Uhrlau, Ernst. “A Post-Cold War Intelligence Service.” Transatlantic Internationale Politik 4 (2000): 1–7.Materials arranged chronologically.
Uhrlau, Ernst. “A Post-Cold War Intelligence Service.” Transatlantic Internationale Politik 4 (2000): 1–7.
When this article was written, the author was the German chancellor's coordinator of intelligence. Later, he headed the German Foreign Intelligence Service (Bundesnachrichtendient, BND). He emphasizes that "in the future the BND will have to confront the dynamics of the dangers arising from today's transnational issues, besides carrying out its share of intelligence-gathering duties in Germany's international peacekeeping, peacemaking, or humanitarian missions."
Boyes,
Roger. "Secret Service Funds May Have Bolstered Bonn Party War Chests."
Times (London), 2 Feb. 2000. [http://www.the-times.co.uk]
According to disclosures on 1 February 2000, "[m]illions of marks from Germany's espionage budget were channelled into secret party funds to strengthen democracy in Spain and Portugal in the 1970s and 1980s. Some may have flowed back to fund election campaigns in Germany." These disclosures "gave another twist to the scandal that has disgraced Helmut Kohl and rocked the [German] political establishment."
Helm,
Toby. "'Slush Fund' To Fight Communism." Electronic Telegraph,
2 Feb. 2000. [http://www.telegraph.co.uk]
In an interview with the Sueddeutsche Zeitung, former chancellor Helmut Schmidt said that "[t]he German government paid millions of pounds to political parties in Spain and Portugal in the Seventies to prevent a rise of communism.... As with the current party funding scandal, in which the Christian Democratic Union opposition has admitted channelling undeclared funds into secret foreign accounts, such a use of money by the Federal Intelligence Service is forbidden under German law."
Sunday Times.
"Stasi Files on Kohl's Tapped Calls Vanish."
17 May 2000. [http://www.sunday-times.co.uk]
Schmidt-Eenboom, Erich.
"The Bundesnachrichtendienst, the Bundewehr and Sigint in the Cold
War and After." Intelligence and National Security 16, no. 1
(Spring 2001): 129-176.
The author traces the development of the BND's Sigint activities from the early days of the Gehlen Organization, through the "massive overhaul" of its infrastructure beginning in 1970, to more recent times of competition between the BND and the Bundeswehr in the Sigint field.
Livingston,
Robert Gerald. "Germany's Intelligence Failure." Washington
Post, 19 Oct. 2001, A29. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]
"Plotting for the strikes against the World Trade Center and the Pentagon was initially centered in Germany. Three of the four killer aircraft pilots -- including the apparent ringleader Mohamed Atta -- lived for as long as nine years in the port city of Hamburg, where they studied at technical colleges and constituted an al Qaeda 'sleeper' cell. During their long stay, none of them was spotted by German intelligence."
Helm,
Toby. "Germany Clashes with America over Intelligence." Electronic
Telegraph, 25 Oct. 2001. [http://www.news.telegraph.co.uk]
"An intense dispute has flared up between America and Germany over which nation's intelligence services are most to blame for failing to prevent the terrorist attacks of September 11. The row ... has surfaced during a trip to Washington and New York by Otto Schily, the German interior minister."
Shpiro, Shlomo. "Intelligence Services and Foreign Policy: German-Israeli Intelligence and Military Co-operation." German Politics 11, no. 1 (Apr. 2002): 23-42.
Brodeur, Jean-Paul, Peter Gill, and Dennis Töllborg, eds. Democracy, Law and Security: Internal Security Services in Contemporary Europe. New York: Columbia University Press, 2003. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003.
Peake, Studies 47.3 (2003), notes that this work is "drawn from papers presented at two symposia in Gothenburg, Sweden, that compare intelligence services in 10 countries: Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Hungary, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. The various chapters look at historical, organizational, and political differences.... In most cases, very little has been published in English about the services discussed, and that enhances the book's importance. For students of intelligence, and especially counterintelligence, this is a very worthwhile contribution."
For Henderson, IJI&C 17.3, this work "provides useful background reference material on several less well-known European domestic security systems." However, "the index and bibliography ... are generally weak"; and the "collection lacks, except for Spain, organizational charts for the various national communities and individual services."
See Shlomo Shpiro, "Parliament, Media, and the Control of Intelligence Services in Germany," 294-315.
Krieger, Wolfgang. "German Intelligence History: A Field in Search of Scholars." Intelligence and National Security 19, no. 2 (Summer 2004): 185-198.
"While Anglo-Saxon scholars are producing books on intelligence history at an ever-increasing rate, the interest in this particular branch of historical studies has been scant in Germany.... [T]here are ... small circles of German intelligence historians.... But the overall picture is undoubtedly one of neglect.... Arguably there are three factors at work: The first is access to sources, the second has to do with the peculiarities of post-1945 intellectual life in Germany, and the third concerns German bureaucratic culture."
Born, Hans, Loch K. Johnson, and Ian Leigh, eds. Who's Watching the Spies? Establishing Intelligence Service Accountability. Dulles, VA: Potomac, 2005.
From publisher: "The assembled authors ... bring together in one volume the rich experience of three decades of experimentation in intelligence accountability. Using a structured approach, they examine the strengths and weaknesses of the intelligence systems of Argentina, Canada, Germany, Norway, Poland, South Africa, South Korea, the United Kingdom, and the United States.... The contributors draw together the best practices into a framework for successful approaches to intelligence accountability, including a prescription for a model law."
Peake, Studies 50.2 (2006), comments that "[t]he experiences of each nation provide an interesting mosaic of desired goals and problems of implementation.... It is a timely topic and worth the attention of all those who must deal with these issues everyday as well as the general public whose civil rights are affected when oversight is too robust or inadequate."
For Winn, Parameters, Summer 2006, this "valuable contribution ... addresses the central criteria that should be taken into account by any nation or international organization that hopes to place intelligence agencies under democratic supervision.... [T]he objectives are to ensure that intelligence and security agencies are insulated from political abuse, but not isolated from executive governance."
Brown, I&NS 21.6 (Dec. 2006), finds this work to be "a disappointment. Most of the material is dry and sometimes soporific. It is also biased toward the advocates of intelligence accountability," in that the "essays all address the positives of such a program, but not the negatives.... A debate format would have been much more appropriate..., and could have easily been accomplished by excluding numerous irrelevant and tedious essays."
To Jacoby, DIJ 16.2 (2007), this work "succeeds greatly as an informative source on the workings of current intelligence oversight systems." However, "[t]he reader is left wanting recommendations and commentary on the ethics of intelligence oversight."
Whitlock, Craig. "Warrants Issued for 13 CIA Operatives in Germany Kidnapping." Washington Post, 31 Jan. 2007. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]
On 31 January 2007, German prosecutors filed arrest warrants in Munich for "13 CIA operatives suspected of kidnapping a German citizen in the Balkans in 2004 and taking him to a secret prison in Afghanistan" before releasing him several months later.
Whitlock, Craig. "Germans Drop Bid for Extraditions in CIA Case: 13 Agency Operatives Charged in Kidnapping." Washington Post, 24 Sep. 2007, A9. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]
German authorities confirmed on 23 September 2007 "that they have dropped their efforts to seek the extradition of 13 CIA operatives charged in the kidnapping" of Khaled el-Masri, a German citizen of Lebanese descent, four years ago.
Moscow Times. "Accused German Linked to Spy Flap." 17 Apr. 2008. [http://www.moscowtimes.ru]
A German man identified only as Werner G., "charged with selling sensitive technology information to Russia[,] is a key figure in a mysterious spy case involving a former Federal Space Agency official that jarred Russian-Austrian relations last year.... [I]nterviews with officials familiar with the case made it clear that the Russian intelligence officer referred to by German prosecutors is ... Vladimir Vozhzhov, who was arrested on spy charges in Austria last year and released after it turned out he had diplomatic immunity."
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