Alsop, Joseph W., with Adam Platt. "I've Seen the Best of It": Memoirs. New York: Norton, 1992.
Surveillant 2.4: The author "knew what CIA was up to in many places ... and had close ties to many senior figures in CIA in its early days.... The book's principal weakness lies in the author's too golden view of the Kennedy administration." Alsop includes a section on "CIA relations with press." See also, Yoder, Joe Alsop's Cold War (1995).
Alsop, Stewart. The Center: People and Power in Political Washington. New York: Harper & Row, 1968.
Petersen: "Useful information on intelligence officials and episodes."
Alsop, Stewart. "CIA, the Battle for Secret Power." Saturday Evening Post, 27 Jul. 1963, 17-21. [Petersen]
Blumenfeld, Yorick F. "Intelligence for Security." Editorial Research Reports, 28 Dec. 1961, 937-954. [Petersen]
Bradlee, Ben C. Conversations with Kennedy. New York: Norton, 1975.
Clark comment: Yes, presidents do discuss covert activities with uncleared friends. However, the stories touched on here are anecdotal in nature and do not significantly expand our knowledge of the events discussed.
Bundy, William. A Tangled Web: The Making of Foreign Policy in the Nixon Presidency. New York: Hill and Wang, 1998.
Thomas, New York Times, 24 May 1998, finds the author's tone to be "fair-minded and dispassionate.... Bundy writes clearly and gracefully and at times with narrative drive, but he offers more diplomatic history than the average reader will want to know.... Still, Bundy's carefully researched analysis will have an impact on the academics, think-tank gurus and pundits."
For Woodard, H-Net Reviews, 23 Aug. 1999, this book "remorselessly builds the factual blocks, but considering the established history that it is challenging, it is no blockbuster. The most serious flaw is that the discretion of the former official prevails over the historian's consuming quest." Schoenfeld, Commentary, Jul. 1998, says this has "its share of ... serious defects. Yet ... A Tangled Web is a thoroughly engrossing work, written in a reasoned voice and, despite its defects, full of insight into the complexities of Richard Nixon's statecraft. Even its errors ... have much to teach."
Falk, Stanley L. The National Security Structure. Washington, DC: Industrial College of the Armed Forces, 1967.
Fauth, James J. "Adversary Agent Radios." Studies in Intelligence 10, no. 1 (Winter 1966): 57-67.
Available samples of Communist bloc agent radios "range from crude, handmade, manually keyed transmitters to top-quality production-line automatic high-speed equipment... There is ... a real technical cleavage between the Eastern [Chinese, North Korean, and North Vietnamese] and Western Communist services corresponding to the discrepancy between the respective national technologies." Among the European Communist countries, "Bulgarian and to a degree Polish agent radios ... show an almost elementary approach to design and a handmade quality in thier fabrication."
Finn, Peter. "Once-Secret Berlin Wall Papers Released." Washington Post, 17 Oct. 2011. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]
On 27 October 2011, "to mark the anniversary of a day that some feared would trigger nuclear war, the National Archives National Declassification Center and the Central Intelligence Agency's Historical Review Program released 370 documents about the building of the Berlin Wall.... The materials are drawn from 11 different government agencies and include intelligence reports, U.S. Army and NATO contingency plans, photographs of the wall rising, and a 600-page State Department analysis covering the situation in Berlin from 1958 to 1962."
See "The Berlin Wall Collection," at: http://www.foia.cia.gov/BerlinWall.asp. The collection includes five "essays," including the State Department analysis mentioned above; Neil Carmichael's "A Brief History of the Berlin Crisis of 1961"; and Donald P. Steury's "Bitter Measures: Intelligence and Action in the Berlin Crisis, 1961."
Freedman, Lawrence. Kennedy's Wars: Berlin, Cuba, Laos, and Vietnam. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.
Roberge, I&NS 17.4, calls this "the most insightful work yet produced on US national security policy during the early 1960s." However, the author's "detached style takes some of the drama out of the story."
Hadley, Arthur T. "Complex Query: What Makes a Good Spy?" New York Times Magazine, 29 May 1960, 12, 43-44.
Hanrahan, James. "Intelligence for the Policy Chiefs." Studies in Intelligence 11, no. 1 (Winter 1967): 1-12.
Helms, Richard. "Intelligence in American Society." Studies in Intelligence 11, no. 3 (Summer 1967): 1-16.
Hersh, Burton. Bobby and J. Edgar: The Historic Face-Off Between the Kennedys and J. Edgar Hoover That Transformed America. New York: Carroll & Graf, 2007.
Goulden, Washington Times, 23 Sep. 2007, finds that this book "does a serious disservice to history (and the truth)." The author has produced "a nose-holder of a book"; it is "laden with outlandish assertions.... Repeating nut stuff serves only to keep nonsense in circulation." For Harter, Intelligencer 15.3 (Summer-Fall 2007), this is "a well-written hodgepdge, blending fact, rumor and innuendo." It has "nothing new." Hersh "includes some mighty tell tales ... which stretch belief, and challenge common sense." Although it is "at times an interesting account," the author too often "allowed speculation to become fact; rumor and innuendo to masquerade as reality."
To Theoharis, I&NS 26.4 (Aug. 2011), this is a "well-written, massive, and extensively research study" that "does not advance our understanding" and "devolve[s] into gossipy, at times conspiratorial, assertions.... Hersh's affinity for the sensational at times leads to his distortion of a more complex reality."
Hilsman, Roger. To Move a Nation: The Politics of Foreign Policy in the Administration of John F. Kennedy. Garden City, NJ: Doubleday, 1967. New York: Dell, 1968. [pb]
Abbot E. Smith, Studies 11.4 (Fall 1967), says that this "is an excellent book, well organized, well written, well worth reading.... There is a great deal about the CIA." Hilsman treats the CIA "fairly and judiciously.... He emphatically denies that the Agency is or was ... an Invisible Government." Pforzheimer finds that the parts of the book on President Kennedy and the CIA and the Cuban Missile Crisis "are of particular interest. Hilsman's comments are highly subjective and frequently very provocative and debatable."
Holland, "The Politics of Intelligence Postmortems: Cuba 1962-1963," IJI&C 20.3 (Fall 2007), p. 426, argues that "Hilsman's position [at the time and in this book] was that of loyalty to the Kennedy administrarion rather than the facts."
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