March - December

Materials arranged chronologically.

Freedberg, Sydney J., Jr. "Men and Machines." National Journal 37, no. 12 (19 Mar. 2005): 834-839.

"America has been the master of high-tech intelligence collection. But it is human intelligence -- 'humint,' the age-old art of one human being getting another to talk -- that is most needed against low-tech adversaries.... And human intelligence has been America's great weakness.... The Pentagon is taking steps to redress its decades-long neglect of human intelligence."

Pincus, Walter. "Pentagon to Upgrade Intelligence Structure: Officials Want Analysts on Front Lines." Washington Post, 24 Mar. 2005, A17 [].

DoD "is seeking to remodel and upgrade its intelligence structure and operations, based on experience in Afghanistan and Iraq and current and expected systems for collecting technical and human intelligence... Among the first steps the Pentagon is planning is upgrading intelligence from being a staff function at headquarters to having analysts and human intelligence collectors on the front lines, particularly in the war on terrorism."

Marchio, James D. "Support to Military Operations: The Evolution and Relevance of Joint Intelligence Centers." Studies in Intelligence 49, no. 1 (2005): 41-54. "[Part I] The Evolution and Relevance of Joint Intelligence Support to Military Operations." Naval Intelligence Professionals Quarterly 22, no. 3 (Jun. 2006): 33-34. "[Part II] Naval Intelligence Professionals Quarterly 22, no. 4 (Sep. 2006): 36-38.

The idea of joint intelligence centers (JICs) "did not fully take root until the Gulf War. The historical record demonstrates that the birth, death, and resurrection of the concept of joint intelligence centers were tied to the changing fortunes of the larger interservice and interagency community, the evolving nature of armed conflict during the last 60 years, and the cyclical political and budgetary environment in which post–World War II US military forces have developed and operated. These same factors augur well for the longevity of JICs as they enter their second decade of continuous service."

Pincus, Walter. "CIA, Pentagon Seek to Avoid Overlap." Washington Post, 4 Jul. 2005, A2. []

DDNI Gen. Michael V. Hayden "told reporters last week that a classified [CIA-Pentagon] memo of understanding ... has been drafted and is awaiting the signatures" of CIA Director Goss and Defense Secretary Rumsfeld. According to senior officials at both agencies, the agreement seeks "to prevent conflicts and overlap in spying, technical collection and analysis between their two organizations."

Graham, Bradley. "Military Expands Homeland Efforts: Pentagon to Share Data with Civilian Agencies." Washington Post, 6 Jul. 2005, A1. []

"A new Pentagon strategy for securing the U.S. homeland calls for expanded U.S. military activity not only in the air and sea ... but also on the ground and in other less traditional, potentially more problematic areas such as intelligence sharing with civilian law enforcement.... In the area of intelligence, the strategy speaks of developing 'a cadre' of Pentagon terrorism specialists and of deploying 'a number of them' to 'interagency centers' for homeland defense and counterterrorism."

Myers, Lisa, Douglas Pasternak, and Rich Gardella. "Is the Pentagon Spying on Americans? Secret Database Obtained by NBC News Tracks 'Suspicious' Domestic Groups.", 14 Dec. 2005. []

"A secret 400-page Defense Department document ... lists ... more than 1,500 'suspicious incidents' across the country over a recent 10-month period." The document shows "how the U.S. military has stepped up intelligence collection inside this country since 9/11, which now includes the monitoring of peaceful anti-war and counter-military recruitment groups." Even incidents that "were discounted because they had no connection to the Department of Defense ... remained in the database.... The database obtained by NBC News is generated by Counterintelligence Field Activity" (CIFA).

Cloud, David S. "Pentagon Is Said to Mishandle a Counterterrorism Database." New York Times, 16 Dec. 2005. []

Pentagon officials said on 15 December 2005 that "analysts appear not to have followed guidelines that require deleting information on American citizens and groups from a counterterrorism database within three months if they pose no security threats." Therefore, "dozens of alerts on antiwar meetings and peaceful protests appear to have remained in the database." The Defense Department database is "known as the Threat and Local Observation Notice reporting system, or Talon."

Pincus, Walter. "Pentagon's Intelligence Authority Widens: Fact Sheet Details Secretive Agency's Growth From Focus on Policy to Counterterrorism." Washington Post, 19 Dec. 2005, A10. []

According to a fact sheet obtained by the Washington Post, the Counterintelligence Field Activity (CIFA), "charged with protecting military facilities and personnel wherever they are, is carrying out intelligence collection, analysis and operations within the United States and abroad.... CIFA's authority is still growing." Earlier this month, DoD "gave CIFA authority to task domestic investigations and operations by the counterintelligence units of the military services."

Posner, Richard A. "Our Domestic Intelligence Crisis." Washington Post, 21 Dec. 2005, A31. []

In this OpEd piece Judge Posner, U.S. Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit, comments that the domestic surveillance activities of Defense Department components, such as, NSA and the Counterintelligence Field Activity "are criticized as grave threats to civil liberties. They are not. Their significance is in flagging the existence of gaps in our defenses against terrorism. The Defense Department is rushing to fill those gaps, though there may be better ways....

"The Pentagon's rush to fill gaps in domestic intelligence reflects the disarray in this vital yet neglected area of national security. The principal domestic intelligence agency is the FBI, but it is primarily a criminal investigation agency that has been struggling, so far with limited success, to transform itself." The United States has" no official with sole and comprehensive responsibility for domestic intelligence. It is no surprise that gaps in domestic intelligence are being filled by ad hoc initiatives."

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