GERMANY

The Interwar Period

Alvarez, David. "Diplomatic Solutions: German Foreign Office Cryptanalysis, 1919-1945." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 9, no. 2 (Summer 1996): 169-185.

The author follows, as far as sources allow, the work of the Z Branch of the Personnel Division of the Foreign Ministry. There are, however, a substantial number of "may haves" in the part of the article discussing inter-war activities. The organization of the unit during World War II is detailed. "Cooperation between Pers Z and the separate cryptanalytic services of the Army, Navy, and Air Force did not exist."

Alvarez, David. "Wilhelm Fenner and the Development of the German Cipher Bureau, 1922-1939." Cryptologia 31, no. 2 (Apr. 2007): 152-163.

Fenner joined the Cipher Bureau in 1922 as head of the its cryptanalytic section; he was the "effective head" of the Bureau for most of the interwar years. This article surveys Fenner's efforts to build the Bureau, to make it a professional organization, and to fend off attacks on its responsibilities from the proliferating intelligence units under the Nazi regime. In the end, Germany's cryptanalytic capabilities were undercut by "duplication of effort, understaffing, inadequate technical resources, and uncoordinated operations."

Beck, Alfred M. Hitler's Ambivalent Attaché: Lt. Gen. Friedrich von Boetticher in America, 1933-1941. Dulles, VA: Potomac, 2005.

Campbell, IJI&C 20.2 (Summer 2007), sees this work as "a careful presentation of Boetticher's ability and achievements in this very difficult achievement." However, although the author "tell[s] exhaustively what General Boetticher did, the volume does not explain why he performed certain primary activities throughout his life."

Brissaud, André. The Nazi Secret Police. New York: Norton, 1974. London: Bodley Head, 1974.

Wilcox notes that this book is a "study of the formation of the Nazi SD under Heydrich, 1933-1939." Constantinides sees Brissaud's journalist background showing in the book's episodic organization.

Browder, George C. Hitler's Enforcers: The Gestapo and the SS Security Service in the Nazi Revolution. New York: Oxford University Press, 1996.

See positive review by Grill, History 26.3.

Campbell, Kenneth J. "Major General Friedrich Gempp: German Intelligence Leader." American Intelligence Journal 25, no. 1 (Summer 2007): 75-81.

"The measure of Gempp's intelligence work is best understood in the context of German military history on the Eastern Front in World War I, where Germany initially faced an extremely dangerous situation in August 1914." Later, Gempp served as the first head of the new Abwehr, established in November 1919.

Chapman, John W.M. "No Final Solution: A Survey of the Cryptologic Capabilities of German Military Agencies, 1926-1935." Intelligence and National Security 1, no. 1 (Jan. 1986): 13-47.

Felstead, Sidney T. Germany and Her Spies: A Story of the Intrigues of the Nazis. London: Hutchinson, 1940.

Wilcox: "Account of pre-World War II German espionage."

Flicke, Wilhelm F. War Secrets in the Ether. 2 vols. Vol. I (parts 1 & 2): to World War II; Vol. II (Part 3): World War II. Laguna Hills, CA: Aegean Books, 1977. Reprinted as 1 vol., 1994.

Denkler, Cryptolog 15.1, notes that "Flicke joined the German [signals intelligence] service at the beginning of World War I and remained through World War II.... Perhaps the most fascinating part[] is his description of the role of the service in counterintelligence operations in World War II."

According to McGinnis, Cryptolog 16.2, "Flicke gives a good account of German failures in the COMINT field during WWI, as well as their successes, such as the Battle of Tannenberg.... Flicke spent much of WWII dealing with agent and partisan communications networks operating within Germany or German occupied territories.... They did locate many of the agent transmitters.... There were so many of the transmitters, and enemy agents, that the flow of intelligence from within German territory to the Allied powers was not greatly interrupted. This is a landmark publication which deserves to be read by any serious student of COMINT.... The work has many defects, and is shallow reading in many parts, but the defects are frequently overshadowed by the author's remarks about how things should have been. He is clearly a proponent of centralized control of intelligence by a single body."

White, IJI&C 7.3, says that Flicke's "accounts of the radio intercept role in the famous engagements of both wars are fascinating." Pforzheimer finds some instances "where Flicke's memory is incorrect or his information is incomplete." Constantinides agrees, commenting that "there are enough instances of error or incomplete information to warn that not everything Flicke says is automatically authoritative."

Peake, AIJ 15.1/90, sees Flicke's work as "an informative overview," but adds that "the absence of sources and the availability of much more recent material greatly limits its utility."

Reviewing the one volume edition (1994), Surveillant 4.1 notes that "Flicke tells the story of German successes in reading the secret codes of both enemies and friends. Historians have long pondered how General Rommel knew in advance th[e] moves of the British army in North Africa. Flicke reveals the reason: the Germans had broken the U.S. secret code between Cairo and Washington."

Frank, Willard C. "Politico-Military Deception at Sea in the Spanish Civil War, 1936-39." Intelligence and National Security 5, no. 3 (Jul. 1990): 84-112.

In a military contest where the two sides were roughly balanced in fighting power, "[s]upply was the key to victory, and most of it had to come by sea." The focus here is on two aspects of deception: "(1) deception and maritime arms traffic; and (2) clandestine naval intervention." The author finds that "German deception was the most successful of all, both in the supply effort and in clandestine submarine warfare, the result of favorable conditions, intense care and good luck."

Gooch, John, and Amos Perlmutter, eds. Military Deception and Strategic Surprise. London: Cass, 1982.

The articles included in this anthology originally appeared in the Journal of Strategic Studies.

Pforzheimer notes that there are three case studies here: German covert rearmament, 1919-1939; Soviet deception on nuclear missile development, 1955-1981; and the Egyptian/Israeli confrontation leading to the 1973 war.

Harris, J.P. "British Military Intelligence and the Rise of German Mechanized Forces, 1929-40." Intelligence and National Security 6, no. 2 (Apr. 1991): 395-417.

"Considering the very limited means of collecting information at its disposal, the British general staff had formed, as early as November 1934, an extraordinarily good picture of the way in which military doctrine in Germany was likely to develop and the way in which the German armed forces were likely to operate in the opening stages of a future war."

Irving, David, ed. Breach of Security: The German Intelligence Files on Events Leading to the Second World War. London: William Kimber, 1968.

According to Constantinides, this work is based on a report of the German Air Ministry's monitoring and intercept service which "broke traffic, tapped telephones, and opened letters.... The book is badly organized, making it difficult to ascertain what was in the original source and what are the credited remarks." There was much here that at the time was new information. Sexton notes that examples of decrypted diplomatic messages from Britain, Bulgaria, France, Italy, Japan, and Turkey are included.

Maiolo, Joseph A. "Deception and Intelligence Failure: Anglo-German Preparations for U-boat Warfare in the 1930s." Journal of Strategic Studies 22, no. 4 (Dec. 1999): 55-76.

From abstract: "This essay ... argues that the Royal Navy (RN) employed the general perception of ASDIC (sonar) as a 'antidote' to the submarine to mislead potential foes about the state of its anti-submarine defences.... [T]he German Navy failed to discover the realities behind ASDIC's image, and this intelligence failure helped to shape U-boat policy."

Maiolo, Joseph A. "'I believe the Hun is cheating': British Admiralty Technical Intelligence and the German Navy, 1936-39." Intelligence and National Security 11, no. 1 (Jan. 1996): 32-58.

This article reconstructs "Admiralty technical intelligence analysis about German capital ships and U-boats from 1936 to 1939.... Evidence ... demonstrates that technical assessors performed better than has been previously acknowledged."

Millman, Chad. The Detonators: The Secret Plot to Destroy America and an Epic Hunt for Justice. New York: Little, Brown, 2006.

Boghardt, Studies 51.1 (Mar. 2007), notes that the Black Tom explosions of July 1916 are discussed; but the "main focus is on the ... legal battles of the German-American Mixed Claims Commission" after the war. The author's "elucidation of the fluid German secret service networks that operated in the United States throughout the period of American neutrality" is of "particular interest.... Unfortunately, the book's readability occasionally comes at the expense of accuracy and nuance.... Millman's lack of nuance is partially due to the fact that he ignores German sources and scholarship." Nonetheless, the author "tells an exciting story and captures the big picture."

Newman, Bernard C. German Secret Service at Work. New York: McBride, 1940.

Wilcox: "Account of the German intelligence & espionage services prior to World War II."

Shore, Zach. "Hitler, Intelligence and the Decision to Remilitarize the Rhine." Journal of Contemporary History 34, no. 1 (Jan. 1999): 5-18.

"[T]he decision to remilitarize the Rhine in March 1936 ... resulted not only from Hitler's recognition of Italy's estrangement from France, but also from Neurath's consistent assurances to Hitler that France would not fight. Neurath's conviction in turn was based partly on accurate intelligence regarding the intentions of French political and military leaders."

van der Meulen, Michael. "The Road to German Diplomatic Ciphers -- 1919 to 1945." Cryptologia 22, no. 2 (Apr. 1998): 141-166.

The German Foreign Office developed two main systems for its codes and ciphers after the disaster of the Zimmermann Telegram; both were hand cipher systems. The foreign office used only one machine cipher system. This system was used on the Berlin-Madrid diplomatic link only for messages classified up to Secret.

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