Garthoff, Raymond L.
1. "American Reaction to Soviet Aircraft in Cuba, 1962 and 1978." Political Science Quarterly 95, no. 3 (1980): 427-439.
2. "Cuban Missile Crisis: The Soviet Story." Foreign Policy 72 (Fall 1988): 61-80.
3. "Commentary: Evaluating and Using Historical Hearsay." Diplomatic History 14, no. 2 (1990): 223-229.
Petersen: "Caveat on recent Soviet-American missile crisis conference revelations."
4. "The Havana Conference on the Cuban Missile Crisis." Cold War International History Project Bulletin 1 (Spring 1992): 1, 3.
5. "The Meaning of the Missiles." Washington Quarterly 5, no. 4 (1982): 76-82. [Petersen]
6. Reflections on the Cuban Missile Crisis. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1987. Rev. ed. 1989.
7. "US Intelligence in the Cuban Missile Crisis." Intelligence and National Security 13, no. 3 (Autumn 1998): 18-63.
"[J]udged on the basis of what could reasonably have been expected of the contribution of US intelligence in the Cuban missile crisis, performance was generally good, in some respects outstanding, albeit with a few shortcomings."
Gibson, David R. Talk at the Brink: Deliberation and Decision during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012.
Peake, Studies 57.3 (Sep 2013), and Intelligencer 20.2 (Fall-Winter 2013), notes that "for nonsociologists, the interpretations" in this book of the conversations in President Kennedy's ExComm "do not discount the simpler explanation that Kennedy considered all the evidence, as disorderly as it was, and simply made the decision that he thought would avoid a nuclear exchange with the Soviet Union."
Gleichauf, Justin F. "Red Presence in Cuba: The Genesis of a Crisis." Army 29 (Nov. 1979): 34-38. [Petersen]
Goodell, Thaxter L. "Cratology Pays Off." Studies in Intelligence 8, no. 4 (Fall 1964): 1-10.
Deals with the identification of Soviet arms and equipment arriving in Cuba by distinguishing among the different sizes and shapes of crates used to transport the cargo.
Greene, Fred. "The Intelligence Arm: The Cuban Missile Crisis." In Foreign Policy in the Sixties: The Issues and the Instruments, eds. Roger Hilsman and Robert C. Good, 127-140. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Press, 1965. [Petersen]
Gribkov, Anatoli I., and William Y. Smith. Operation ANADYR: U.S. and Soviet Generals Recount the Cuban Missile Crisis. Chicago: Edition Q, Inc., 1994.
According to Friedman, NSLR, Oct. 1994, this book "compares the views of two senior military officers who were adversaries in the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis.... Joint Chiefs were unaware that Kennedy had determined that the United States could live with Castro.... Neither Kennedy nor Khrushchev clearly articulated their objectives in the time period immediately preceding the crisis." Hansen, Studies 46.1/50/fn.4, calls this "a vital source, given Gen. Gribkov's role in planning and implementing the operation."
Haig, Alexander M., and Charles McCarry. Inner Circles: How America Changed the World, A Memoir. New York: Warner Books, 1992. [pb] 1994. E840H335
Surveillant 2.4: "Haig talks about the many intelligence matters he was involved in. Chapter Seven, 'Missiles and Mythology,' covers the Cuban Missile Crisis. Chapter Eight, 'Covert Actions,' discusses covert activities against Cuba which Haig performed on behalf of Cyrus Vance at the Pentagon."
Hansen, James H. "Soviet Deception in the Cuban Missile Crisis." Studies in Intelligence 46, no. 1 (2002): 49-58.
"From its inception, the Soviet missile operation entailed elaborate denial and deception (D&D) efforts," for which the author provides both details and context.
Herring, Eric. Danger and Opportunity: Explaining International Crisis Outcomes. Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 1995.
Gray and Walton, I&NS 13.2, present this work as a mixed bag. They see the theoretic section as "solid" and the author's knowledge of the literature as "excellent." On the other hand, the associated cases studies -- "including two crises relating to Berlin, the Cuban Missile Crisis, [and] the Sino-Soviet crisis of 1969" -- "are somewhat disappointing." Overall, however, the book "is a good introduction to the debates in crisis theory."
Hershberg, James G.
1. "Anatomy of a Controversy: Anatoly Dobrynin's Meeting with Robert F. Kennedy, Saturday, 27 October 1962." Cold War International History Project Bulletin 5 (Spring 1995): 75, 77-80.
2. "Before the Missiles of October: Did Kennedy Plan a Military Strike Against Cuba?" Diplomatic History 14, no. 2 (Spring 1990): 163-198.
3. "More on Bobby [Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy] and the Cuban Missile Crisis." Cold War International History Project Bulletin 8-9 (Winter 1996-1997): 274, 344-347.
The focus here is on Robert Kennedy's back-channel contacts with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin.
4. "New Evidence on the Cuban Missile Crisis: More Documents from the Russian Archives." Cold War International History Project Bulletin 8-9 (Winter 1996-1997): 270-338.
The documents, which cover the period 14 September-10 December 1962, begin on page 278 and include excerpts of a cable from Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko reporting on his 18 October 1962 meeting with President Kennedy.
Hershberg, James G. "Their Man in Havana: Anglo-American Intelligence Exchanges and the Cuban Crises, 1961-62." Intelligence and National Security 15, no. 2 (Summer 2000): 121-176.
Abstract: "When the United States broke diplomatic relations with Cuba in January 1961, American officials turned to London, which maintained its embassy in Havana, to provide political, economic, and military intelligence on ... Cuba. Over the next two years,... the British government used this channel not only to provide information to its superpower ally, but also to try to 'moderate' Washington's anti-Castro policies ... and to deflect pressures to join its campaign of economic pressures against the island."
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