ISRAEL

Issues of Surprise

Included here:

1. Surprise Generally

2. Suez Crisis (1956)

3. "Rotem" Crisis (1960)

4. "War of Attrition" (1969-1970)

1. Surprise Generally

Cohen, Raymond. "Threat Assessment in Military Intelligence: The Case of Israel and Syria, 1985-86." Intelligence and National Security 4, no. 4 (Oct. 1989): 735-764.

"During the ten-month period September 1985-June 1986 the Israeli Army was placed on heightened alert on at least five separate occasions as a result of forebodings of a possible Syrian attack.... In response to Israel's heightened states of alert the Syrian Army itself took precautionary measures and tension rose dangerously." Why, then, did war not result? This is the interesting question with which Cohen plays provocatively.

Handel, Michael I. "Crisis and Surprise in Three Arab Israeli Wars." In Strategic Military Surprise: Incentives and Opportunities, eds. Klaus Knorr and Patrick Morgan, 111-122. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1984.

This article includes information on the Israeli deception plan prior to the Sinai Campaign in 1956.

Kahana, Ephraim. "Analyzing Israel's Intelligence Failures." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 18, no. 2 (Summer 2005): 262-279.

The author lists a substantial number of "failures," dividing them into strategic failures and covert action failures. He concludes that Israel's "leaders must find a balance between exaggerating threats to the country and accurately assessing opportunities for peace."

2. Suez Crisis (1956)

For broader issues dealing with the Suez Crisis, click HERE.

This article includes information on the Israeli deception plan prior to the Sinai Campaign in 1956.

Sheffy, Yigal. "Unconcern at Dawn, Surprise at Sunset: Egyptian Intelligence Appreciation Before the Sinai Campaign, 1956." Intelligence and National Security 5, no. 3 (Jul. 1990): 7-56.

The author notes that Egyptian President Nasser had received recent early warnings of an Israeli attack, yet was shocked when the attack began on 29 October 1956 and was surprised yet again when the British and French entered the fray. The question, then, is, "Why?" Sheffy finds the answer rooted in "almost universal failures in judgement at [the] national level which give rise to mistaken intelligence appreciations. Such failures are based at first on fixed perceptions and preconceptions, gather strength with the adaptation of information to the conception, and finally fall victim to the enemy's deception stories."

For information on the Israeli deception plan, see Michael Handel, "Crisis and Surprise in Three Arab Israeli Wars," in Strategic Military Surprise: Incentives and Opportunities, eds. Klaus Knorr and Patrick Morgan, 111-122 (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1984).

3. "Rotem" Crisis

Bar-Joseph, Uri. "Israel Caught Unawares: Egypt's Sinai Surprise of 1960." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 8, no. 2 (Summer 1995): 203-219.

The author describes the "Rotem" crisis of February-March 1960, arising out of the massive and surprise Egyptian build up of its forces in the Sinai, as "a missing link in the historiography of the Arab-Israeli conflict, as well as in the study of strategic surprises." The article seeks to bridge this gap "by offering a detailed description and analysis of the intelligence aspects of this episode."

See also, Yitzhak Rabin, The Rabin Memoirs (New York: SUNY Press, 1998), 43-44.

4. "War of Attrition" (1969-1970)

Adamsky, Dima, and Uri Bar-Joseph. "'The Russians Are Not Coming': Israel's Intelligence Failure and Soviet Military Intervention in the 'War of Attrition.'" Intelligence and National Security 21, no. 1 (Feb. 2006): 1-25.

The authors review AMAN's failure to anticipate the Soviet decision to send military forces to Egypt beginning in late 1969.

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