Alin, Erika. The United States and the 1958 Lebanon Crisis. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1994.
Lucas, I&NS 12.3, calls this a "closely argued and well-documented study." The author avoids "the trap of arguing that the US unconditionally opposed Arab nationalism." The reviewer also notes that Alin is evaluating U.S. diplomatic and conventional military responses to events in the Lebanon and throughout the Middle East," rather than focusing on intelligence and covert action issues.
Alsop, Joseph W., with Adam Platt. "I've Seen the Best of It": Memoirs. New York: Norton, 1992.
Surveillant 2.4: The author "knew what CIA was up to in many places ... and had close ties to many senior figures in CIA in its early days.... The book's principal weakness lies in the author's too golden view of the Kennedy administration." Alsop includes a section on "CIA relations with press." See also, Yoder, Joe Alsop's Cold War (1995).
Alsop, Stewart. The Center: People and Power in Political Washington. New York: Harper & Row, 1968.
Petersen: "Useful information on intelligence officials and episodes."
Ambrose, Stephen E. Eisenhower. Vol. II. The President. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984.
Probably because of his earlier Ike's Spies (see below), Ambrose proves particularly adept at integrating intelligence matters into his biography of Eisenhower.
Ambrose, Stephen E., with Richard H. Immerman. Ike's Spies: Eisenhower and the Espionage Establishment. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1981.
Clark comment: Ambrose is a respected historian and Eisenhower biographer. The focus of the first part of the book is on the World War II years, including Ultra, Torch, and Overlord. Ambrose compares the Allied surprise at the beginning of the Battle of Bulge to the German surprise on D-Day. The second part of the book covers intelligence issues during Eisenhower's presidency.
To Constantinides, the "principal fault of this book is the authors' exaggeration of Eisenhower's direct role and first-hand participation in intelligence matters as distinct from his general responsibilities as commander and president.... Little evidence is produced to show that he took more than a normal leader's interest in intelligence operations and techniques." There are enough errors to "cause the reader to be cautious," but there are "some good passages" as well. Lucas, I&NS 12.3/197, comments that Ike's Spies "illuminated covert action's importance within US strategy" but also "fell prey to the myth of Eisenhower as controlling influence."
Bailey, Bill. "Summer of '57." Naval Intelligence Professionals Quarterly 5, no. 2 (1987): 3-5. [Petersen]
Bohlen, Charles E. Witness to History, 1929-1969. New York: Norton, 1973.
Bohlen was U.S. Ambassador to Moscow from 1953 to 1957. Although it is certainly not the focus of his discussion of his time in the USSR, the author provides some coverage of intelligence-related matters.
Brands, H.W., Jr. Cold Warriors: Eisenhower's Generation and American Foreign Policy. Contemporary American History Series. New York: Columbia University Press, 1988. ISBN: 0231065264.
Grant, Millennium: Journal of International Studies 17.3 (Dec. 1988), calls this work "witty, perseptive and highly readable." The chapters on C.D. Jackson and Harold Stassen "are especially useful." However, the brevity of these and other chapters "is ultimately too constraining for a serious analysis of U.S. foreign policy in the 1950s." For Doenecke, JAH 76.1 (1989), the author offers a "well-written narrative" and "finely crafted portraits of leading [Eisenhower] administration figures."
Branyan, Robert L., and Lawrence H. Larsen. "The Intelligence Community." In The Eisenhower Administration, 1953-1961: A Documentary History, ed. Robert L. Branyan, 1208-1280. New York: Random House, 1971.
Buckow, Anjana. Zwischen Propaganda und Realpolitik: Die USA und der sowjetisch besetzte Teil Deutschlands 1945-1955. USA-Studies 13. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2003.
von Buelow, H-German, H-Net Reviews, Oct. 2004, notes that the author discusses "the activities of RIAS (the famous broadcasting station in the American sector of Berlin) and various other propaganda efforts, particularly those aimed at East Germany's youth." However, Buckow concentrates "exclusively on the perceptions of a small group of American military and diplomatic policy-makers." Her "meticulous research could have paid more attention to the perceptions of the U.S. intelligence community, particularly since this group played a critical function during the Cold War (especially in Berlin), not merely in their role as furnishers of secret information to policy-makers but also as covert actors." (footnote omitted)
Bundy, William P. "The Guiding of Intelligence Collection." Studies in Intelligence 3, no. 1 (Winter 1959): 37-52.
"[B]y and large we are now in a situation where the demands are manifold, the priorities difficult to keep clear, and the collection capabilities variable, hard to appraise and extremely limited relative to demands. In these circunstances guidance become one of our major problems."
Calhoun, Daniel F. Hungary and Suez, 1956: An Exploration of Who Makes History. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1991.
According to Aldrich, I&NS 9.3, the author uses only "limited source material," and his "understanding of the day-to-day diplomacy is far inferior to that offered in the other studies now available." He gives only a "thin treatment of clandestine activities." Calhoun's "observations on the activities of Radio Free Europe are ... balanced and fairly well-informed."
Calhoun, Ricky-Dale. "The Art of Strategic Counterintelligence: The Musketeer's Cloak: Strategic Deception During the Suez Crisis of 1956." Studies in Intelligence 51, no. 2 (2007): 47-58. [https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol51no2/the-art-of-strategic-counterintelligence.html]
"[T]he British, French, and Israelis hid their preparations [for an attack on Egypt] in plain sight by allowing the Americans to see what they expected to see and thus led them to a false conclusion, then acted in an unexpected way. The strategic deception operation that enabled them to do so was multi-faceted and complex."
Cline, Ray S. "Is Intelligence Over-Coordinated?" Studies in Intelligence 1, no. 4 (Fall 1957): 11-18.
In the intelligence community, it "has not been the operational conduct of business or the anaytical procedures followed by the intelligence agencies" that have been coordinated tirelessly, "but purely their verbal product in the form of written reports and estimates."
Cook, Blanche W. The Declassified Eisenhower: A Divided Legacy. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1981. [Petersen]
Corke, Sarah-Jane. "The Eisenhower Administration and Psychological Warfare." Intelligence and National Security 24, no. 2 (Apr. 2009): 277-290.
This is a "Review Article" on works by Gati, Failed Illusions (2006); Osgood, Total War (2006); and Tudda, Truth Is Our Weapon (2006). However, the author's narrative on the subject makes it worth reading for its own sake.
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