ISRAEL

Issues of Surprise

Included here:

1. Surprise Generally

2. Suez Crisis (1956)

3. "Rotem" Crisis (1960)

4. "War of Attrition" (1969-1970)

1. Surprise Generally

Cohen, Raymond. "Threat Assessment in Military Intelligence: The Case of Israel and Syria, 1985-86." Intelligence and National Security 4, no. 4 (Oct. 1989): 735-764.

Handel, Michael I. "Crisis and Surprise in Three Arab Israeli Wars." In Strategic Military Surprise: Incentives and Opportunities, eds. Klaus Knorr and Patrick Morgan, 111-122. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1984.

Includes information on the Israeli deception plan prior to the Sinai Campaign in 1956.

Kahana, Ephraim. "Analyzing Israel's Intelligence Failures." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 18, no. 2 (Summer 2005): 262-279.

The author lists a substantial number of "failures," dividing them into strategic failures and covert action failures. He concludes that Israel's "leaders must find a balance between exaggerating threats to the country and accurately assessing opportunities for peace."

2. Suez Crisis (1956)

For broader issues dealing with the Suez Crisis, click HERE.

Handel, Michael I. "Crisis and Surprise in Three Arab Israeli Wars." In Strategic Military Surprise: Incentives and Opportunities, eds. Klaus Knorr and Patrick Morgan, 111-122. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1984.

Includes information on the Israeli deception plan prior to the Sinai Campaign in 1956.

Sheffy, Yigal. "Unconcern at Dawn, Surprise at Sunset: Egyptian Intelligence Appreciation Before the Sinai Campaign, 1956." Intelligence and National Security 5, no. 3 (Jul. 1990): 7-56.

3. "Rotem" Crisis

Bar-Joseph, Uri. "Israel Caught Unawares: Egypt's Sinai Surprise of 1960." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 8, no. 2 (Summer 1995): 203-219.

4. "War of Attrition" (1969-1970)

Adamsky, Dima, and Uri Bar-Joseph. "'The Russians Are Not Coming': Israel's Intelligence Failure and Soviet Military Intervention in the 'War of Attrition.'" Intelligence and National Security 21, no. 1 (Feb. 2006): 1-25.

The authors review AMAN's failure to anticipate the Soviet decision to send military forces to Egypt beginning in late 1969.

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