D - J

Debatto, Dave. Our Generals Don't Even Know Who We Are: How Incompetence, Inattention, and Inefficiency Within U.S. Military Intelligence Has Left America More Vulnerable Than Ever. Nashville, TN: WND/Cumberland Books, 2006.

From publisher: The author, "a former U.S. Army counterintelligence special agent and army instructor who served in Iraq in 2003 during Operation Iraqi Freedom," argues that "the current U.S. Army CI force is impotent, demoralized, ineffective, and in poor shape to confront the current growing terrorist threat to the nation." In addition, "the generals have no training or understanding of the abilities of the CI personnel under their command, and they simply refuse to learn." Debatto "offers concrete, easy-to-implement solutions for getting this critical component of the U.S. military branch back on track."

Decker, Michael, and Christopher B. Batts [CAPT/USMC]. "Marine Corps Counterintelligence Support to the Warfighter: Past, Present, and Future." American Intelligence Journal 20, nos. 1 & 2 (Winter 2000-2001): 21-26.

"[E]ven with advances in technolgy, the core competencies of Marine Corps CI will continue to be intelligence collection focused on espionage, sabotage, subversion and terrorism."

Defense Intelligence Journal. "Counterintelligence." 4, no. 1 (Spring 1995): Entire issue.

Click for Table of Contents.

Gertz, Bill. "Intelligence Intransigence." Washington Times, 5 Feb. 2006. []

Military "intelligence-gathering and counterintelligence have been frustrated by legal restrictions and conflicting missions.... [T]he Pentagon's Counterintelligence Field Activity [CIFA] ... still lacks the authority to take a direct role in the activities of the military counterintelligence units."

Gilbert, James L., John P. Finnegan, and Ann Bray. In the Shadow of the Sphinx: A History of Counterintelligence. Fort Belvoir: Department of the Army, 2005.

Sulick, Studies 50.4 (2006), concludes that Gilbert's "stories of the prowess and courage of individual agents and his frank assessment of Army counterintelligence flaws, its problematic role in the domestic subversion arena, and difficult evolution into an accepted part of the Army mission all make In the Shadow of the Sphinx a compelling story for historians, intelligence and counterintelligence professionals, and general readers who simply like good spy yarns."

Herrington, Stuart A. [COL/USA (Ret.)] "Reviving DoD Strategic Counterintelligence: An Appeal to the 'NCIX.'" American Intelligence Journal 20, nos. 1 & 2 (Winter 2000-2001): 35-40.

The author expresses concerns about an overemphasis on "tactically-oriented CI activities to support deployed joint task forces." He offers the Army's Foreign Counterintelligence Activity (FCA) as a potential model for the National Counterintelligence Executive (NCIX).

Herrington, Stuart A. Traitors among Us: Inside the Spy Catcher's World. Novato, CA: Presidio, 1999.

According to Sullivan, NWCR, Summer 2000, the major focus of this book is the "extremely sensitive counterintelligence operations worldwide" of the Army's elite Foreign Counterintelligence Activity (FCA), based at Fort Meade, Maryland. This "is a fast-paced story of 'teamwork and cooperation between counterintelligence agents of the United States Army, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation,' who 'collaborated closely with German, Swedish, Austrian, and Italian security officials.'"

Hess, Pamela. "DIA's New Mission Adds to Intel Arsenal." Associated Press, 5 Aug. 2008. []

With the establishment of the Defense Counterintelligence and Human Intelligence Center (DCHC), the "DIA joins just three other military organizations authorized to carry out offensive counterintelligence operations -- the Army Counterintelligence office, the Navy Criminal Investigative Service and the Air Force Office of Special Investigations."

Hoffman, Daniel M. [LT/USNR] "Naval Counterintelligence in the 90s: A Whole New Way of Doing Things." Naval Intelligence Professionals Quarterly 11, no. 1 (Winter 1995): 5-7.

Jajko, Walter. "The State of Defense Counterintelligence: An Opinion." Intelligencer 14, no. 1 (Winter-Spring 2004): 7-9.

Defense CI is "antiquated" and "not up to its mission." There is a need for "an effective, integrated, centralized, single Department of Defense Counterintelligence Service." Roy Reed and Anthony McIvor, "'The State of Defense Counterintelligence': A Reply," Intelligencer 14, no. 2 (Winter-Spring 2005): 7-11, respond to Jajko's (and others) criticisms with the argument that (1) "significant ameliorative measures are well underway"; and (2) Defense CI is "on the threshold.of attaining a substantial capability to contribute to national security as a strategic asset."

Jonkers, Roy K. [COL/USAF (Ret.)] "Presidential Decision Directive CI 21 Counterintelligence." American Intelligence Journal 20, nos. 1 & 2 (Winter 2000-2001): 41-42.

Provides the substance of the Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) entitled "U.S. Counterintelligence Effectiveness for the 21st Century," released by the White House on 5 January 2001.

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