GENERAL POST-WORLD WAR II

Science & Technology

Through the 1960s

Ahern, Charles R. "The Yo-Yo Story: An Electronics Analysis Case History." Studies in Intelligence 5, no. 1 (Winter 1961): 11-23.

The author details "community teamwork" in the mid and late-1950s in gaining ... intelligence on "a major technological advance" in "radar control for surface-to-air missiles in the Soviet air defense system."

Baxter, James P., III. Scientists Against Time. Boston: Little, Brown, 1946. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1948. [pb]

Winner of the 1947 Pulitzer Prize for History by the official historian of the Office of Scientific Research and Development (OSRD) during World War II.

Brandwein, David S. "Interaction in Weapons R&D." Studies in Intelligence 12, no. 1 (Winter 1968): 13-20.

The author deals with "the difficulties in generating satisfactory intelligence hypotheses on the basis of thin data, validating them by independent checkout on the part of the several analytic groups involved, and then feeding them back to the R&D community, difficulties which make the process less than ideally effective."

Brandwein, David S. "Telemetry Analysis." Studies in Intelligence 8, no. 4 (Fall 1964): 21-29.

There are two key problems in monitoring Soviet telemetry: "First, the intercept usually covers only the time when the missile is above the horizon of the place of intercept, and second, we have neither a key to the channel assignments nor a list of calibrations." This article is about overcoming the second obstacle.

Brown, Donald C. "On the Trail of Hen House and Hen Roost." Studies in Intelligence 13, no. 2 (Spring 1969): 11-19. [Richelson, Wizards (2002)]

Eliot, Frank."Moon Bounce Elint." Studies in Intelligence 11, no. 2 (Spring 1967): 59-65. [Richelson, Wizards (2002)]

Finer, Sydney Wesley. "The Kidnapping of the Lunik." Studies in Intelligence 11, no. 1 (Winter 1967): 33-39.

In this slightly redacted article one of the participants from the Joint Factory Markings Center tells the story of how a touring model of the last-stage Lunik space vehicle was "borrowed" overnight, inspected, photographed, and returned before the Soviets missed it.

Garofalo, Nicholas R. "Present and Future Capabilities of OTH Radars." Studies in Intelligence 13, no. 2 (Spring 1969): 53-61. [Richelson, Wizards (2002)]

Gray, William A. "Crystal Balls and Glass Bottles." Studies in Intelligence 12, no. 2 (Spring 1968): 1-6.

Scientific and technical intelligence officers believe that an "early tip-off on future military systems can be found in appropriate aspects of selected R&D efforts, so that intelligence on adversary R&D can give our own planners and policy makers valuable lead time." The author uses the example of the development of Soviet pulse power tube technology.

Herman, Isadore "Estimating Aircraft Performance." Studies in Intelligence 6, no. 1 (Winter 1962): 13-22.

An estimate of the performance characteristics of a newly unveiled aircraft "can be made with good reliability if a few photographs of the plane have been taken from the ground. The task begins with the photogrammetrist and the photo interpreter."

Jackson, Wayne. "Scientific Estimating." Studies in Intelligence 9, no. 3 (Summer 1965): 7-11.

Estimators "have a troublesome time with the problem of incorporating scientific or technical contributions into a finished estimate."

Klaimon, Jerold H. "Reentry Vehicle Analysis." Studies in Intelligence 12, no. 3 (Summer 1968): 23-33. [Richelson, Wizards (2002)]

Kroger, Charles A., Jr. "ELINT: A Scientific Intelligence System." Studies in Intelligence 2, no. 1 (Winter 1958): 71-83.

"This primer on ELINT (electronic intelligence) ... provides a brief history of the field as well as a good explanation of what it is and how it works. Includes a brief description of CIA's (and the DO's) role in ELINT."

Lawrence, R.E., and Harry W. Woo. "Infrared Imagery in Overhead Reconnaissance." Studies in Intelligence 11, no. 3 (Summer 1967): 17-40. [Richelson, Wizards (2002)]

Nance, William H. "Quality ELINT." Studies in Intelligence 12, no. 2 (Spring 1968): 7-19.

"Precision measurement of the operating parameters of uncooperating radars."

Ostensoe, James G. "The Problem of Scientific Surprise." Studies in Intelligence 5, no. 4 (Fall 1961): 15-20.

"Progress report on efforts to pin down an elusive estimative problem."

Plaster, Henry G. "Snooping on Space Pictures." Studies in Intelligence 8, no. 4 (Fall 1964): 31-39. [Richelson, Wizards (2002)]

Reiser, Donald, and Harry Wood. "Microtechnology." Studies in Intelligence 12, no. 4 (Fall 1968): 23-38.

"Intelligence needs impel giant advances in micropowered microelectronic systems."

Rothenberg, Herbert C. "Identifying the Future Threat." Studies in Intelligence 12, no. 4 (Fall 1968): 13-21.

"How R&D analysts used mathematical techniques, inductive and deductive logic, mirror imaging, and 'thinking like a Russian' to cope with the 'bathtub curve' of data on new weapons development in the 1960s."

Shea, James R. "Winnowing Wheat from Chaff." Studies in Intelligence 13, no. 4 (Fall 1969): 19-23.

"Tracking down Soviet underground nuclear explosions."

Smith, Alan B. "Costing Nuclear Programs." Studies in Intelligence 10, no. 1 (Winter 1966): 23-38.

"Direct and analog methods of determining what foreign countries spend on atomic energy for military and peaceful uses."

Soohoo, Edmund L. "An Elint Vigil, Unmanned." Studies in Intelligence 12, no. 2 (Spring 1968): 21-27.

Discusses the potential use of automated systems (note the date) for monitoring hard-to-get and/or infrequent electronic signals. The example is the Soviet SA-2 Guideline.

Stappen, James Van. "Laboratory Analysis of Suspect Documents." Studies in Intelligence 4, no. 3 (Summer 1960): 47-55.

"Some of the possibilities, methods, and results of submitting written materials to examination by test tube and microscope."

Stevens, Sayre. "'Foretesting' ABM Systems: Some Hazards." Studies in Intelligence 12, no. 3 (Summer 1968): 1-9.

"In the analysis of foreign weapons systems, protected by all the mechanisms of security the modern state can erect, the problem has become one of cautiously (and above all, elegantly) defining the bounds of what is technically possible."

Tauss, Edward. "Foretesting a Soviet ABM System." Studies in Intelligence 12, no. 1 (Winter 1968): 21-26.

The author offers a "case history in inductive reasoning" to "show how a slim amount of data may give a basis for determining the general characteristics and net capabilities of a new Soviet system before the Soviets themselves have a firm prototype of it." Sayre Stevens, "'Foretesting' ABM Systems: Some Hazards," Studies in Intelligence 12, no. 3 (Summer 1968): 1-9, takes issue with some of the propositions presented in this article.

U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. Penetrating the Iron Curtain: Resolving the Missile Gap with Technology, at: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/historical-collection-publications/resolving-the-missile-gap-with-technology/index.html.

"With few well-placed human sources inside the Soviet Union, it was only with the CIA's development of, what can only be called, timely technological wizardry -- the U-2 aircraft and Corona Satellite reconnaissance program -- that breakthroughs occurred in gaining valuable, game-changing intelligence. Coupled with the innovative use of aerial and satellite photography and other technical collection programs, the efforts began to produce solid, national intelligence."

Wheelon, Albert D., and Sidney Graybeal. "Intelligence for the Space Race." Studies in Intelligence 7, no. 4 (Fall 1963): 1-13. [Richelson, Wizards (2002)]

Whitmire, Frank A., and Edward G. Correll. "The Failure of Cosmos 57." Studies in Intelligence 10, no. 3 (Summer 1966): 25-29. Quest: The History of Spaceflight 15, no. 1 (Feb. 2008).

The authors show how telemetry analysis identified what went wrong with Cosmos 57 and why that failure did not delay the flight of Voskhod 2 and its attendant spacewalk.

Wonus, M. C. "The Case of the SS-6." Studies in Intelligence 13, no. 1 (Winter 1969): 25-31. [https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/kent-csi/vol13no1/html/v13i1a03p_0001.htm]

"The author argues that the intelligence community badly misunderstood the propellant system of the Soviet space rocket booster, the SS-6, because analysts engaged in mirror imaging, assuming wrongly the applicability of US design criteria."

Zabetakis, Stanley G., and John F. Peterson. "The Diyarbkir Radar." Studies in Intelligence 8, no. 4 (Fall 1964): 41-47.

The authors "describe a ground-based radar at Diyarbakir, in eastern Turkey, which is not unlike other radar systems currently deployed to satisfy S&T intelligence collection requirements."

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