Berger, Brian. "National Security Needs Cut Into NASA's Plutonium." Space News, 24 Jul. 2002. [http://www.space.com]
"Earl Wahlquist, associate director of the Department of Energy's Space and Defense Power Systems Office, said [on 23 July 2002] that 7 kilograms of Plutonium 238[,] slightly more than half of the U.S. inventory[,] is being reassigned for use by an undisclosed national security agency.... [T]he Department of Energy announced in January 2001 that it planned to resume production of the radioactive material this decade. But re-establishing a production capability at U.S. nuclear laboratories will take five to six years, according to Wahlquist. In the meantime, the Department of Energy will continue to buy Plutonium 238 from Russia."
Carroll, James. House of War: The Pentagon and the Disastrous Rise of American Power. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2006.
Peake, Studies 50.4 (2006) and Intelligencer 15.2 (Fall-Winter 2006-2007), notes that the author is the anti-war activist son of the DIA's first director, Lt. Gen. Joseph Carroll. This is an "often spiteful book" that does, however, provide "unique insight into the life of the father and the origins of DIA." Nevertheless, the author's "focus is on blaming the Pentagon and its culture of power" for most of the evils of the world. "Carroll attempts to buttress [many of] his assertions with references to intelligence," but his sources (where they are given) do not support his assessments.
For Record, Parameters 36.4 (Winter 2006-2007), this "polemic against American might and those who have served it ... is as much about [Lt. Gen.] Joseph F. Carroll and his estranged son as it is about war and US foreign policy." This book "is a failed ... attempt to exorcize the Pentagon of what Carroll believes to be the inherent evil of US military power. It deserves no place in the libraries of serious students of American defense policy."
Daugherty, William J. Executive Secrets: Covert Action and the Presidency. Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 2004.
Clark comment: Although the author works much too hard in making his point that covert action is a tool of U.S. Presidents, not just of the CIA, this is a fine book of great value to any future discussion of the role of covert action in the making and implementing of American national security policy. It is, however, terribly thin on discussion of the Presidents since Reagan, an effect no doubt of the fact that Daugherty knew too much for the CIA to clear any references to unacknowledged actions. If I were teaching a national security or intelligence-related course at this time, Executive Secrets would be of great assistance.
Periscope 26.1 (2004), notes that the author "provides an overview of the nature and proper use of covert action as a tool of presidential statecraft and discusses its role in transforming presidential foreign policy into reality." For Brown, I&NS 20.4 (Dec. 2005), the author's "approach is logical and lucid." He argues that covert action operations represent "viable foreign policy options" undertaken at the direction of the President. This "is a very timely and useful examination of a controversial, but necessary[,] aspect of foreign policy."
Peake, Studies 50.2 (2006), notes that in examining "covert action policies and operations in each administration from Truman to Clinton," the author "shows that the level of activity varied more with international turmoil of the moment than with the party in power." Daugherty argues that covert action will "continue as an instrument of presidential policy when conventional methods short of war are unsuccessful," and he "provides ample justification for this position while illuminating this contentious topic with facts. This is a fine textbook and a valuable contribution."
Davis, Jack. "Improving CIA Analytic Performance: Analysts and the Policymaking Process." Occasional Papers 1, no. 2. Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, The Sherman Kent Center for Intelligence Analysis, Sep. 2002. [https://www.cia.gov/library/kent-center-occasional-papers/vol1no2.htm]
"The present paper addresses the challenge of establishing effective analyst-policymaker relations. It reviews five post-mortem critiques: (1) Douglas J. MacEachin, 'Tradecraft of Analysis,' U.S. Intelligence at the Crossroads: Agendas for Reform (1995); (2) Adm. David Jeremiah (R), Intelligence Communitys Performance on the Indian Nuclear Tests (1998); (3) CIA, Office of Inspector General, Alternative Analysis in the Directorate of Intelligence (1999); (4) Report of the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States (1998); (5) Working Group on Intelligence Reform of the National Strategy Information Center, The Future of US Intelligence (1996)."
Gaddis, John Lewis. Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy during the Cold War. 2d rev. & expanded ed. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005.
Haass, Richard N. "Supporting US Foreign Policy in the Post-9/11 World." Studies in Intelligence 46, no. 3 (2002): 1-13.
"Successful intelligence ... requires a mutual understanding between policy-makers and the Intelligence Community that is all too often lacking." How that gap might be closed is the subject matter of this article by Ambassador Haass, Director, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State.
Jajko, Walter [BGEN/USAF (Ret.)]. "Strategy: Back to Basics." Intelligencer 15, no. 2 (Fall-Winter 2006-2007): 7-9.
"The planning and application of a mutually reinforcing effort against an enemy has to be the result of an integrated, coherent orchestration of a sustained national strategy that is suffused with an authentically strategic direction. Unfortunately, in the U.S. an understanding of this necessity and an organization for its conduct are absent."
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