MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

Army

Post-Cold War

2010s

Harrison, Edd [MAJ/USA]. "Enabling MI Analysts to Succeed in COIN Operations." Military Intelligence 37, no. 3 (Jul.-Sep. 2011): 43-45.

"The MI Corps needs to enable its analysts to produce quality assessments in COIN [counterinsurgency] operations by updating doctrine with the introduction of a COIN intelligence summary (INTSUM), create a cadre of Master Analysts to oversee the analytical process at the BCT [brigade combat team] and division level, and to increase the collaboration of BCT and division analysts with the Intelligence Community (IC) at large."

Paddock, Alfred H., Jr. "Legitimizing Army Psychological Operations." Joint Forces Quarterly 56 (1st Quarter 2010): 89-93.

The author looks at the development in the U.S. Army of propaganda/psychological warfare (PSYWAR)/psychological operations (PSYOPS) from World War I to the present. He argues strongly that the term propaganda is a neutral one and should continue to be used, as should the historically well-established PSYWAR and PSYOPS, rather than "a steady stream of euphemisms..., usually with the word information attached." (Italics in original) He believes that "aggressive institutionalizing ... can and should be done by all PSTOP individuals ... to prevent a loss of identity for their craft."

Smith, Niel. "Educating the Army in Its Own COIN." U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 136, no. 2 (Feb. 2010): 42-46.

"[C]ounterinsurgency, or COIN, remains a tense subject for the U.S. Army, and it has not embraced the topic in its educational institutions.... Despite sporadic and halting efforts to incorporate the subject as a core competency, such instruction remains uneven in both quality and quantity throughout the Army, to the detriment of operational performance."

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