Liaison Among Nations

Richard J. Aldrich

Aldrich, Richard J.

1. "British Intelligence and the Anglo-American 'Special Relationship' during the Cold War." Review of International Studies 24, no. 3 (1998): 331-352.

2. "Dangerous Liaisons: Post-September 11 Intelligence Alliances." Harvard International Review 24, no. 3 (Fall 2002): 50-54.

The United States "is a massive exporter of technical intelligence while it is also surprisingly dependent on friends for certain kinds of espionage," particularly human intelligence from Africa and the Middle East. Nevertheless, "the overall result has been a mutual dependence that is healthy and ensures a greater reservoir of unique skills in the service of Western policy."

3. "Global Intelligence Co-operation versus Accountability: New Facets to an Old Problem." Intelligence and National Security 24, no. 1 (Feb. 2009): 26-56.

"It is hard to avoid the conclusion that intelligence liaison and accountability have never mixed well.... [T]he acceleration of intelligence liaison over the last decade has brought about a qualitative change in the nature of intelligence. Improved international intelligence cooperation has changed the way in which agencies work. Accordingly, the 'black hole' presented by liaison is now too big to ignore."

4. "Intelligence Co-operation in Theory and Practice." In International Intelligence Co-operation and Accountability, eds. Hans Born, Ian Leigh, and Aidan Wills, 18-41. London: Routledge, 2010.

5. "Transatlantic Intelligence and Security Cooperation." International Affairs 80, no. 3 (Jul. 2004): 733-753.

From Abstract: "If cooperation is to improve, we require a better mutual understanding about the relationship between privacy and security to help us decide what sort of intelligence should be shared.... While most practical problems of intelligence exchange are ultimately resolvable, the challenge of agreeing what the intelligence means in broad terms is even more problematic. The last section of this article argues that shared NATO intelligence estimates would be difficult to achieve and of doubtful value."

6. "The UK-US Intelligence Alliance in 1975: Economies, Evaluations and Explanations." Intelligence and National Security 21, no. 4 (Aug. 2006): 557-567.

From abstract: New archival releases appear "to show that, partly because of the contraction of defence dispositions, UK intelligence activities were called upon to compensate and therefore became relatively more important as a substantive contribution to the alliance."

7. "US-European Intelligence Co-operation on Counter-terrorism: Low Politics and Compulsion." British Journal of Politics and International Relations 11, no.1 (Feb. 2009): 122-139.

The author suggests intelligence cooperation can be viewed "as a rather specialist kind of 'low politics' that is focused on practical arrangements." It allows countries "to work together in one area even while they disagree about something else. Meanwhile, the pressing need to deal with a range of increasingly elusive transnational opponents ... compels intelligence agencies to work more closely together, despite their instinctive dislike of multilateral sharing. Therefore, transatlantic intelligence co-operation will continue to deepen, despite the complex problems that it entails."

8. "The Value of Residual Empire: Anglo-American Intelligence Cooperation in Asia after 1945." In Intelligence, Defence and Diplomacy: British Policy in the Post-War World, eds. Richard J. Aldrich and Michael F. Hopkins, 226-258. London and Portland, OR: Cass, 1994.


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