Materials arranged chronologically.

Lichtblau, Eric, and Mark Mazzetti. "Military Is Expanding Its Intelligence Role in U.S.." New York Times, 14 Jan. 2007. []

The Defense Department has been issuing national security letters "to obtain banking and credit records of hundreds of Americans and others suspected of terrorism or espionage inside the United States, part of an aggressive expansion by the military into domestic intelligence gathering." The CIA also uses "national security letters to gain access to financial records from American companies, though it has done so only rarely, intelligence officials say.... Some national security experts and civil liberties advocates are troubled by the C.I.A. and military taking on domestic intelligence activities, particularly in light of recent disclosures that the [Pentagon's] Counterintelligence Field Activity office had maintained files on Iraq war protesters in the United States in violation of the military’s own guidelines."

Waterman, Shaun. "Analysis: Clapper's record at DIA." United Press International, 15 Jan. 2007. []

The man expected to be named as the next undersecretary of defense for intelligence, retired U.S. Air Force Gen. James Clapper, "instituted a controversial and ultimately failed reorganization" at DIA in the 1990's. More recently, Clapper left his post as head of the NGA in June 2006, "several months earlier than he had wanted, after clashing with [Defense Secretary Donald] Rumsfeld over his support for the idea" that the DNI "should have authority over the five major U.S. intelligence agencies inside the Department of Defense....

"Retired Army Col. Pat Lang, who was a senior official at the agency at the time, and left after clashing with Clapper over the reorganization, called it 'disastrous ... extremely destructive.'" Lang added that "Clapper 'had no interest whatsoever in the (agency's) national-level role in developing strategic intelligence for policy-makers.'" Instead, he "organized analysts 'strictly to support the military-technical side of things,' like assessing the capabilities of weapons systems."

Pincus, Walter, and R. Jeffrey Smith. "Official's Key Report on Iraq Is Faulted: 'Dubious' Intelligence Fueled Push for War." Washington Post, 9 Feb. 2007, A1. []

According to a report by the Pentagon's inspector general, the "[i]ntelligence provided by former undersecretary of defense Douglas J. Feith to buttress the White House case for invading Iraq included 'reporting of dubious quality or reliability' that supported the political views of senior administration officials rather than the conclusions of the intelligence community."

Bowden, Mark. "Pentagon Spy Effort Serves a Purpose." Philadelphia Inquirer, 18 Mar. 2007. []

"Impatient with the inability of the [CIA] to give him what he needed," former defense secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld "decided to do it himself. He began placing small units of special operators all over the world, dubbed 'military liaison elements' (MLEs), some in the field, some in U.S. embassies." This has meant some overlap and tension with the CIA. Nonetheless, "[m]ilitary spies have different functions from their CIA counterparts. In the war on terrorism, they are needed."

Levin, Carl. "Press Release: Levin Releases Newly Declassified Pentagon Inspector General Report on Intelligence Assessment Activities of the Office of Under Secretary of Defense Doug Feith." 5 Apr. 2007. []

In releasing the report, Sen. Carl Levin (D-MI), Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, said: "It is important for the public to see why the Pentagon's Inspector General [IG] concluded that [Under] Secretary [of Defense for Policy Douglas J.] Feith's office 'developed, produced and then disseminated alternative intelligence assessments on the Iraq and al-Qaeda relationship,' which included 'conclusions that were inconsistent with the consensus of the Intelligence Community,' and why the Inspector General concluded that these actions were 'inappropriate.'"

The declassified report by the Pentagon Inspector General, dated 9 February 2007, is available at: http://www.fas/org/irp/agency/dod/ig020907-decl.pdf. A rebuttal from Feith's Office, dated 16 January 2007, to a draft version of the IG report, is available at: The arguments in the latter amount to a lengthy "we didn't do anything wrong."

Pincus, Walter. "Pentagon to End Talon Data-Gathering Program." Washington Post, 26 Apr. 2007, A10. []

Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence James R. Clapper, Jr. "is moving to end the controversial Talon electronic data program. The program "collected and circulated unverified reports about people and organizations that allegedly threaten" DoD facilities." Talon -- Threat and Local Observation Notices -- began in 2003 and has been "operated under the direction of the Counterintelligence Field Activity" (CIFA).

Friman, Henrik. "Innovation, Change and Experimentation: A New Model for Addressing Organizational Challenges in Military Intelligence." American Intelligence Journal 25, no. 1 (Summer 2007): 29-37.

"An earlier version of this article appeared in Stefan Axberg and Jan Foghelin, eds., Perspectives on Military Technology (Stockholm: Swedish Royal Academy of War Science, 2006)."

Waterman, Shaun. "Analysis: New Defense Intelligence Policy." United Press International, 28 Sep. 2007. []

"A new Pentagon policy directive for U.S. military intelligence mandates information-sharing with U.S. domestic agencies and foreign partners and recognizes the leading role" of the DNI. Deborah Barger, head of policy in the office of the undersecretary of defense for intelligence, retired Gen. James Clapper, said that "'[r]esponsibility to provide' was the new principle replacing need-to-know."

Alpert, Sheri. "Total Information Awareness -- Forgotten But Not Gone: Lessons for Neuroethics." American Journal of Bioethics 7, no. 5 (2007): 24-26.

DARPA's Total Information Awareness (TIA) did not really disappear when Congress cancelled its funding. "[M]any of the projects that comprised TIA were moved" to such agencies as NSA's Advanced Research and Development Activity. "In other words, the programs not only survived the attempt to eliminate them by Congress, but worse, they were transferred to the 'black' (classified) budget, where they continue beyond public scrutiny." This precedent is a cause for concern.

Valentine, James A. [LCDR/USCG] "Transparency: The Seventh Principle of MOOTW." Defense Intelligence Journal 16, no. 2 (2007): 75-86.

Secrecy is getting harder to maintain. In Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW), "[t]he most effective way to deal with environmental transparency is not through tighter information and perception control, but through a superior model of open information and perception management," that is, through a new principle of intentional transparency.

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