Allen, Lewis. "Japanese Intelligence Systems." Journal of Contemporary History 22, no. 4 (Oct. 1987): 547-561.
Sexton calls this article "a balanced account of Japanese Intelligence organizations." The author's "discussion of the Owada Sigint unit is especially enlightening."
Coleman, Joseph. "Papers Tie U.S. to 1950s Japan Coup Plot." Associated Press, 28 Feb. 2007. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]
Declassified CIA files released by the National Archives in January 2007 "reveal that Japanese ultranationalists with ties to U.S. military intelligence plotted to overthrow the Japanese government and assassinate the prime minister in 1952.... [T]he documentary evidence ... illustrates the violent potential of the right-wing, anti-communist cabal that had worked under the U.S. occupation authority's 'G-2' intelligence wing in the ... late 1940s and early 50s.... The CIA files ... say the [G-2] operations were riddled with intelligence leaks, hobbled by a lack of competent agents, and deeply compromised by rivalries among the rightists themselves.... The departure of [Maj. Gen. Charles] Willoughby [chief of G-2 in the occupation government] from Japan in 1951 ... deprived the rightists of their leading American patron and paymaster."
Deacon, Richard [Donald McCormick].
1. Kempai Tai: A History of the Japanese Secret Service. London: Muller, 1982. New York: Beaufort, 1983.
See below for revised and updated edition.
2. Kempai Tai: The Japanese Secret Service, Then and Now. Tokyo: Charles Tuttle, 1990.
Surveillant 1.2 notes that this is the revised and updated edition. Deacon sees Japanese intelligence as a "giant organization that efficiently sucks in staggering amounts of information." For Oros, IJI&C 15.1, Deacon's work "provides good background material on the variety of Japanese intelligence activities through World War II, but falters badly in examining the postwar period."
DeLuca, John Vito. "Shedding Light on the Rising Sun." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 2, no. 1 (Spring 1988): 1- 20.
This article surveys Japanese domestic security organizations, the Japan Defense Agency, and the structure of the Japanese foreign policy and foreign intelligence bureaucracies.
Jourdonnais, Adam. "Intelligence in the New Japan." Studies in Intelligence 7, no. 3 (Summer 1963): 1-14.
There are "historical, psychological, and institutional" reasons why modern Japan has not established "an intelligence system appropriate to its current involvement in world affairs."
Mercado, Stephen C. "The Japanese Army's Noborito Research Institute." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 17, no. 2 (Summer 2004): 286-299.
The Noborito Research Institute "conducted research and development in four main areas: intelligence, counterintelligence (CI), covert action, and propaganda.... The military officers who led Noborito were accomplished men who hired technical talent from Japan's top universities, drew on the expertise of academic experts, and tapped corporate resources to execute the institute's projects." After the war, "Noborito's veterans applied their skills in an organization designated the Government Printing Supplies Office (GPSO). Their reproductions supported the agent operations conducted before and during the Korean War." [Footnotes omitted]
Miyagi, Takemi. "Which Way Did They Go?" Studies in Intelligence 11, no. 1 (Winter 1967): 67-70.
"After the initial period of resettlement and inevitable interrogation," many of the members of the organizations that made up Imperial Japanese Intelligence chose to "find employment ... as mercenaries of the occupying power." With the coming of the Korean War, Japanese industry began to grow, and with it the need for certain kinds of foreign "environmental reportage."
Richelson, Jeffrey T. Foreign Intelligence Organizations. Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 1988.
According to NameBase, Richelson "offers organization-chart overviews of the services of several countries, and summaries of some of the current issues. Included [is] ... Japan (Naicho, PSIA, commercial trade intelligence)." Cline, PSQ 104.1, comments that "[g]iven the uneven quality of the information available to him, Richelson has done a skillful job of weaving together a systematic description of the secret intelligence agencies of eight important nations.... [T]he account of the two Asian nations ... is pretty sketchy and spotty."
Schaller, Michael. The American Occupation of Japan: The Origins of the Cold War in Asia. New York: Oxford University Press, 1985. 1987. [pb]
From publisher: The author "traces the origins of the Cold War in Asia to the postwar occupation of Japan by U.S. troops..... Cut off from its former trading partners, which were now all Communist-controlled, Japan, with U.S. backing, turned its attention to the rich but unstable Southeast Asian states. The stage was thus set for U.S. intervention in China, Korea, and Vietnam."
Seth, Ronald. Secret Servants: A History of Japanese Espionage. New York: Farrar, Straus & Cudahy, 1957. London: Gollancz, 1957.
Pforzheimer notes that Secret Servants is "[n]ot considered particularly valuable or accurate.... Generally the book is unsourced, reducing its value as verifiable history." To Constantinides, the reader is "constantly alerted to the book's poor quality by its failure to indicate sources and by excessive claims and errors."
U.S. Department of State. Office of the Historian. Gen. ed., David S. Patterson. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968. Vol. XXIX, Part 2. Japan. Ed., Karen L. Gatz. Washington, DC: GPO, 2006. [Available at: http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v29p2]
From "Summary": "During the Johnson administration, U.S. officials became concerned that the covert programs of supporting key pro-American Japanese officials, begun in the late 1950s and continuing into the early 1960s, and splitting off the moderate wing of the leftist opposition, was neither appropriate nor worth the risk of exposure. As a result, these programs were phased out in 1964, but broader covert programs -- propaganda and social action -- to encourage key Japanese elements to reject the influence of the left continued at moderate levels through 1968."
Weiner, Tim. "C.I.A. Spent Millions to Support Japanese Right in 50's and 60's." New York Times, 9 Oct. 1994.
"In a major covert operation of the cold war, the Central Intelligence Agency spent millions of dollars to support the ... Liberal Democratic Party and its members in the 1950's and the 1960's.... Since then, the C.I.A. has dropped its covert financial aid and focused instead on gathering inside information on Japan's party politics and positions in trade and treaty talks....
"The C.I.A.'s help for Japanese conservatives resembled other cold war operations, like secret support for Italy's Christian Democrats. But it remained secret -- in part, because it succeeded. The Liberal Democrats thwarted their Socialist opponents, maintained their one-party rule, forged close ties with Washington and fought off public opposition to the United States' maintaining military bases throughout Japan."
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