GENERAL POST-WORLD WAR II

Intelligence & Policy

1990s

A - G

Alexander, Michael. "Does Better Intelligence Improve Foreign Policy Decisions?" RUSI Journal 144, no. 5 (Oct. 1999): 1-6. [Marlatt]

Barry, James A., Jack Davis, David D. Gries, and Joseph Sullivan. "Bridging the Intelligence-Policy Divide." Studies in Intelligence 37, no. 5 (1994): 1-8.

This article documents "a clear trend toward an increasingly close relationship between intelligence and policy." While there is broad support for the new trend, "there also is continuing validity in the traditional" view that intelligence should be kept "at arm's length from policy."

Berkowitz, Bruce D. "Facing the Consequences: As El Shifa Shows, It Takes More than Intelligence to Make Smart Decisions." Washington Post, 5 Sep. 1999, B1. "In the Intelligence Game, Keep a Poker Face." Washington Post National Weekly Edition, 13 Sep. 1999, 21.

With regard to "the flap over the intelligence used to justify the bombing of the El Shifa Pharmaceutical Industries Co. in Khartoum, Sudan,... the problem seems to have been not just faulty intelligence but in the judgment of officials using it.... [A]s we have since discovered,... the link between bin Laden and El Shifa was not as close as officials first suggested....

"Officials have often used intelligence to account for their actions after the fact.... The problem is that, after the strike on El Shifa, U.S. officials tried to use intelligence as though it were evidence in a court case, and intelligence is usually poorly suited for that task.... Officials need to use intelligence, make their best judgments -- and then accept the public consequences.... Intelligence will always have gray cases where officials must exercise judgment. El Shifa may or may not have been an intelligence failure. But the record certainly suggests a failure by policy makers."

Conner, William E., ed.

1. "Former HPSCI Chairman David McCurdy Highlights the Private Sector's Role in the Digital Age." National Security Law Report 21, no. 1 (May 1999): 1, 4.

Edited remarks at 18 March 1999 meeting of the ABA's Standing Committee on Law and National Security in Washington, DC.

2. "Representative Bill McCollum Discusses U.S. National Security Policy in the 21st Century." National Security Law Report 21, no. 1 (May 1999): 1, 4.

Edited remarks at 15 September 1998 meeting of the ABA's Standing Committee on Law and National Security in Washington, DC.

Derian, James Der. "Anti-Diplomacy, Intelligence Theory and Surveillance Practice." Intelligence and National Security 8, no. 3 (Jul. 1993): 29-51.

The author uses a "post-structualist approach to explore ... the power of surveillance.... [A]s surveillance intensifies, the truth becomes not clearer but more ambiguous.... [I]t is ... technical intelligence ... that constitute[s] a new regime of power in international relations."

Dornan, Diane. "Isolationism, Internationalism and the Future of U.S. Intelligence." American Intelligence Journal 13, no. 3 (Summer 1992): 39-46.

HPSCI Staff from 1985.

Drachman, Edward R., and Alan Shank. Presidents and Foreign Policy: Countdown to Ten Controversial Decisions. Ithaca, NY: SUNY Press, 1997.

Clark comment: The authors offer a case study of one major decision for each president from Truman to Clinton. It is possible to argue that there are better potential cases for each president than the ones selected for study, but those chosen are interestingly fitted into the authors' novel countdown approach. The cases presented are:

1. Truman's decision not to extend diplomatic recognition to the PRC.

2. Eisenhower's decision to oppose the British-French-Israeli Suez invasion.

3. Kennedy's decision to support the Bay of Pigs invasion.

4. Johnson's decision to end the U.S. escalation of the Vietnam War.

5. Nixon's decision to order the Cambodian incursion.

6. Ford's decision to intervene in Angola.

7. Carter's decision to boycott the 1980 Moscow Olympics.

8. Reagan's decision to bomb Libya.

9. Bush's decision to end the Gulf War.

10. Clinton's decision to use the U.S. military to restore Aristide as Haitian president.

Larson, APSR 92.1, appreciates the authors' efforts to "present more objective criteria" than is normally the case in decision-making evaluation. Their evaluation scheme "seems plausible and reasonable on the face," but "it does not always work well when applied to specific cases." Nevertheless, "the case studies are well researched, concise, and provocative."

Gertz, Bill. Betrayal. Washington, DC: Regnery, 1999.

Clark comment: The Washington Times reporter at one time regarded by many as often having the best "inside" information on intelligence and related matters takes on the national security policy of the Clinton administration. The thrust of his work is not a surprise, but the manner in which he supports his arguments is:

According to a report by Diamond, Associated Press, 21 May 1999, "[c]lassified documents of the kind that normally take decades to come to light are there for all to see" in the book's appendix where "all or part of 23 documents from the Clinton administration -- some as recent as last year -- ranging in classification from confidential to top secret" are reprinted.

Gertz maintains that the Clinton administration "carried out a policy of appeasement of real or potential U.S. enemies that 'so angered some intelligence, defense and foreign policy officials that they responded in the only way they knew how: by disclosing to the press some of the nation's most secret intelligence.'''

Gries, David. "New Links Between Intelligence and Policy." Studies in Intelligence 34, no. 2 (Summer 1990): 1-6. In Inside CIA's Private World: Declassified Articles from the Agency's Internal Journal, 1955-1992, ed. H. Bradford Westerfield, 357-365. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1995.

Gries points to the increased importance of the "oral assessments," growing out of the expansion over time of contacts between intelligence officers and policymakers. Such contacts include meetings, briefings, and less structured channels. With specific exceptions, written assessments "today mainly influence the policy process indirectly. Senior intelligence officers and the staffs that support policy officers are now their principal readers."

 

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