Agrell, Wilhelm. "Sweden and the Dilemmas of Neutral Intelligence Liaison." Journal of Strategic Studies 29, no. 4 ( 2006): 633-651.
Agrell, Wilhelm. "Sweden and the Dilemmas of Neutral Intelligence Liaison." Journal of Strategic Studies 29, no. 4 ( 2006): 633-651.
From abstract: Despite a declared policy of non-alignment during the Cold War, Sweden "established security links with a number of Western powers, first of all Britain and the US.... Intelligence liaison was of crucial importance for the security of non-aligned Sweden, but also significant for the major Western powers in filling gaps in intelligence collection.... However, intelligence liaison contained policy dilemmas, some of a more general nature, some specific for a country with an overt policy of non-alignment."
Aid, Matthew M. "In the Right Place at the Right Time: US Signals Intelligence Relations with Scandinavia, 1945-1960." Journal of Strategic Studies 29, no. 4 (Aug. 2006): 575-605.
From abstract: "This paper demonstrates that US-Scandinavian intelligence relations in general, and Signals Intelligence (Sigint) relations in particular, during the period 1945 through 1960 were more extensive and complicated than had previously been believed.... This paper covers the quantity, quality, and types of intelligence information provided to the US by each of the Scandinavian nations [Norway, Denmark, and Sweden], demonstrating that the nature of US intelligence relations with these countries changed substantially as time went by."
Aldrich, Richard J.
1. "British Intelligence and the Anglo-American 'Special Relationship' during the Cold War." Review of International Studies 24, no. 1 (Mar. 1998): 331-351.
2. "Dangerous Liaisons: Post-September 11 Intelligence Alliances." Harvard International Review 24, no. 3 (Fall 2002): 50-54.
The United States "is a massive exporter of technical intelligence while it is also surprisingly dependent on friends for certain kinds of espionage," particularly human intelligence from Africa and the Middle East. Nevertheless, "the overall result has been a mutual dependence that is healthy and ensures a greater reservoir of unique skills in the service of Western policy."
3. "Transatlantic Intelligence and Security Cooperation." International Affairs 80, no. 3 (Jul. 2004): 733-755.
4. "The UK-US Intelligence Alliance in 1975: Economies, Evaluations and Explanations." Intelligence and National Security 21, no. 4 (Aug. 2006): 557-567.
From abstract: New archival releases appear "to show that, partly because of the contraction of defence dispositions, UK intelligence activities were called upon to compensate and therefore became relatively more important as a substantive contribution to the alliance."
5. "The Value of Residual Empire: Anglo-American Intelligence Cooperation in Asia after 1945." In Intelligence, Defence and Diplomacy: British Policy in the Post-War World, eds. Richard J. Aldrich and Michael F. Hopkins. London/Portland, OR: Cass, 1994.
Alexander, Martin
S. "Introduction: Knowing Your Friends, Assessing Your Allies - Perspectives
on Intra-Alliance Intelligence." Intelligence and National Security
13, no. 1 (Spring 1998): 1-17.
This is Alexander's introduction to Intelligence and National Security 13, no. 1 (Spring 1998).
"Spying on friendly powers ... is among the most sensitive type of intelligence work and is often denied, though less so by former directors of French intelligence than by their Anglo-Saxon counterparts."
Alexander, Martin
S., ed.
1. "Special Issue on Knowing Your Friends: Intelligence Inside Alliances from 1914 to the Cold War." Intelligence and National Security 13, no. 1 (Spring 1998): Entire issue.
Click for Table of Contents of I&NS 13.1.
2. Knowing Your Friends: Intelligence Inside Alliances from 1914 to the Cold War. London: Frank Cass, 1998.
Clark comment: The articles here were originally published in Intelligence and National Security 13, no. 1 (Spring 1998).
Nelsen, Choice, Nov. 1998, comments that the individual chapters are "disparate studies ... [whose] only commonality is that all the cases are from the 20th century. Perhaps the greatest weakness of the volume is its irrelevance to the contemporary world."
On the other hand, Cohen, FA 78.2, sees this as an "excellent collection of articles," and Christensen, Military Review, Jul./Aug. 1999, comments that "[a]nyone who has worked with allies or in combined operations will find much thought provoking material in this collection."
Andrew, Christopher.
"The Growth of the Australian Intelligence Community and the Anglo-American
Connection." Intelligence and National Security 4, no. 1 (Apr.
1989): 213-256.
Clark comment: Andrew's judicious approach makes this article the best brief exposition of the development of Australian intelligence from World War I through the mid-1980s that this reader has seen. His conclusion that "[t]he Anglo-American connection is likely to remain a fundamental feature of Australian intelligence policy well into the twenty-first century" seems on the mark.
Andrew, Christopher.
"The Making of the Anglo-American SIGINT Alliance." In In the
Name of Intelligence: Essays in Honor of Walter Pforzheimer, eds. Hayden
B. Peake and Samuel Halpern, 95-109. Washington, DC: NIBC Press, 1994.
Ball, Desmond
J. A Base for Debate: The US Satellite Station at Nurrungar. Sydney:
Allen & Unwin, 1987.
According to Cain, I&NS 6.1, the U.S. Air Force base at Nurrungar, some 500 miles northeast of Adelaide, differs from the CIA base at Pine Gap in that Nurrungar is "fundamentally ... part of the US defence system and forms an internal element of the US C3I system... Ball argues that Australia obtains no benefit from the Nurrungar base and that the disadvantages of it probably outweigh the advantages."
Ball, Desmond J. "Desperately Seeking Bin Laden: The International Dimension of the War against Terrorism." In Worlds in Collision: Terror and the Future of Global Order, eds. Ken Booth and Tim Dunne. Houndmills, UK: Palgrave, 2002.
Ball, Desmond
J. "Over and Out: Signals Intelligence (Sigint) in Hong Kong."
Intelligence and National Security 11, no. 3 (Jul. 1996): 474-496.
In the 1920s and 1930s, Hong Kong was important to the British for monitoring Japanese diplomatic and military signals. The British reestablished Sigint facilities in Hong Kong immediately after World War II. As the Commonwealth Sigint Organization (CSO) and UKUSA arrangements came into effect, Hong Kong became "the principal Western station for Sigint activity concerning the southeastern sector of mainland China and the northwestern sector of the South China Sea." Major operations ended in January 1995.
Ball, Desmond
J. Pine Gap: Australia and the U.S. Geostationary Signals Intelligence Satellite Program. Canberra, Australia: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, 1988. Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1988.
Cain, I&NS 6.1, says that Pine Gap "brings up to date the functions and purpose" of what Ball "declares to be the CIA's most important COMINT spy base outside the USA."
Ball, Desmond
J. A Suitable Piece of Real Estate: American Intelligence in Australia. Sydney: Hale & Iremonger, 1980.
The focus here is on the U.S. satellite ground stations in Australia.
Best, R. A. "Cooperation with Like-Minded Peoples": British Influences on American Security Policy, 1945-1949. Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1986.
Campbell, Anthony. "Canada-United States Intelligence Relations and 'Information Sovereignty.'" In Canada Among Nations 2003: Coping with the American Colossus, eds. David Carment, Fen Osler Hampson, and Norman Hillmer, 156-179. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003.
Clift, A. Denis. "Through the Prism of National Security: The Challenge of Intelligence Sharing." Defense Intelligence Journal 11, no. 1 (Winter 2002): 97-104.
Remarks by the President of the Joint Military Intelligence College at the Kennedy School, Harvard University, 27 August 2001.
Clough, Chris. "Quid Pro Quo: The Challenges of International Strategic Intelligence Cooperation." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 17, no. 4 (Winter 2004-2005): 601-613.
Cogan, Charles. "American-French Intelligence Relations and the French Nuclear Deterrent." Journal of Intelligence History 3, no. 1 (Summer 2003). [http://www.intelligence-history.org/ jih/previous.html]
From abstract: "The difficulty in U.S.-French relations stems from the period of World War II.... [B]oth out of power considerations and security concerns, the U.S. in the postwar did not treat France as an equal, and particularly not on a par with Great Britain.... With de Gaulle’s departure from NATO’s integrated command (1966) and with the emergence of France’s nuclear force de frappe, American-French tensions over nuclear issues diminished."
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