On 27 December 2001, the U.S. State Department released 38 declassified documents requested by the Congress of Peru concerning U.S. Government relations with former Peruvian intelligence chief Vladimiro Montesinos. The documents became publicly available on 7 January 2002. Jonkers, AFIO WIN 1-02, 7 Jan. 2002.
Materials arranged chronologically
Vogel, Thomas T., Jr., and Matt Moffett. "Hostage Crisis Tarnishes Peru Spymaster." Wall Street Journal, 28 Jan. 1997, A12.
ProQuest: Peru's victory over the Shining Path guerrillas "has been compromised" by the hostage situation at Japan's Embassy in Lima. "Many Peruvians are blaming Montesinos and an intelligence apparatus that became increasingly distracted from its duties by infighting and alleged dirty tricks."
Golden, Tim. "C.I.A. Links Cited on Peru Arms Deal That Backfired." New York Times, 6 Nov. 2000. [http://www.nytimes.com]
Peru's former intelligence chief, Vladimiro Montesinos, "a crucial C.I.A. ally in the region," has been implicated in an arms deal in 1998 that saw Jordanian AK-47 assault rifles end up in the hands of leftist guerrillas in Colombia.
Lane, Charles. "Superman Meets Shining Path: Story of a CIA Success." Washington Post, 7 Dec. 2000, A1. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]
Taking down the guerrillas in Peru.
1. "U.S. Shares Fault in Peru Incident: Probe Blames Procedures in Shootdown." Washington Post. 31 Jul. 2001, A1. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]
According to sources familiar with the findings of a State Department investigation into the shootdown of a civilian aircraft carrying American missionaries over northern Peru in April 2001, both "Peru and the United States were undisciplined and 'sloppy' in the way they conducted" the joint drug-interdiction program.
2. "Report Issued in Plane's Downing: Lax Procedures Are Cited in Peru Shoot-Down." Washington Post. 3 Aug. 2001, A2. [http://www. washingtonpost.com]
The report of the joint U.S.-Peruvian investigation into the April 2001 shootdown in Peru of a plane carrying American missionaries was released on 3 August 2001. "The report does not assign blame for the incident.... But its description of the program under which the United States helped Peru to shoot down drug planes is of a tragedy waiting to happen."
Loeb, Vernon. "Behind the Peruvian Shootdown." Washington Post, 26 Aug. 2002. [http:// www.washingtonpost.com]
An SSCI report on the shootdown by the Peruvian Air Force of a float plane carrying American missionaries in April 2001 concludes "that, while CIA, State Department and National Security officials 'failed to adequately monitor the operation of this risky program,' the CIA pilots [in a spotter aircraft] had repeatedly tried to stop the shoot down and 'expressed strong reservations to their own chain of command' once the Peruvians initiated military action."
Bowen, Sally, and Jane Holligan. The Imperfect Spy: The Many Lives of Vladimiro Montesinos. Lima, Peru: Ediciones PEISA, 2003.
Wes, IJI&C 18.3 (Fall 2005), notes that Montesinos was "in charge of the efficient Servicio de Inteligencia Nacional (SIN), although never formally its director," during the presidency of Alberto Fujimora in Peru. This work is "a remarkable case study of what one can only hope was a very unique spy chief."
For Peake, Studies 49.3 (2005), the authors "have done a splendid job telling the often gruesome, but always interesting, story of Montesinos and the secret police he created.... The lack of source notes is largely compensated for by the chronology and references to known people, dates, and events. The authors have provided an important exemplar of how a corrupt security service can influence an entire country."
Forero, Juan. "Peruvian Spy Chief Convicted in First of His Trials." New York Times, 25 Mar. 2003. [http://www.nytimes.com]
On 24 March 2003, Vladimiro Montesinos, the former "Peruvian spy chief accused of widespread corruption during the 10-year rule of former President Alberto K. Fujimori, was convicted ... for having used his influence to help the brother of his former mistress ...to be released from jail." This was the "first of more than 60 public trials" Montesinos faces.
Economist. Editors. "Spying on the Spies." 11 Oct. 2003, 38.
Peru has a new intelligence chief -- Daniel Mora, a retired general and member of President Alejandro Toledo's Perú Posible party. "His appointment has stirred controversy: opponents say that the intelligence service should serve the state, rather than the governing party. But the bigger problem is that the service needs thorough reform."
McSherry, J. Patrice.
1. "Operation Condor: Clandestine Inter-American System." Social Justice 26, no. 4 (Winter 1999): 144-175.
This article traces "[a]nti-insurrection collusion among the intelligence services of the 'southern cone' countries of Argentina, Brazil and Chile, Bolivia, Paraguay and Uruguay." Swenson, IJI&C 16.1/127/fn25.
2. Predatory States: Operation Condor and Covert War in Latin America. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005.
From publisher: "Operation Condor was a military network created in the 1970s to eliminate political opponents of Latin American regimes. Its key members were the anticommunist dictatorships of Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, Bolivia, Paraguay, and Brazil, later joined by Peru and Ecuador, with covert support from the U.S. government." The author draws "on a wealth of testimonies, declassified files, and Latin American primary sources." McSherry "shows how ... Operation Condor hunted down, seized, and executed political opponents across borders."
Matei, Florina Cristiana, and Thomas C. Bruneau. "Policymakers and Intelligence Reform in the New Democracies." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 24, no. 4 (Winter 2011-2012): 656-691.
The authors look at Brazil, Argentina, Peru, Poland, Romania, Spain, and Russia ("a stunning case of democratic regress"). In "at least four" of these countries -- "Poland, Brazil, Romania, and Spain -- the decisionmakers have managed to institutionalize agencies that are either transparent or effective, or both."
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