Defense Intelligence Journal. "Counterintelligence." 4, no. 1 (Spring 1995): Entire issue.
1. Richard L. Haver, "The Ames Case: Catalyst for a National Counterintelligence Strategy," pp. 11-18.
There are "fundamental legal, organizational and managerial weaknesses" plaguing U.S. counterintelligence. These are "the lack of national authority and prestige, an outmoded organizational structure and lack of a unifying strategic concept to help manage and institutionalize inter-agency CI cooperation.... [S]ince Aldrich Ames' arrest, the Executive Branch ... has restructured and resubordinated the inter-agency staff responsible for managing US CI agencies." The National Counterintelligence Center (NACIC), created by Executive Order on 3 May 1994, "coordinates national-level CI activities." NACIC reports to the National Security Council (NSC) through the National Counterintelligence Policy Board (NACIPB), not to the DCI. This and other changes "are steps in the right direction"; but more needs to be done.
2. Kenneth A. Krantz, "Counterintelligence Support to Joint Operations," pp. 19- 27.
Krantz gives a quick overview of CI in the DoD and the services. He makes clear that the "four Services each treat CI differently" -- even to the extent of having different funding bases. "Too often in their 'stovepipe' world, CI organizations do not have to integrate their efforts with other Services, or within the joint structure." The author argues for greater "jointness" among the CI organizations.
3. David G. Major, "Operation 'Famish': The Integration of Counterintelligence into the National Strategic Decisionmaking Process," pp. 29-55.
Operation "Famish" was the FBI codename for a series of national security policy decisions implemented March-November 1986. Eighty KGB and GRU officers were ordered to leave the United States. Major's article examines "the interagency structure and process" through which the Operation "Famish" decisions were made.
4. M.E. Bowman, "Prosecuting Spies: An Uneasy Alliance of Security, Ethics, and Law," pp. 57-81.
"Historically, espionage prosecution was resisted due to the potential for public disclosure of national security information." In fact, "prosecution involving classified information is one of the most difficult undertakings of our legal system." The author identifies six basic issues which underlie the problems of espionage prosecution: the charges, discovery, the evidence, using classified information (the author discusses the Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA)), defenses (diplomatic status, the national security standard, reliance on apparent authority, extra-territorial acts, promises), and sentencing. An earlier version of this article, "Prosecuting Spies: An Uneasy Alliance of Security, Ethics and Law," appears in American Intelligence Journal 11, no. 2 (1990): 29-39.
5. Dan Carter, "Marine Corps Counterintelligence in Somalia and Beyond," pp. 83-89.
In the Marine Corps, "all CI training and activities are oriented totally toward the tactical environment.... Additionally, Marine Corps CI has a distinctive tactical human intelligence (HUMINT) mission.... Marine Corps CI conducts ... HUMINT collection operations ... [to] assist the tactical intelligence collection effort in determining the enemy's order of battle ... and intentions.... Marine Corps CI is now expanding and defining its role in deception operations, information warfare, psychological operations and operational security."
6. Stephen D. Kelly, "Neglect and Trendiness," pp. 91-97.
The "weakness that predisposes the Intelligence Community to suffer from Ames-type episodes is a basic Community-wide neglect of CI and a culture of 'functional trendiness' that causes intelligence functions or disciplines to fall in or out of favor based on the current fashion or emphasis of the moment."
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