Stafford, David, and Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones, eds. "Special Issue on American-British-Canadian Intelligence Relations 1939-2000." Intelligence and National Security 15, no. 2 (Summer 2000): Entire issue.
Unless otherwise noted, the comments accompanying each listing are taken from the article abstracts in I&NS 15.2.
1. Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones and David Stafford, "Introduction," 1-4.
2. Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones, "The Role of British Intelligence in the Mythologies Underpinning the OSS and Early CIA," 5-19.
"Two mythologies helped to underpin the OSS and early CIA. One was the Miracle Thesis [attributed by the author to Ray Cline], which held that US intelligence was inadequate in the interwar years, but miraculously recovered in World War II with British help. The moral of this tale was that you cannot always rely on miracles, so it is best to have an ever-ready peacetime intelligence capability. The second myth stemmed from the Conspiracy Thesis, according to which the British manipulated American intelligence in furtherance of their own imperial designs. Though contrary to the first myth, this one, too, played into the hands of CIA boosters, as it suggested that a full US intelligence capability was necessary to the defence of American sovereignty."
3. Roderick Bailey, "OSS-SOE Relations, Albania 1943-44," 20-35.
"[T]he Balkan files of Britain's Special Operations Executive confirm that SOE ... sought to resist excessive interference by the American Office of Strategic Services just as OSS sought greater involvement. Yet care must be taken not exaggerate the scope of this friction and the geographical area affected.... Contrary to the claims of the official OSS historian, SOE was not responsible for the limited involvement and achievements of OSS in the mountains and forests of Albania."
4. David Stafford, "Roosevelt, Churchill and Anglo-American Intelligence: The Strange Case of Juan March," 36-48.
"Roosevelt and Churchill ... personally made possible a major intelligence operation involving large-scale bribery to keep [Franco's] Spain neutral."
5. Stephen Budiansky, "The Difficult Beginnings of US-British Codebreaking Cooperation," 49-73.
"Recently declassified files in Britain and the United States reveal the often bitter mutual suspicions that roiled the codebreaking bureaux of the two nations as they began to cooperate during World War II.... In the evolving British-American relationship, differences between the US Army and Navy were skillfully exploited on both sides of the Atlantic."
6. Paul Maddrell, "British-American Scientific Intelligence Collaboration during the Occupation of Germany," 74-94.
"That they were fellow-Occupiers of Germany was ... central to the development of British-American scientific intelligence collaboration.... Their intelligence agencies had to collaborate to do their job properly and in partnership they achieved in Germany the first significant penetration of the USSR's military-industrial complex."
7. Scott Lucas and Alistair Morey, "The Hidden 'Alliance': The CIA and MI6 Before and After Suez," 95-120.
"[T]he CIA maintained co-operation with [MI6] during and after Suez... [T]his 'special relationship' ... was based not on emotional or cultural ties but on the CIA's pragmatic if wayward assessment that MI5 was vital to the achievement of US objectives in the Middle East."
8. James G. Hershberg, "Their Man in Havana: Anglo-American Intelligence Exchanges and the Cuban Crises, 1961-62," 121-176.
"When the United States broke diplomatic relations with Cuba in January 1961, American officials turned to London, which maintained its embassy in Havana, to provide political, economic, and military intelligence on ... Cuba. Over the next two years,... the British government used this channel not only to provide information to its superpower ally, but also to try to 'moderate' Washington's anti-Castro policies ... and to deflect pressures to join its campaign of economic pressures against the island."
9. Reg Whitaker, "Cold War Alchemy: How America, Britain and Canada Transformed Espionage into Subversion," 177-210.
"At the outset of the Cold War, a series of high-level Soviet espionage scandals unfolded in the English-speaking countries. These cases had a very significant impact in shaping the dominant counter-espionage model in the West."
10. Bruce Craig, "A Matter of Espionage: Alger Hiss, Harry Dexter White and Igor Gouzenko -- The Canadian Connection Reassessed," 211-224.
"Craig argues that ... the [Russian] defector [Igor Gouzenko] did not possess a shread of evidence ... that implicated Harry Dexter White in the Soviet [espionage] conspiracy.... Gouzenko's revelations have no relevance or bearing on the espionage case relating to White."
11. Stuart Farson, "Parliament and Its Servants: Their Role in Scrutinizing Canadian Intelligence," 225-258.
"This study ... shows how Parliament's capacity to scrutinize Canada's intelligence community is currently inadequate.... [It analyzes] both the shortfalls in current review mechanisms and the steps Parliament would have to take to achieve better scrutiny."
12. Douglas M. Charles, "American, British and Canadian Intelligence Links: A Critical Annotated Bibliography," 259-269.
"The American-British-Canadian intelligence literature ... has evolved, and continues to grow, from partisan accounts to scholarly studies. Thirteen leading studies in the field are discussed thematically and annotated."
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