J., ed. Military Signal Communications. 2 vols. New York: Arno Press, 1980. [Petersen]
Stein, Larry [CDR/USN]. "GBS IP Receiver Decoder: What's All the Buzz About?" Naval Intelligence Professionals Quarterly 21, no. 2 (Jun. 2005): 13-14.
The author discusses "some lessons learned during USS HARRY S. TRUMAN's 2004-2005 combat deployment in support of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM while employing the Joint Service Imagery Processing System-Navy (JSIPS-N) Concentrator Architecture (JCA), Buzzlite, and multiple communications paths."
Tidwell, William A. "Notes on the CRITIC System." Studies in Intelligence 4, no. 2 (Spring 1960): 19-23.
NSCID No. 7 designated the Defense Department "as executive agent for creating and managing a world-wide communications system for the transmission of critical intelligence." The special CRITIC reporting system was set up in 1958. "The progress achieved by the CRITIC system has ... been excellent, but a number of problems remain to be overcome before it can reach full efficiency."
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