See also, "The ALSOS Mission and Heisenberg"
Milano, James V. [COL/USA (Ret.)], and Patrick Brogan. Soldiers, Spies, and the Rat Line: America's Undeclared War Against the Soviets. Washington, DC: Brassey's, 1996.
Ruffner, "CIC Records...," CSI Bulletin 11 (Summer 2000), notes that "[a]s the chief of the Operations Branch of the G-2, or Intelligence Section, of the headquarters of the United States Forces in Austria, Milano worked closely with the officers and special agents of the 430th CIC Detachment" from 1945 until 1950. This work "fleshes out many of the vignettes in CIC's official history."
According to Friedman, Parameters 27 (Summer 1997), this book "describes how U.S. military intelligence personnel ... became at first indirectly and then directly involved in providing cover and escape mechanisms for some former adversaries. It is a cautionary tale and one that should be kept in mind by future generations of military intelligence officers caught up in changing political situations."
Kruh, Cryptologia 20.3, comments that the author "recounts the exciting, sometimes rowdy, and, at times, amusing adventures of some of the first espionage efforts of the postwar era.... It is a riveting true story of the real world of intelligence during a precarious period of the Cold War."
To Cutler, Proceedings, Apr. 1996, Milano's "secret operations designed to thwart the Soviet occupation forces in Austria" were "[h]ighly successful in some ways," but introduced "unforeseen complications in others.... This so-called 'rat line' unwittingly served as the means of escape for the 'Butcher of Lyons,' Klaus Barbie. Laced with humor and insightful revelations, this memoir serves as an unusual account of heretofore closely guarded methods and secrets."
O'Flaherty, Eamon. "Ireland's Nazis." History Ireland 15, no. 2 (Mar.-Apr. 2007): 48-49.
This review of two 1-hour programs on Ireland television, "Ireland's Nazis," on 9 and 16 January 2007, notes that the main theme "is the use of Ireland as a safe haven or refuge for a number of fugitive Nazis in the immediate post-war era."
Daniel Leach, "Irish Post-War Asylum: Nazi Sympathy, Pan-Celticism or Raisons d'Etat?" History Ireland 15, no. 3 (May-Jun. 2007): 36-41, "takes issue with some of the conclusions" in the "Ireland's Nazis" documentary. He points out that "it is now commonly understood that Ireland's neutrality [during World War II] was 'friendly' toward the Allies in practical, if discreet terms."
Ruffner, Kevin C. "A Persistent Emotional Issue: CIA's Support to the Nazi War Criminal Investigations." Studies in Intelligence (Semiannual ed. no. 1, 1997). [https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/97unclass/naziwar.html]
"The public is intrigued by tales of escaped Nazis, and CIA's own mystique lends itself to the belief that it directed classified operations that allowed such people to escape from justice. The media and self-proclaimed Nazi hunters quickly link the Agency to any new rumors of one Nazi fugitive or another. This controversy will outlive its participants -- the accused war criminals and collaborators as well as their American case officers."
1. "Intelligence Agencies and War Crimes Prosecution: Allen Dulles's Involvement in Witness Testimony at Nuremberg." Journal of International Criminal Justice 2 (2004): 826-854.
See also, Lorie Charlesworth and Michael Salter, "Ensuring the After-Life of the Ciano Diaries: Allen Dulles' Provision of Nuremberg Trial Evidence," I&NS 21.4 (Aug. 2006): 568-603.
2. Nazi War Crimes, U.S. Intelligence and Selective Prosecution at Nuremburg: Controversies Regarding the Role of the Office of Strategic Services. New York: Routledge-Cavendish, 2007.
Peake, Studies 52.1 (Mar. 2008) and Intelligencer 16.1 (Spring 2008), finds that "[m]ost of this very detailed book dwells" on the contribution of the former OSS's war crimes staff." It also "details the involvement in Nuremberg of OSS Director William Donovan." After OSS was disbanded in 1945, "Donovan was assigned to the Nuremburg trials as deputy to Robert Jackson.... Donovan had definite views on the trials' handling, and they conflicted sharply with Jackson's.... [T]he differences with Jackson led to Donovan's dismissal." The book "is comprehensive" and, with one exception, "thoroughly documented with primary sources."
3. "The Prosecution of Nazi War Criminals and the OSS: The Need for a New Research Agenda." Journal of Intelligence History 2, no. 1 (Summer 2002). [http://www. intelligence-history.org/jih/previous.html]
From abstract: The author proposes "a new research program addressing the constructive role played by different branches of the OSS in supporting the Nuremberg war crimes prosecutors, partly as a worthwhile topic in its own right but also as a much-needed corrective to the lack of balance within the present literature addressing the involvement of U.S. intelligence agencies with Nazi war crimes issues."
Simpson, Christopher. Blowback -- America's Recruitment of Nazis and Its Effects on the Cold War. New York: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1988.
Sinkin, NameBase, says that Simpson "traces the post-World War II recruitment by the U.S. of ... Reinhard Gehlen, and the increasing reliance of U.S. intelligence on the Gehlen organization's estimates of Soviet strengths and intentions. In the critical period from 1945 to 1948, the correct assessments by U.S. military intelligence that the Soviet occupation forces in Eastern Europe were worn out and posed no threat, were supplanted with the Gehlen organization's lie that these same forces were a major military threat posed to invade Germany. The rest is our history, known as the Cold War."
To Mapother, IJI&C 2.4, Blowback "provides more than average curiosity value ... [but] does not achieve clear focus." Simpson's "research is unreliable," although he "does useful research when the mood strikes him, yet even then [he] often contradicts himself.... Nevertheless, his prodigious research churns up information that is new."
Steury, Donald P. "Tracking Nazi 'Gold': The OSS and Project SAFEHAVEN." Studies in Intelligence 9 (Summer 2000): 35-50.
"Although it was evident from the outset that SAFEHAVEN would be primarily an intelligence-gathering problem, it does not appear to have occurred to anyone to consult the intelligence services, which were excluded from the planning and implementation of SAFEHAVEN until the end of November 1944.... Once the OSS was brought into the SAFEHAVEN fold, all the advantages of a centralized intelligence organization were brought to bear.... [For OSS,] SAFEHAVEN ... emerged as a joint SI [Secret Intelligence Branch]/X-2 [Counterintelligence Branch] operation..., especially in the key OSS outposts in Switzerland, Spain, and Portugal."
Szamuely, George. "Did the U.S. Recruit Nazi War Criminals?" Commentary 85, no. 6 (Jun. 1988): 50-53.
The author considers some of the recent works that address this topic.
Unrath, Walter J. "A Matter of Hindsight: Army Clandestine Intelligence Operations and the Klaus Barbie Affair. A Personal Perspective on the Vagaries of the Intelligence Profession." American Intelligence Journal 14, no. 1 (Autumn/Winter 1993): 47-51.
This is a personal account of the investigation and report by the Department of Justice in 1983 of a clandestine U.S. Army Counter Intelligence Corps operation culminating in the exfiltration of Barbie from Europe to South America. Unrath was the chief of the Technical Specialist Division of the 66th CIC Group. Barbie was "a covert informant/agent targeted against East Germany and the Soviet Union, among other targets" whose "continued presence in the theater of operations could seriously jeopardize U.S. security." The author believes there is a "need for legislative clarification of accountability and also for a much needed official definition of 'lawful orders.'"
Walters, Guy. Hunting Evil: The Nazi War Criminals Who Escaped and the Hunt to Bring Them to Justice. New York: Bantam, 2009.
According to Peake, Studies 54.4 (Dec. 2010), and Intelligencer 18.2 (Winter-Spring 2011), the author "found that the Odessa network [a purported Vatican-sponsored network that helped Nazis escape prosecution for war crimes] is a myth and that allegations that Pope Pius XII was directly involved in engineering escapes are wrong, though the participation of various priests is well documented.... This is a fine book containing valuable professional background."
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