Baker, Stewart. "Should Spies Be Cops?" Foreign Policy 97 (Winter 1994-1995): 36-52.
ProQuest: The BNL affair "centered on charges that the Justice Department and the CIA covered up the Bush administration's channeling of prewar military assistance to Iraq. Whether the CIA should expand its traditional beat to become cops is discussed."
Baumann, Andrea Barbara. "Silver Bullet or Time Suck? Revisiting the Role of Interagency Coordination in Complex Operations." PRISM 3, no. 3 (Jun. 2012): 33-46. [http://www.ndu.edu/press]
"The drawdown of American military presence in Iraq and Afghanistan has led to a reduction in the immediate demand for operational civilian-military coordination within the U.S. Government.... The resulting challenge is to design a flexible institutional framework that allows agencies to cooperate effectively if and where needed, while at the same time allowing them to prioritize scarce resources in accordance with distinctly different core mandates and working methods." (Italics in original)
Hulnick, Arthur S. "Intelligence and Law Enforcement: The 'Spies Are Not Cops' Problem." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 10, no. 3 (Fall 1997): 269-286.
The author looks at some of the problems inherent in the relationship between intelligence and law-enforcement agencies, and specifically between the CIA and FBI. He notes a growing degree of cooperation between the two in counterintelligence and other areas since the Ames case, but clearly sees that differences remain and are likely to continue to do so. He believes there is a need for a "permanent body to adjudicate issues of tasking, warrants, and the like."
Kitfield, James. "Covert Counterattack." National Journal, 16 Sep. 2000, 2858-2865.
"[S]enior officials of the CIA, FBI, Defense Department, and National Security Council have worked quietly for more than a year to draft a plan [called "Counter-Intelligence 21" or CI-21] to broaden cross-agency cooperation to encompass virtually the government's entire national security apparatus."
Perlez, Jane. "F.B.I. Chief Cites C.I.A. Help in African Bombing Inquiry." New York Times, 15 Sep. 1998, A5 (N).
In a visit to an FBI-financed international training center in Budapest, Hungary, on 14 September 1998, FBI Director Louis J. Freeh said that "much of the progress made in the investigation of the bombings of two American embassies in East Africa had been a result of close cooperation between two usually rival agencies" -- the FBI and the CIA.
Riebling, Mark. Wedge: The Secret War Between the FBI and the CIA. New York: Knopf, 1994. Wedge: From Pearl Harbor to 9/11: How the Secret War Between the FBI and the CIA Has Endangered National Security. New York: Simon & Schuster/Touchstone, 2002. [pb]
Richard Gid Powers, WPNWE, 7-13 Nov. 1994, calls Wedge a "lively and engaging narrative of interagency bungling, infighting, [etc.] in every known intelligence case." Unfortunately, Riebling has turned his material into "a series of '[f]or the loss of a nail the war was lost' stories." For example, he picks up the old and dismissed tale of Popov's Pearl Harbor questionnaire. "Just as misguided and illogical is his thesis that the Kennedy assassination could have been prevented if the CIA had only passed on to the FBI the news that an official at the Soviet embassy in Mexico City who talked to Oswald shortly before the assassination was a KGB agent attached to Soviet death squads.... This points to Riebling's ... unfamiliarity with authorities like Gordon Prange or Gerald Posner, who have laid to rest so much of this tedious conspiracy-theorizing.... The real story in these superficially exciting revelations of official secrets is that there is no story -- the squabbles between ... Hoover and ... Donovan's many successors do not explain the history of our time."
Surveillant 3.6 says that some of its "reviewers did not find [the author's] research and fact-checking sufficiently rigorous.... 'He does not evaluate ... his sources.... He also repeats errors which have been long since discussed in public print and corrected.... [He has] produced another book on a subject of which he knows very little, and understands less.... For example, he states that the U.S. has the only intelligence and security service in the world which divides counterintelligence into domestic responsibility ... and foreign responsibility.... The author could not be further from the truth.... [E]rrors of fact ... also lead to errors of interpretation.'"
For McGehee, CIABASE, January 1995 Update Report, this book is "so rife with unsupported data and conclusions - it loses all credibility." Periscope 20.2 notes that Sam Papich "disagrees with the author's specific conclusions concerning both the Popov case and the JFK/Oswald case as well as his concluding views." Nonetheless, Papich believes he was treated fairly and the book is worth reading. James E. Nolen comments that after 1972 "the liaison role diminished in importance precisely because a broad exchange at all levels in the field and at Headquarters was developing." W. Raymond Wannell notes that it is "unfortunate the author did not pursue his research to the point of eliminating rumor, speculation and biased sources.... Riebling missed the boat."
Beschloss, NYTBR, 6 Nov. 1994, comments that this "thoroughly researched narrative ... is constructed as a series of tales, peopled by picaresque figures from Ian Fleming to Oliver North." According to Riebling, "the Nixon White House quietly encouraged the two agencies to encroach on each other's territory." The author "succeeds ... in persuading the reader that the F.B.I.-C.I.A. conflict was a more important piece of the cold war mosaic than heretofore noted by historians."
According to Robbins, CIRA Newsletter 20.2, "readers of the innumerable exposes of infighting within the American intelligence community" will find "little in Wedge that is actually new. First-time author Riebling, however, does profit from his experience as a Random House editor to bring an exceptionally readable and coherent account ... into one exhaustively sourced work." NameBase finds Riebling's writing to be "articulate and reflective.... In some sections of this book, Riebling appears to have relied heavily on the assistance he received from Edward Jay Epstein.... Fortunately, Riebling explains the Angleton view so competently that it finally makes sense on its own terms."
Loeb, Washington Post, 21 Oct. 2002, notes that the 2002 paperback edition of this work includes "an epilogue which Riebling uses to update his thesis and outline a string of missteps he believes kept the FBI and CIA from preventing al Qaeda's suicide hijackings." If Riebling's thesis "was provocative at the time, it seems prescient now.... Riebling traces the failure of both the FBI and the CIA to share the ample clues they possessed of an al Qaeda plot to the Ames case and its aftermath. The FBI was given authority to police the CIA and wound up ... eviscerating its clandestine service."
Scalingi, Paula L. "Intelligence Community Cooperation: The Arms Control Model." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 5, no. 4 (Winter 1991-1992): 401-410.
Turner, Michael A. "CIA-FBI Non-Cooperation: Cultural Trait or Bureaucratic Inertia?" International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 8, no. 3 (Fall 1995): 259-273.
"The CIA's culture ... alone does not account for the lack of interagency cooperation between the CIA and the FBI.... Additional causes are vested in the vagueness of the governing legislation and the bureaucratic inertia created by the historic separation of the two agencies." The bipartisan Presidential Commission "has the opportunity to affect the structural relationship between the CIA and the FBI in a positive way by addressing the legal ambiguities and promoting training in interagency cooperation." However, such changes will last "only if accompanied by steps to significantly affect the attitudes of key officials in each of the agencies."
Zapp, Greg. "Former Attorney General [William P. Barr] Comments on Intelligence and Law Enforcement." Periscope 18, no. 6 (1993): 1.
This is a report on remarks by Barr, the last Attorney General in the Bush Administration and a CIA employee 1973-1977, at an AFIO luncheon 7 June 1993 at Fort Myers Officers' Club. Barr stated: "US involvement [in a coup attempt against Noriega], had Noriega been killed, would not have been legally considered assassination."
In other remarks, Barr noted that "[s]ome of the difficulties that arise in the Intelligence Community's cooperation with the Department of Justice result from different mission requirements: the Intelligence Community needs to protect sources and methods while Law Enforcement needs to identify sources in order to prosecute.... In Mr. Barr's analysis, if Intelligence is to support Law Enforcement, American intelligence agencies will have to organize to improve dissemination."
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