Air Force Print News. "OSI, FBI Establish Joint Office." 22 Jun. 2001. [http://www.af. mil/news]
The Air Force Office of Special Investigations and the FBI have "formally activated a joint operations group outside of Atlanta. The group consists of a resident OSI agent, an FBI supervisory agent and four FBI field agents. They are collocated in the AFOSI Region 3, Operation Location B, satellite office at Dobbins Air Reserve Base in Marietta, Ga."
Arnold, William R. [COL/USAF (Ret.)] "The AFOSI Counterintelligence Mission: Past, Present, and the Future." American Intelligence Journal 20, nos. 1 & 2 (Winter 2000-2001): 7-19.
The Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI) was formed on 1 August 1948. It provides "a full suite of investigative (criminal and fraud) and counterintelligence (CI) support to the Air Force." The author "examines the origins and history [of AFOSI] while focusimg on its CI mission.... The emphasis is on major post-WWII conflicts and [AFOSI's] CI structure today and in the future."
Beebe, Kenneth. "The Air Force's Missing Doctrine: How the U.S. Air Force Ignores Counterinsurgency." Air & Space Power Journal 20 (Spring 2006): 27-34.
Brown, Jason M. [MAJ/USAF] "To Bomb or Not to Bomb? Counterinsurgency, Airpower, and Dynamic Targeting." Air & Space Power Journal 21, no. 4 (Winter 2007): 75-85.
Abstract: "Air strikes, independent from ground operations, are known as 'dynamic targeting.'" Such "strikes have typically been counterproductive in counterinsurgency campaigns" due to real or perceived collateral damage. However, Brown "asserts that commanders and planners who integrate dynamic targeting into the counterinsurgency campaign using careful target selection; quick, precise employment; and solid assessment of the enemy and population will produce positive, tangible results."
Champness, Michael. "The Role of the US Air Force in Fighting Terrorism at Home." Aerospace Power Journal 16 (Spring 2002): 101-105.
Corum, James S. [LTCOL/USAR (Ret.)] "On Airpower, Land Power, and Counterinsurgency: Getting Doctrine Right." Joint Force Quarterly 49 (2nd Quarter 2008): 93-97.
FM 324 keeps "the discussion of the various aspects of military operations in counterinsurgency ... to basic theory and guidelines. The doctrine was addressed to the strategic planner and operator and was not intended as a guide to the employment of specific technologies and tactics.... What the doctrine does stress is the need to understand the context of counterinsurgency and how airpower fits into that context."
Deptula, David A. [LTGEN/USAF], and R. Greg Brown [MAJ/USAF]. "The Indivisibility of Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance." Air & Space Power Journal 22, no. 2 (Summer 2008). [http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil]
"Airmen must realize, accept, and act on the principle that ISR [Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance] is indivisible. Such indivisibility rests on four tenets: first, ISR is operations; second, ISR denotes synchronization and integration; third, ISR is domain neutral; and fourth, ISR is about capabilities and effects, not personnel, platforms, and culture."
Downs, Michael L. [LTCOL/USAF] "Rethinking the Combined Force Air Component: Commander's Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Approach to Counterinsurgency." Air & Space Power Journal 22, no. 3 (Fall 2008). [http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj08/fal08/downs.html]
From abstract: In Iraq and Afghanistan, the "air component finds itself ill equipped to handle" the "unique and complex intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) requirements" of counterinsurgency operations "since it still adheres to a doctrine of major theater war. The author provides historical context, offers an alternative approach to managing ISR, and recommends changes to doctrine."
Steven Maceda [MAJ/USAF], "Control of Theater Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance for the Ground Commander," Air & Space Power Journal 22, no. 4 (Winter 2008), disagrees with Downs' "proposal to use the close air support request process for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)." This process "still does not allow the flexibility in execution required by the ground commander.... The combined air operations center (CAOC) must allow decentralized execution of ISR assets -- particularly full-motion-video platforms -- by delegating tactical control of platforms apportioned to Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) during execution."
Dunlap, Charles J., Jr. [MGEN/USAF]
1. "Air-Minded Considerations for Joint Counterinsurgency Doctrine." Air & Space Power Journal 21, no. 4 (Winter 2007): 63-74.
Abstract: "[P]ublication of Army Field Manual 3-24/Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-33.5, Counterinsurgency, reflects a distinctly 'surface-minded' perspective. Since airpower possesses unique capabilities, such as speed, range, flexibility, and persistence, [Dunlap] proposes exploiting these 'air-minded' viewpoints to enlarge and enhance what is currently a service-centric doctrine. [He] suggests that doing so would produce a much-improved and well-rounded joint approach."
2. "Developing Joint Counterinsurgency Doctrine: An Airman's Perspective." Joint Force Quarterly 49 (2nd Quarter 2008): 86-92.
The Army's new Field Manual (FM) 324 (Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 333.5), Counterinsurgency, "superbly articulate[s] a thoughtful landpower [emphasis in original] perspective on the complicated challenge of counterinsurgency (COIN). It does not purport to be, however, a full-dimensional joint approach.... [T]he various groundcentric COIN strategies attempted in Iraq over the years may have proven costly and time-consuming. Exploiting the full capabilities of the whole joint team would seem the wiser course given the complexities of COIN."
3. "Making Revolutionary Change: Airpower in COIN Today." Parameters 38, no. 2 (Summer 2008): 52-66.
The author describes the revised Army and Marine Corps counterinsurgency (COIN) manual -- Field Manual (FM) 3-24.2 -- as "airpower 'lite.'" The manual's "examination of airpower is confined to a brief, five-page annex that essentially conceives airpower as aerial artillery.... In perhaps no other area has the manual been proven more wrong by the events of 2007. As this article will outline, the profound changes in airpower's capabilities have so increased its utility that it is now often the weapon of first recourse in COIN operations, even in urban environments."
Fulghum, David A.
1. "Intel Aircraft Program Changes." Aviation Week & Space Technology, 17 Jun. 2002, 27-28.
"In a surprise move, the Air Force is mapping out a fundamental change in the development and acquisition of its next-generation, Boeing 767-based, intelligence-gathering aircraft by shifting key components into a separate competition.... [P]lanners have decided to launch a separate program for development of the aft section of the multisensor command and control aircraft (MC2A) that is being designed to hold battle management, communications and intelligence-gathering equipment and the staff to operate it."
2. "Shooting Images." Aviation Week & Space Technology, 23 May 2005, 53-54.
U.S. Air Force F-15Es in the Gulf region are flying non-traditional intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) missions. The aircraft's sensors are being used to track insurgent gunmen and messengers or those who plant bombs and plan ambushes.
3. "USAF Chief Signals Key Funding Priorities." Aviation Week & Space Technology, 3 Jul. 2000, 56-58.
U.S. Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Mike Ryan says that "high on the [service's] immediate list of priorities is to get Congress to restore funding for the Discoverer II satellite, a radar-carrying constellation of spacecraft that can track moving targets on the ground."
George, Scott [COL/USAF], and Robert Ehlers [LTCOL/USAF]. "Air-Intelligence Operations and Training: The Decisive Edge for Effective Airpower Employment." Air & Space Power Journal 22, no. 2 (Summer 2008). [http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil] American Intelligence Journal 26, no. 1 (Summer 2008): 18-23.
"For the first time since 1945, the Air Force is ... moving rapidly in the direction of a vigorous intelligence program, establishing new organizations such as the ISR Agency with specific mission sets as well as making each intelligence organization within the Air Staff and other commands responsible for specific programmatic, operational, and training responsibilities. Most importantly, Air Force senior leaders [have] recognized the rapidly increasing importance of intelligence by creating an entirely new deputy chief of staff position, the USAF/A2, with authority to make the changes required to bring intelligence into the twenty-first century."
Goodman, Glenn W., Jr. "Low Density/High Demand: USAF's Limited Numbers of ISR Aircraft Remain Overstretched." Armed Forces Journal International 139 (Oct. 2001): 20-21.
Grier, Peter. "A Quarter Century of AWACS." Air Force Magazine, Mar. 2002, 42-47.
This is a compact look backward and forward on the use of AWACS.
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