National Intelligence Council. Foreign Missile Developments
and the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States Through 2015.
Washington, DC: September 1999.
National Intelligence Council. Foreign Missile Developments
and the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States Through 2015.
Washington, DC: September 1999.
"This paper has been prepared under the auspices of the National Intelligence Officer for Strategic and Nuclear Programs, Bob Walpole; comments or questions should be directed to CIA's Office of Public Affairs on (703) 482-7677."
See also Robert D. Walpole, "Statement for the Record," 16 Sep. 1999.
The Table of Contents, Preface, and Key Points of this document are given below.
Contents
Preface
Key Points
Discussion
The Evolving Missile Threat in the Current Proliferation Environment
Classification of Ballistic Missiles by Range
Threat Availability Before "Deployment"
Potential ICBM Threats to the United States
North Korea
Iran
Iraq
Russia
China
Foreign Assistance
Warning Times and Our Ability to Forecast Ballistic Missile Development and Acquisition
Space Launch Vehicle (SLV) Conversion
Alternative Threats to the United States
Forward-Based Threats
Non-Missile WMD Threats to the United States
Immediate Theater Missile Threats to US Interests and Allies
Penetration Aids and Countermeasures
Congress
has requested that the Intelligence Community produce annual reports on
ballistic missile developments. We produced the first report in March 1998
and an update memorandum in October 1998 on the August North Korean launch
of its Taepo Dong-1 space launch vehicle (SLV). Our 1999 report is a classified
National Intelligence Estimate, which we have summarized in unclassified
form in this paper.
This
year we examined future capabilities for several countries that have or
have had ballistic missiles or SLV programs or intentions to pursue such
programs. Using intelligence information and expertise from inside and outside
the Intelligence Community, we examined scenarios by which a country could
acquire an ICBM by 2015, including by purchase, and assessed the likelihood
of various scenarios. (Some analysts believe that the prominence given to
missiles countries "could" develop gives more credence than is
warranted to developments that may prove implausible.) We did not attempt
to address all of the potential political, economic, and social changes
that could occur. Rather, we analyzed the level of success and the pace
countries have experienced in their development efforts, international technology
transfers, political motives, military incentives, and economic resources.
From that basis, we projected possible and likely missile developments by
2015 independent of significant political and economic changes. Subsequent
annual reports will be able to account for such changes.
Our
projections for future ICBM developments are based on limited information
and engineering judgment. Adding to our uncertainty is that many countries
surround their ballistic missile programs with secrecy, and some employ
deception. Although some key milestones are difficult to hide, we may miss
others. For example, we may not know all aspects of a missile systems configuration
until flight testing; we did not know until the launch last August that
North Korea had acquired a third stage for its Taepo Dong 1.
We
took into account recommendations made in July 1998 by the Commission to
Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States and incorporated
the results of several academic and contractor efforts, including politico-economic
experts to help examine future environments that
might foster ICBM sales and missile contractors to help postulate potential
ICBM configurations that rogue states could pursue.
We
project that during the next 15 years the United States most likely will
face ICBM threats from Russia, China, and North Korea, probably from Iran,
and possibly from Iraq. The Russian threat, although significantly reduced,
will continue to be the most robust and lethal, considerably more so than
that posed by China, and orders of magnitude more than that potentially
posed by other nations, whose missiles are likely to be fewer in number
probably a few to tens, constrained to smaller payloads, and less reliable
and accurate than their Russian and Chinese counterparts.
We
judge that North Korea, Iran, and Iraq would view their ICBMs more as strategic
weapons of deterrence and coercive diplomacy than as weapons of war. We
assess that:
North
Korea could convert its Taepo Dong-1 space launch vehicle (SLV) into an
ICBM that could deliver a light payload (sufficient for a biological or
chemical weapon) to the United States, albeit with inaccuracies that would
make hitting large urban targets improbable. North Korea is more likely
to weaponize the larger Taepo Dong-2 as an ICBM that could deliver a several-hundred
kilogram payload (sufficient for early generation nuclear weapons) to the
United States. Most analysts believe it could be tested at any time, probably
initially as an SLV, unless it is delayed for political reasons.
Iran
could test an ICBM that could deliver a several-hundred kilogram payload
to many parts of the United States in the last half of the next decade using
Russian technology and assistance. Most analysts believe it could test an
ICBM capable of delivering a lighter payload to the United States in the
next few years following the North Korean pattern.
Analysts
differ on the likely timing of Iran's first test of an ICBM that could threaten
the United Statesassessments range from likely before 2010 and very likely
before 2015 (although an SLV with ICBM capability probably will be tested
in the next few years) to less than an even chance of an ICBM test by 2015.
Iraq
could test a North Korean-type ICBM that could deliver a several- hundred
kilogram payload to the United States in the last half of the next decade
depending on the level of foreign assistance. Although less likely, most
analysts believe it could test an ICBM that could deliver a lighter payload
to the United States in a few years based on its failed SLV or the Taepo
Dong-1, if it began development now.
Analysts
differ on the likely timing of Iraq's first test of an ICBM that could threaten
the United Statesassessments range from likely before 2015, possibly before
2010 (foreign assistance would affect capability and timing) to unlikely
before 2015.
By
2015, Russia will maintain as many nuclear weapons on ballistic missiles
as its economy will allow but well short of START I or II limitations.
By
2015, China is likely to have tens of missiles capable of targeting the
United States, including a few tens of more survivable, land- and sea-based
mobile missiles with smaller nuclear warheadsin part influenced by US technology
gained through espionage. China tested its first mobile ICBM in August 1999.
Sales
of ICBMs or SLVs, which have inherent ICBM capabilities and could be converted
relatively quickly with little or no warning, could increase the number
of countries able to threaten the United States. North Korea continues to
demonstrate a willingness to sell its missiles. Although we judge that Russia
or China are unlikely to sell an ICBM or SLV in the next fifteen years,
the consequences of even one sale would be extremely serious.
Several
other means to deliver weapons of mass destruction to the United States
have probably been devised, some more reliable than ICBMs that have not
completed rigorous testing programs. For example, biological or chemical
weapons could be prepared in the United States and used in large population
centers, or short-range missiles could be deployed on surface ships. However,
these means do not provide a nation the same prestige and degree of deterrence
or coercive diplomacy associated with ICBMs.
The
proliferation of medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs)driven primarily
by North Korean No Dong saleshas created an immediate, serious, and growing
threat to US forces, interests, and allies, and has significantly altered
the strategic balances in the Middle East and Asia. We judge that countries
developing missiles view their regional concerns as one of the primary factors
in tailoring their programs. They see their short- and medium-range missiles
not only as deterrents but also as force- multiplying weapons of war, primarily
with conventional weapons, but with options for delivering biological, chemical,
and eventually nuclear weapons. South Asia provides one of the most telling
examples of regional ballistic missile and nuclear proliferation:
Pakistan has Chinese-supplied M-11 short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) and Ghauri MRBMs from North Korea.
Foreign assistance continues to have demonstrable effects on missile advances around the world, particularly from Russia and North Korea. Moreover, some countries that have traditionally been recipients of foreign missile technology are now sharing more amongst themselves and are pursuing cooperative missile ventures.
We
assess that countries developing missiles also will respond to US theater
and national missile defenses by deploying larger forces, penetration aids,
and countermeasures. Russia and China each have developed numerous countermeasures
and probably will sell some related technologies.
Click
for text of Robert D. Walpole, National
Intelligence Officer for Strategic and Nuclear Programs, "Statement for the Record" to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
on 16 September 1999.
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