Antunes, Priscila Carlos Brandao. "Establishing Democratic Control of Intelligence in Argentina." In Reforming Intelligence: Obstacles to Democratic Control and Effectiveness, eds. Thomas C. Bruneau and Steven C. Boraz, 195-218. Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 2007.

Associated Press. "Argentina's Congress Debates Reform of Spy Agency." 3 Feb. 2015. []

On 3 February 2015, Argentina's Congress "began debating a proposal to reform the clandestine service." The proposed bill "lays out a broad framework for replacing the current spy service with a new 'National Federal Intelligence Agency.' Gathered intelligence would be delivered to the Public Ministry, which would be the only entity empowered to initiate legal action. Currently, intelligence goes to a different department inside the same agency."

Born, Hans, Loch K. Johnson, and Ian Leigh, eds. Who's Watching the Spies? Establishing Intelligence Service Accountability. Dulles, VA: Potomac, 2005.

From publisher: The authors "examine the strengths and weaknesses of the intelligence systems of Argentina, Canada, Germany, Norway, Poland, South Africa, South Korea, the United Kingdom, and the United States."

Peake, Studies 50.2 (2006), comments that "[t]he experiences of each nation provide an interesting mosaic of desired goals and problems of implementation.... It is a timely topic and worth the attention of all those who must deal with these issues everyday as well as the general public whose civil rights are affected when oversight is too robust or inadequate." To Jacoby, DIJ 16.2 (2007), this work "succeeds greatly as an informative source on the workings of current intelligence oversight systems." However, "[t]he reader is left wanting recommendations and commentary on the ethics of intelligence oversight."

For Winn, Parameters, Summer 2006, this "valuable contribution ... addresses the central criteria that should be taken into account by any nation or international organization that hopes to place intelligence agencies under democratic supervision.... [T]he objectives are to ensure that intelligence and security agencies are insulated from political abuse, but not isolated from executive governance."

Brown, I&NS 21.6 (Dec. 2006), finds this work to be "a diappointment. Most of the material is dry and sometimes soporific. It is also biased toward the advocates of intelligence accountability," in that the "essays all address the positives of such a program, but not the negatives.... A debate format would have been much more appropriate..., and could have easily been accomplished by excluding numerous irrelevant and tedious essays."

Bruneau, Thomas C., and Steven C. Boraz, eds. Reforming Intelligence: Obstacles to Democratic Control and Effectiveness. Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 2007.

According to Peake, Studies 52.1 (Mar. 2008) and Intelligencer 16.1 (Spring 2008), this book's 13 chapters include "studies that discuss democratic control and effectiveness in three Western nations -- the United States, the United Kingdom, and France -- and seven new democracies -- Brazil, Taiwan, Argentina, Romania, South Africa, Russia, and the Philippines." Reforming Intelligence "is well documented, well written, and should serve as a foundation for studying this persistent problem."

Reddig, NIPQ 23.4 (Sep. 2007), calls this a "useful and thought provoking compendium of case studies," dealing with "the challenge of maintaining an intelligence establishment in a democratic framework." For Skarstedt, NIJ 1.1 (2009), "[a]ll of the authors provide outstanding analysis of their various subjects, and this book is a comprehensive study of intelligence reform and its problems. The commoin theme shared by all of the authors is that intelligence must be closely controlled."

Davies, Philip H. J., and Kristian C. Gustafson, eds. Intelligence Elsewhere: Spies and Espionage Outside the Anglosphere. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2013.

Heard, Studies 59.1 (Mar. 2015), calls this work "a remarkably ambitious, edited collection of essays on the intelligence activities and organizations of a dozen countries or regions of the world." The book is divided into two sections. "The first contains four studies of what might be called the 'deep history' of intelligence in ancient China, India, the Byzantine Empire..., and the Islamic world. The book's second section has chapters on contemporary intelligence issues in Pakistan, Iran, Indonesia, Japan, Ghana, Argentina, Sweden, and Finland."

Matei, Florina Cristiana, and Thomas C. Bruneau. "Policymakers and Intelligence Reform in the New Democracies." International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 24, no. 4 (Winter 2011-2012): 656-691.

The authors look at Brazil, Argentina, Peru, Poland, Romania, Spain, and Russia ("a stunning case of democratic regress"). In "at least four" of these countries -- "Poland, Brazil, Romania, and Spain -- the decisionmakers have managed to institutionalize agencies that are either transparent or effective, or both."

McSherry, J. Patrice. "Argentina: Dismantling an Authoritarian Legacy." NACLA [North American Congress on Latin America] Report on the Americas, Mar.-Apr. 2000, 1.

"The new administration of Frenando de la Rua has taken several important steps to reduce the power of the Argentine intelligence apparatus.... In January and February, the President ordered the dismissal of hundreds of agents from two notorious intelligence structures, the army's Battalion 601 ... and the Secretariat of State Intelligence (SIDE), and said that Battalion 601 would be dissolved.... The administration also reduced SIDE's budget."

McSherry, J. Patrice.

1. "Operation Condor: Clandestine Inter-American System." Social Justice 26, no. 4 (Winter 1999): 144-175.

This article traces "[a]nti-insurrection collusion among the intelligence services of the 'southern cone' countries of Argentina, Brazil and Chile, Bolivia, Paraguay and Uruguay." Swenson, IJI&C 16.1/127/fn25.

2. Predatory States: Operation Condor and Covert War in Latin America. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005.

From publisher: "Operation Condor was a military network created in the 1970s to eliminate political opponents of Latin American regimes. Its key members were the anticommunist dictatorships of Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, Bolivia, Paraguay, and Brazil, later joined by Peru and Ecuador, with covert support from the U.S. government." The author draws "on a wealth of testimonies, declassified files, and Latin American primary sources." McSherry "shows how ... Operation Condor hunted down, seized, and executed political opponents across borders."

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