Hilsman, Roger. To Move a Nation: The Politics of Foreign Policy in the Administration of John F. Kennedy. Garden City, NJ: Doubleday, 1967. New York: Dell, 1968. [pb] Hilsman, Roger. To Move a Nation: The Politics of Foreign Policy in the Administration of John F. Kennedy. Garden City, NJ: Doubleday, 1967. New York: Dell, 1968. [pb]
Abbot E. Smith, Studies 11.4 (Fall 1967), says that this "is an excellent book, well organized, well written, well worth reading.... There is a great deal about the CIA." Hilsman treats the CIA "fairly and judiciously.... He emphatically denies that the Agency is or was ... an Invisible Government."
Pforzheimer finds that the parts of the book on President Kennedy and the CIA and the Cuban Missile Crisis "are of particular interest. Hilsman's comments are highly subjective and frequently very provocative and debatable."
Max Holland, "The Politics of Intelligence Postmortems: Cuba 1962-1963," International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 20, no. 3 (Fall 2007): 426, argues that "Hilsman's position [at the time and in this book] was that of loyalty to the Kennedy administrarion rather than the facts."
Holland, Max. "The 'Photo Gap' that Delayed Discovery of Missiles in Cuba." Studies in Intelligence 49, no. 4 (2005): 15-30.
"The political decision to desist from intrusive or risky overflights [of Cuba] and stretch out the missions" contributed to "a dysfunctional surveillance regime in a dynamic situation." The result was to delay the discovery of the offensive missiles at San Cristóbal by almost amonth.
Holland, Max. "The Politics of Intelligence Postmortems: Cuba 1962-1963." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 20, no. 3 (Fall 2007): 415-452.
"What is striking was how the four ex post facto analyses varied in their findings and conclusions regarding the performance of the Intelligence Community in the run-up to the missile crisis, notwithstanding the sameness of the facts at issue." Central to Holland's discussion is the treatment in the postmortems of the results and/or meaning of the 10 September 1962 meeting where the Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance (COMOR) agreed to restrict the regularly scheduled U-2 overflights of Cuba. The author concludes that "the lesson from 1962-1963 would seem to be that all such inquests should be viewed critically, and with the utmost caution."
Following the release in June 2007 of CIA IG Jack Earman's November 1962 report, Holland extends the thesis of this article in "More on Postmortems," International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 21, no. 1 (Spring 200): 188-189.
Hotz, Robert. "What
Was the Threat." Aviation Week & Space Technology, 12 Nov.
1962, 21.
According to Garthoff, I&NS 13.3/57/fn. 16, this "inaccurate" article "gave rise to a school of revisionist analysis [of the Cuban Missile Crisis] ... that questioned whether the Kennedy administration had honestly presented the picture of the missile threat, but these speculations were misinformed and without merit."
Hughes, John T., with A. Denis Clift. "The San Cristobal Trapezoid." Studies in Intelligence, Winter 1992: 41-56. Studies in Intelligence: 45th Anniversary Special Edition, Fall 2000, 149-165.
Hughes was Special Assistant to DIA Director Lt. Gen. Joseph F. Carroll during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Here, he gives his version of the events of that period.
Johnson, Thomas R., and David A. Hatch. NSA and the Cuban Missile Crisis. Ft. George G. Meade, MD: National Security Agency, Center for Cryptologic History, 1998. [http://www.nsa.gov/publications/publi00033.cfm]
"[S]ignals intelligence did not provide any direct information about the Soviet introduction of offensive ballistic missiles into Cuba. However, in the more than two years before that fact was known, SIGINT analysts thoroughly studied the Cuban military buildup. Once the offensive missiles were discovered, SIGINT provided direct support for day-to-day management of the crisis."
Kahan, Jerome H., and Anne K. Long. "The Cuban Missile Crisis: A Study of Its Strategic Context." Political Science Quarterly 87 (Dec, 1972): 564-590.
Kennedy, Robert F.
Thirteen Days: A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis. New York: Norton,
1969.
Kent, Sherman. "A
Crucial Estimate Relived." Studies in Intelligence 8, no. 2 (Spring 1964): 1-18. Studies in Intelligence 36, no. 5 (1992): 111-119.
Westerfield: "Kent's account of his greatest mistake: the prediction three weeks before the Cuban missile crisis that Moscow would be unlikely to station missiles in Cuba that could reach much of the United States."
See Michael Douglas Smith, "The Perils of Analysis: Revisiting Sherman Kent’s Defense of SNIE 85-3-62." Studies in Intelligence 51, no. 3 (2007). [https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol51no3/index.html]
Knorr, Klaus. "Failures
in National Intelligence Estimates: The Case of the Cuban Missiles."
World Politics 16, no. 3 (Apr. 1964): 455-467.
Kramer, Mark, et al.
"Remembering the Cuban Missile Crisis: Should We Swallow Oral History?"
International Security 15, no. 1 (1990): 212-218.
Larson, David, ed. The 'Cuban Crisis' of 1962. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1963.
Laubenthal, Sanders A. [CAPT/USAF] The Missiles in Cuba, 1962: The Role of SAC Intelligence. Offutt AFB, NE: Strategic Air Command, 1984.
Lechuga, Carlos M.,
and Mirta Muniz. In the Eye of the Storm: Castro, Khrushchev, Kennedy, and Missile Crisis. Melbourne, Australia: Ocean Press, 1995.
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