O'Flaherty, Eamon. "Ireland's Nazis." History Ireland 15, no. 2 (Mar.-Apr. 2007): 48-49.See also, "The ALSOS Mission and Heisenberg"
O'Flaherty, Eamon. "Ireland's Nazis." History Ireland 15, no. 2 (Mar.-Apr. 2007): 48-49.
This review of two 1-hour programs on Ireland television, "Ireland's Nazis," on 9 and 16 January 2007, notes that the main theme "is the use of Ireland as a safe haven or refuge for a number of fugitive Nazis in the immediate post-war era."
Daniel Leach, "Irish Post-War Asylum: Nazi Sympathy, Pan-Celticism or Raisons d'Etat?" History Ireland 15, no. 3 (May-Jun. 2007): 36-41, "takes issue with some of the conclusions" in the "Ireland's Nazis" documentary. He points out that "it is now commonly understood that Ireland's neutrality [during World War II] was 'friendly' toward the Allies in practical, if discreet terms."
Ruffner, Kevin C. "A Persistent Emotional Issue: CIA's Support to the Nazi War Criminal Investigations." Studies in Intelligence (Semiannual ed. no. 1, 1997). [https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/97unclass/naziwar.html]
"The public is intrigued by tales of escaped Nazis, and CIA's own mystique lends itself to the belief that it directed classified operations that allowed such people to escape from justice. The media and self-proclaimed Nazi hunters quickly link the Agency to any new rumors of one Nazi fugitive or another. This controversy will outlive its participants -- the accused war criminals and collaborators as well as their American case officers."
Salter, Michael. "Intelligence Agencies and War Crimes Prosecution: Allen Dulles's Involvement in Witness Testimony at Nuremberg." Journal of International Criminal Justice 2 (2004): 826-854.
Salter, Michael. Nazi War Crimes, U.S. Intelligence and Selective Prosecution at Nuremburg: Controversies Regarding the Role of the Office of Strategic Services. New York: Routledge-Cavendish, 2007.
Peake, Studies 52.1 (Mar. 2008) and Intelligencer 16.1 (Spring 2008), finds that "[m]ost of this very detailed book dwells" on the contribution of the former OSS's war crimes staff." It also "details the involvement in Nuremberg of OSS Director William Donovan." After OSS was disbanded in 1945, "Donovan was assigned to the Nuremburg trials as deputy to Robert Jackson.... Donovan had definite views on the trials' handling, and they conflicted sharply with Jackson's.... [T]he differences with Jackson led to Donovan’s dismissal." The book "is comprehensive" and, with one exception, "thoroughly documented with primary sources."
Salter, Michael. "The Prosecution of Nazi War Criminals and the OSS: The Need for a New Research Agenda." Journal of Intelligence History 2, no. 1 (Summer 2002). [http://www. intelligence-history.org/jih/previous.html]
From abstract: The author proposes "a new research program addressing the constructive role played by different branches of the OSS in supporting the Nuremberg war crimes prosecutors, partly as a worthwhile topic in its own right but also as a much-needed corrective to the lack of balance within the present literature addressing the involvement of U.S. intelligence agencies with Nazi war crimes issues."
Simpson, Christopher. Blowback -- America's Recruitment of Nazis and Its Effects on the Cold War. New York: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1988.
Sinkin, NameBase, says that Simpson "traces the post-World War II recruitment by the U.S. of defeated Nazi chief of intelligence for Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, Reinhard Gehlen, and the increasing reliance of U.S. intelligence on the Gehlen organization's estimates of Soviet strengths and intentions. In the critical period from 1945 to 1948, the correct assessments by U.S. military intelligence that the Soviet occupation forces in Eastern Europe were worn out and posed no threat, were supplanted with the Gehlen organization's lie that these same forces were a major military threat posed to invade Germany. The rest is our history, known as the Cold War."
To Mapother, IJI&C 2.4, Blowback "provides more than average curiosity value ... [but] does not achieve clear focus." Simpson's "research is unreliable," although he "does useful research when the mood strikes him, yet even then [he] often contradicts himself.... Nevertheless, his prodigious research churns up information that is new."
Steury,
Donald P. "Tracking Nazi 'Gold': The OSS and Project SAFEHAVEN."
Studies in Intelligence 9 (Summer 2000): 35-50.
"Although it was evident from the outset that SAFEHAVEN would be primarily an intelligence-gathering problem, it does not appear to have occurred to anyone to consult the intelligence services, which were excluded from the planning and implementation of SAFEHAVEN until the end of November 1944.... Once the OSS was brought into the SAFEHAVEN fold, all the advantages of a centralized intelligence organization were brought to bear.... [For OSS,] SAFEHAVEN ... emerged as a joint SI [Secret Intelligence Branch]/X-2 [Counterintelligence Branch] operation..., especially in the key OSS outposts in Switzerland, Spain, and Portugal."
Szamuely, George. "Did the U.S. Recruit Nazi War Criminals?" Commentary 85, no. 6 (Jun.
1988): 50-53.
The author considers some of the recent works that address this topic.
Unrath, Walter J. "A
Matter of Hindsight: Army Clandestine Intelligence Operations and the Klaus
Barbie Affair. A Personal Perspective on the Vagaries of the Intelligence
Profession." American Intelligence Journal 14, no. 1 (Autumn/Winter
1993): 47-51.
This is a personal account of the investigation and report by the Department of Justice in 1983 of a clandestine U.S. Army Counter Intelligence Corps operation culminating in the exfiltration of Barbie from Europe to South America. Unrath was the chief of the Technical Specialist Division of the 66th CIC Group. Barbie was "a covert informant/agent targeted against East Germany and the Soviet Union, among other targets" whose "continued presence in the theater of operations could seriously jeopardize U.S. security." The author believes there is a "need for legislative clarification of accountability and also for a much needed official definition of 'lawful orders.'"
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