Eisenberg, Dennis, Uri Dan, and Eli Landau. The Mossad: Israel's Secret Intelligence Service -- Inside Stories. New York & London: Paddington, 1978.
Constantinides finds sufficient errors in this book to warn that it "is not useful for the historian or the professional who requires ... meticulous attention to facts, sources, and evaluation." The book does have "some very good inside information," but it has to be sifted "from the errors."
Eshed, Haggai. Tr., David Zinder and Leah Zinder. Reuven Shiloah -- The Man Behind the Mossad: Secret Diplomacy in the Creation of Israel. London: Frank Cass, 1997.
Clark comment: Shiloah was the founder and first head of Mossad (1951-1953), but he had already played a role in the establishment of Israel. From publisher: This book "is based on documents from private archives ... and interviews with people who worked closely with Shiloah both in Israel and abroad." Rathmell, I&NS 13.2, finds this biography to be "an important contribution to our understanding of the early days of Mossad and the Israeli intelligence apparatus." He warns, however, that one of the author's "main aims [is] to rehabilitate the reputation of Shiloah -- a man who made plenty of enemies."
Ganor, Boaz. The Counter-Terrorism Puzzle: A Guide for Decision Makers. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 2005.
According to Norwitz, NWCR 59.1 (Winter 2006), the author uses the Israeli model to observe that "democracies are uniquely vulnerable to terrorism where government must defend itself yet maintain principles of transparency, rule of law, and representative governance while remaining mindful of world opinion.... This book is an authoritative accounting of Israel's struggle against terrorism. However, Ganor's exclusive analysis of the Israeli experience is also a weakness."
The author was head of Israeli military intelligence (A'man), 1974- 1978.
1. "Estimates and Fortune-Telling in Intelligence Work." International Security 4, no. 4 (Spring 1980): 36-56.
2. "Intelligence Estimates and the Decision-Maker." Intelligence and National Security 3, no. 3 (Jul. 1988): 261-287.
Includes an Appendix, "Operation Peace for Galilee" (pp. 282-287), which deals with three decisions made in the Israeli war in Lebanon.
3. "Intelligence and the Peace Process in Israel." Intelligence and National Security 12, no. 3 (Jul. 1997): 35-66.
Addresses the past, present, and future role of Israeli intelligence in the peace process in three phases: (1) the period prior to the negotiations process, (2) activities in support of the negotiations process, and (3) tasks after an agreement is reached.
Gilboa, Amos, and Ephraim Lapid, eds. Israel's Silent Defender: An Inside Look at Sixty Years of Israeli Intelligence. Springfield, NJ: Gefen Books, 2012.
Peake, Studies 56.3 (Sep. 2012) and Intelligencer 19.3 (Winter-Spring 2013), finds that for this work "the editors have assembled 36 firsthand accounts of intelligence operations that span the 60-year history of the three principal Israeli intelligence services.... Israel's Silent Defender provides a fine summary of the origins and present-day configuration of Israel's intelligence community."
Halevy, Efraim. Man in the Shadows: Inside the Middle East Crisis with a Man Who Led the Mossad. New York: St Martin's, 2006.
According to DKR, AFIO WIN 14-06 (3 Apr. 2006), the author headed Mossad from 1998 to 2002. "He draws portraits of world leaders and describes Mossad failures that made the news.... He also has something to say about how the world might deal with Islamist terrorist organizations. But don't expect to learn any of the secrets Mossad keeps."
Publishers Weekly's reviewer (via Amazon.com) calls this book a "20-year political history that includes much secret maneuvering but little skullduggery.... Halevy delivers insightful and often acerbic portraits of world leaders and shows a surprising sympathy toward the Arab point of view. He also describes several operational fiascoes that made the news."
For Peake, Studies 50.4 (2006) and Intelligencer 15.2 (Fall-Winter 2006-2007), this work seems to get off to a slow start, as the author spends the first 10 chapters sharing "his views on Israel's political problems since its creation." When he gets to discussing intelligence matters, Halevy "spends considerable space describing the problems that arise when the political masters, in his case Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, attempt to manage operations directly." In the end, he "leaves the impression that he has more to say."
Skelly, IJI&C 20.4 (Winter 2007), refers to Halevy's "elegantly written memoirs.... In his skilled hands," aspects of the Middle East that are often clouded in obscurity "emerge from the shadows." Although "short on details," Halevy's discussion of his modernization of the Mossad "is long on insights into the revitalization of an intelligence organization."
Horesh, Joshua. An Iraqi Jew in the Mossad: Memoir of an Israeli Intelligence Officer. Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 1997.
According to Kruh, Cryptologia 26.2, the author worked with British intelligence in World War II, served with the Jewish underground prior to independence, and joined Mossad after the establishment of Israel. The author tells "a memorable story of the struggles and triumphs not only of one man but also of the then new State of Israel."
Indinopulos, Thomas. "Shin Bet's Blind Side." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 10, no. 1 (Spring 1997): 91-96.
Shin Bet and the Israeli political leaders initially misread the Intifada, seeing its origins in outside agitators rather than in the Palestinian camps and villages. Similar mistakes were made in Shin Bet's failure to protect Yitzhak Rabin; that is, Shin Bet and the politicians misread the nature of "the internal Jewish threat to state security and stability. In both cases, intelligence was not sufficient to get beyond skewed political assessments."
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