1. Immediate Post-Civil War
2. Military Intelligence General
3. The Indian Wars
4. Spanish-American War
5. The Philippines
Fishel, Edwin C. "A Cable from Napoleon." Studies in Intelligence 2, no. 3 (Summer 1958): 81-101.
From https://www.cia.gov: "Tells the story of how the US government, in 1867, intercepted a critically important cable from Napoleon III to his commanding general in Mexico confirming Napoleon's order to withdraw all French troops from Mexico. This was probably the first instance of US peacetime communications intelligence."
Weber, Ralph E.
1. "America's First Encrypted Cable." Studies in Intelligence 36, no. 5 (1992): 105-109.
In November 1866, Secretary of State Seward dispatched by Atlantic cable an encrypted message to American Minister to France John Bigelow. The cost: $19,540.50, which the secretary refused to pay. Seward later released the full text of the message to the New York Herald. Less than a year later the State Department issued a new code for diplomatic dispatches, although not a particularly useful one. Eventually, the U.S. had to pay up for services rendered.
2. "Seward's Other Folly: The Fight Over America's First Encrypted Cable." Cryptologia 19, no. 4 (Oct. 1995): 321-348.
The cost ($19,000) of sending an encrypted cable on the Atlantic cable sent the State Department looking for a new encryption system, its first in over 50 years.
Wagner, Arthur L. The Service of Security and Information. Kansas City, MO: Hudson-Kimberly, 1893. 3d ed., 1896. 9th ed., 1903. 14th ed. Kansas City, MO: Franklin Hudson, n.d.
Petersen calls this the "first American book on tactical intelligence." According to Constantinides, this multi-edition work by the head of the War Department's Bureau of Military Intelligence was primarily a "tactical military manual covering such military practices and methods as reconnaissance, patrols, and advance and rear guards." He treats intelligence as an arm of military operations. See "Arthur L. Wagner: The Man Who Wrote the Book on Intelligence" at the Huachuca History Program under "Masters of the Intelligence Art": http://www.huachuca.army.mil/sites/History/PDFS/MWAGNER.PDF.
Bigelow, Michael E. "The Apache Campaigns Under General Crook: A Historical Perspective on Low-Intensity Conflict." Military Intelligence 16, no. 3 (1990): 38-40.
Burnham, Philip. "Unlikely Recruits: Indians Scouting for America." MHQ: The Quarterly Journal of Military History 17, no. 3 (Spring 1999): 78-85.
The author does not focus on the intelligence role that the Indian scouts played for the U.S. Army during the Indian Wars. The article is nonetheless worth reading for the light shed on the use of Native Americans as scouts and soldiers.
Stewart, Jacque J. The U.S. Government and the Apache Indians, 1871-1876: A Case Study in Counterinsurgency. Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1993. Available at: http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA273161.
From Abstract: "[T]he long struggle between the government and the Apache Indians ... bears all the earmarks of a traditional, or secessionist, insurgency. This study evaluates the methods used to suppress the Apache insurgency.... The strength of the government's approach was in its ability to conduct a short, decisive military campaign which defeated most of the hostile bands and induced others to surrender. The major weakness lay in the government's inability to develop a balanced national strategy for dealing with the insurgency."
Bradford, James C., ed. Crucible of Empire: The Spanish-American War and Its Aftermath. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1992.
O'Toole, IJI&C 6.4: "Two of the nine papers ... bear directly on the matter of intelligence.... 'Diplomat and Naval Intelligence Officer: The Duties of Lt. George L. Dyer, U.S. Naval Attaché to Spain,' by Diane E. Cooper ... [and] 'American Intelligence During the Spanish-American War,' by David F. Trask."
Jeffreys-Jones, Rhodri. "The Montreal Spy Ring of 1898 and the Origins of 'Domestic Surveillance' in the United States." Canadian Review of American Studies 5 (Fall 1974): 119-134.
Petersen: "Discusses Secret Service counterintelligence operations."
O'Toole, George J.A.
1. "Our Man in Havana: The Paper Trail of Some Spanish War Spies." Intelligence Quarterly 2, no. 2 (1986): 1-3. [Petersen]
2. The Spanish War: An American Epic. New York: Norton, 1984.
Petersen: O'Toole gives "good coverage of the intelligence episodes of the war, including U.S. penetration of a telegraph office in Havana, efforts to thwart a Spanish spy ring in Montreal, and communications with Cuban insurgents."
Wilkie, John E.
1. "Catching Spain's Spies." Boston Sunday Herald, 2 Oct. 1898. [Petersen]
2. "The Secret Service in the War." In The Spanish-American War: A History by the War Leaders. Norwich, CT: Chas. C. Haskell, 1899. [Petersen]
Young, James R. Reminiscences and Thrilling Stories of the War by Returned Heroes. Philadelphia: Standard, 1899.
Petersen: "Chapter on espionage and counterespionage."
Arnold, James R. The Moro War: How America Battled a Muslim Insurgency in the Philippine Jungle, 1902-1913. New York: Bloomsbury, 2011.
Goulden, Intelligencer 18.3 (Summer-Fall 2011): "This slice of American history is not pleasant reading; nonetheless, it should be required reading for persons planning counter-insurgencies far from our shores."
Deady, Timothy K. "Lessons from a Successful Counterinsurgency: The Philippines, 1899-1902." Parameters 35, no. 1 (Spring 2005): 53-68.
The author provides a "brief review" of the Philippine Insurrection of 1899-1902, examines "the strategic and operational lessons of America's successful campaign," considers "the belligerents' policy goals, strategies, and their centers of gravity," and identifies "lessons applicable for winning today's counterinsurgencies."
Linn, Brian M.
1. "Intelligence and Low-Intensity Conflict in the Philippine War, 1899-1902." Intelligence and National Security 6, no. 1 (Jan. 1991): 90-114.
"It is not too harsh to conclude that for much of the Philippine War, American intelligence was as diffuse, unconnected and disorganized as the resistance the soldiers encountered in the field.... Only at the end of the war, and then only in an area close to the DMI's [Division of Military Information; created by MacArthur in December 1900] headquarters, was the army's official intelligence agency able to play a major role in ending Filipino resistance." What occurred instead was that the officers in the field developed and implemented their own localized intelligence methods.
2. The U.S. Army and Counterinsurgency in the Philippine War, 1899-1902. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1989.
O'Toole, I&NS 6.1, calls Linn's work "the most authoritative study to date of this all-but-forgotten chapter of American military history.... Linn has selected four districts on ... Luzon for his study, and he concentrates on both the military and non-military aspects of the US Army's pacification program within each of them.... [A]s intelligence was an integral part of counter-insurgency operations, ... [the author] presents a far more detailed picture than has been published before."
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