Gooch, John, and Amos Perlmutter, eds. Military Deception and Strategic Surprise. London: Cass, 1982.
Clark comment: The articles included in this anthology originally appeared in the Journal of Strategic Studies. Pforzheimer points to three case studies here: German covert rearmament, 1919-1939; Soviet deception on nuclear missile development, 1955-1981; and the Egyptian/Israeli confrontation leading to the 1973 war.
Harris, J.P. "British Military Intelligence and the Rise of German Mechanized Forces, 1929-40." Intelligence and National Security 6, no. 2 (Apr. 1991): 395-417.
"Considering the very limited means of collecting information at its disposal, the British general staff had formed, as early as November 1934, an extraordinarily good picture of the way in which military doctrine in Germany was likely to develop and the way in which the German armed forces were likely to operate in the opening stages of a future war."
Irving, David, ed. Breach of Security: The German Intelligence Files on Events Leading to the Second World War. London: William Kimber, 1968.
According to Constantinides, this work is based on a report of the German Air Ministry's monitoring and intercept service which "broke traffic, tapped telephones, and opened letters.... The book is badly organized, making it difficult to ascertain what was in the original source and what are the credited remarks." There was much here that at the time was new information. Sexton notes that examples of decrypted diplomatic messages from Britain, Bulgaria, France, Italy, Japan, and Turkey are included.
Kahn, David. "The Fonds de Moscou, TICOM, and the Nerve of a Spy." Intelligence and National Security 24, no. 6 (Dec. 2009): 865-875.
The author reviews French pre-war documents (the Fonds de Moscou), returned to France after being held in the Soviet Union; German pre-war documents (TICOM) previously held in the United Kingdom and returned to the Federal Republic; and a 1930 document concerning the activities of Hans-Thilo Schmidt.
Maiolo, Joseph A.
1. "Deception and Intelligence Failure: Anglo-German Preparations for U-boat Warfare in the 1930s." Journal of Strategic Studies 22, no. 4 (Dec. 1999): 55-76.
From abstract: "This essay ... argues that the Royal Navy (RN) employed the general perception of ASDIC (sonar) as a 'antidote' to the submarine to mislead potential foes about the state of its anti-submarine defences.... [T]he German Navy failed to discover the realities behind ASDIC's image, and this intelligence failure helped to shape U-boat policy."
2. "'I believe the Hun is cheating': British Admiralty Technical Intelligence and the German Navy, 1936-39." Intelligence and National Security 11, no. 1 (Jan. 1996): 32-58.
This article reconstructs "Admiralty technical intelligence analysis about German capital ships and U-boats from 1936 to 1939.... Evidence ... demonstrates that technical assessors performed better than has been previously acknowledged."
Millman, Chad. The Detonators: The Secret Plot to Destroy America and an Epic Hunt for Justice. New York: Little, Brown, 2006.
Boghardt, Studies 51.1 (Mar. 2007), notes that the Black Tom explosions of July 1916 are discussed; but the "main focus is on the ... legal battles of the German-American Mixed Claims Commission" after the war. The author's "elucidation of the fluid German secret service networks that operated in the United States throughout the period of American neutrality" is of "particular interest.... Unfortunately, the book's readability occasionally comes at the expense of accuracy and nuance.... Millman's lack of nuance is partially due to the fact that he ignores German sources and scholarship." Nonetheless, the author "tells an exciting story and captures the big picture."
Newman, Bernard C. German Secret Service at Work. New York: McBride, 1940.
Reynolds, David. "Great Britain and the Third Reich, 1933-1940: Appeasement, Intelligence and Misperceptions." In Das gestörte Gleichgewicht: Deutschland als Problem britischer Sicherheit im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert, eds. Adolf M. Birke and Marie-Luise Recker, 113-133. Munich: 1990.
Shore, Zach. "Hitler, Intelligence and the Decision to Remilitarize the Rhine." Journal of Contemporary History 34, no. 1 (Jan. 1999): 5-18.
"[T]he decision to remilitarize the Rhine in March 1936 ... resulted not only from Hitler's recognition of Italy's estrangement from France, but also from Neurath's consistent assurances to Hitler that France would not fight. Neurath's conviction in turn was based partly on accurate intelligence regarding the intentions of French political and military leaders."
van der Meulen, Michael. "The Road to German Diplomatic Ciphers -- 1919 to 1945." Cryptologia 22, no. 2 (Apr. 1998): 141-166.
The German Foreign Office developed two main systems (both hand ciphers) for its codes and ciphers after the Zimmermann Telegram disaster. The foreign office used only one machine cipher system and this only for messages classified up to Secret on the Berlin-Madrid diplomatic link.
Wala, Michael. "A Triangle of Deception: Intelligence and Germany's Military Relations with the United States and the Soviet Union, 1919-1939." Journal of Intelligence History 8, no. 2 (Winter 2008-2009). [http://www.intelligence-history.org/jih/journal.html]
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