GENERAL POST-WORLD WAR II

1950s

Works of General Intelligence Interest

D - L

 

Dick, James C. "The Strategic Arms Race, 1957-1961: Who Opened a Missile Gap?" Journal of Politics 34, no. 4 (1972): 1062-1110. [Petersen]

Divine, Robert A.

1. Blowing on the Wind: The Nuclear Test Ban Debate, 1954-1960. New York: Oxford University Press, 1978.

Cold War Connection, "Top Books on the Cold War," http://www.cmu.edu/coldwar/annot.htm, comments that the author "ably chronicles the complex dynamics of the 'Fallout Debate' within the United States which involved scientific, medical, political, military, and national security questions. The book shows that such questions ultimately delayed United States's treaty ratification until 1963."

2. Eisenhower and the Cold War. New York: Oxford University Press, 1981.

3. The Sputnik Challenge: Eisenhower's Response to the Soviet Satellite. New York: Oxford University Press, 1993.

Smith, I&NS 9.4, notes that President "Eisenhower was able to respond in a calm and systematic manner to Sputnik because he had access to intelligence information which led him to conclude that the Soviet satellite did not pose a threat to U.S. national security." Cold War Connection, "Top Books on the Cold War," http://www.cmu.edu/coldwar/annot.htm, says "this dynamic ... political history" provides good coverage of "[t]he Eisenhower administration's various responses to 'Sputnik,' including a fear of a growing 'missile gap,' an increased interest in US scientific and engineering capabilities, and a reevaluation of the national education system."

Dockrill, Saki. Eisenhower's New-Look National Security Policy, 1953-61. London: Macmillan, 1996.

The I&NS 12.3 reviewer, W. Scott Lucas, appears to belong to the re-revisionist school with regard to President Eisenhower. That is, no longer the passive Eisenhower of the pre-Ambrose days, but also something less than Ambrose's vision of Eisenhower the master strategist. Writing from that point of view, Lucas finds that "Dockrill's attempt to re-evaluate the meaning of the 'New Look' is commendable but, in the end, it becomes yet another ritual, highly selective account of US foreign and military policy." In particular, Lucas is displeased with what he sees as the author's failure to give covert operations pride of place in evaluating the Eisenhower years.

Duncan, K.C. "Geographic Intelligence." Studies in Intelligence 3, no. 2 (Spring 1958): 17-30.

The author discusses cross-country terrain, ports and beaches, railways, roads, inland water transportation, airfields, climate, mapping, photography, geographic names, and air targeting.

Eisenhower, Dwight D.

1. The White House Years: Mandate for Change, 1953-1956. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1963.

Petersen: "Internal security, Guatemala, Open Skies."

2. The White House Years: Waging Peace, 1956-1961. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1965.

Petersen: "Missile Gap, U-2, CIA and Allen Dulles."

Fedornak, Michael. Partizan, The Heroic Story of Michael Fedornak; American-Born Rusyn Spy Behind Enemy Lines and the Iron Curtain. Ellsworth, ME: Downeast Graphics and Printing, 1998.

According to Anderson, Intelligencer 10.3, this autobiography covers the author's "adventures as a WWII partisan in Czechoslovakia and his early Cold War work as an agent of US intelligence.... This is a 'nuts and bolts' view into a confusing and messy period.... Fedornak doesn't try to deal with the grand design of the events in which he played a part. Instead,... he shows the reader what he did and how he survived."

Felix, Christopher [James McCargar]. "The 'Modern Spy' Extends His Arena." New York Times Magazine (8 Jun. 1953): 24 ff. [Petersen]

Garthoff, Raymond L. "Intelligence Aspects of Early Cold War Summitry (1959-60)." Intelligence and National Security 14, no. 3 (Autumn 1999): 1-22.

From abstract: "The author recounts, on the basis of personal experience as the responsible CIA officer and using previously classified documentation, intelligence aspects of summit level visits of Vice President Richard Nixon to the Soviet Union and Soviet Premier Nikita Khruschev to the United States in 1959, and the planned but aborted visit of President Dwight Eisenhower to the Soviet Union in 1960."

Gati, Charles. Failed Illusions: Moscow, Washington, Budapest, and the 1956 Hungarian Revolt. Cold War International History Project. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006. 2008. [pb]

Goulden, Intelligencer 15.2 (Fall-Winter 2006-2007) and Washington Times, 26 Nov. 2006, notes that the author "delves deeply in the politics of the revolt, both in terms of tangled internal politics, and Budapest's relations with Moscow." Gati "sorely faults RFE, but also notes that policy guidance, such as it was, was confused." For Corke, I&NS 27.2 (Apr. 2009), this is "an excellent book. It is eminently readable, beautifully written, and compelling in both form and substance.... [I]t provides one of the best studies available on the events that occurred in Hungary."

Greenberg, Harold M. "Research Note: The Doolittle Commission of 1954." Intelligence and National Security 20, no. 4 (Dec. 2005): 687-694.

This is an effort to resurrect the Doolittle Commission's review of covert action from the dustbin of history, to which it has been consigned by many historians. The main point is that "the secrecy of its progress and the narrow dissemination of its report cast doubt that the Doolittle Commission was calculated simply to outmaneuver Congress."

Grose, Peter. Operation Rollback: America's Secret War Behind the Iron Curtain. Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin, 2000.

Click for reviews.

Hilsman, Roger. "Intelligence and Policy-Making in Foreign Affairs." World Politics 5, no., 1 (Oct. 1952): 1-45.

Hook, Sidney. "The Strategy of Political Warfare." In Political Power and Personal Freedom: Critical Studies in Democracy, Communism, and Civil Rights, 389-401. New York: Criterion, 1959. [Petersen]

Hopkins, Robert S., III. "An Expanded Understanding of Eisenhower, American Policy and Overflights." Intelligence and National Security 11, no. 2 (Apr. 1996): 332-344.

Apart from the civilian U-2 flights approved by Eisenhower, the President also endorsed military reconnaissance missions over the Soviet Union. He also "delegated the authority to conduct them to senior military leaders." In addition, he "judged the value of such missions on both their military as well as political value or consequences."

Kinzer, Stephen. The Brothers: John Foster Dulles, Allen Dulles, and Their Secret World War. New York: Times Books, 2013.

Goldstein, Washington Post, 14 Nov. 2013, sees this as "a bracing, disturbing and serious study of the exercise of American global power." The author "displays a commanding grasp of the vast documentary record, taking the reader deep inside the first decades of the Cold War." He provides a "devastating critique" of the Dulles brothers, "who are depicted as jointly responsible for acts of extreme geopolitical myopia, grave operational incompetence and misguided adherence to a creed of corporate globalism." For Peake, Studies 58.2 (Jun. 2014), Kinzer's narrative "calls attention" both to the brothers' simiularities and "their sharp differences."

Larres, Klaus. "Eisenhower and First Forty Days after Stalin's Death: The Incompatibility of Detente and Political Warfare." Diplomacy & Statecraft 6 (Jul. 1995): 431-469.

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