Gimbel, John.See also, "The ALSOS Mission and Heisenberg"
Gimbel, John.
1. "German Scientists, United States Denazification Policy, and the 'Paperclip Conspiracy.'" International History Review 12, no. 3 (Aug. 1990): 441-465.
2. "Project Paperclip: German Scientists, American Policy, and the Cold War." Diplomatic History 14, no. 3 (1990): 343-365.
In these articles, the author argues that "Project Paperclip was a national policy developed and implemented by duly authorized, responsible agents of the United States government, including cabinet officers, who consulted with and obtained the approval of the president of the United States." Gimbel, I&NS 7.3.
Hunt, Linda. Secret
Agenda: The United States Government, Nazi Scientists, and Project Paperclip,
1945 to 1990. New York: St. Martin's, 1991. Secret Agenda: The U.S. Government and Nazi Scientists. London: St. Martin's, 1991.
Gimbel, I&NS 7.3, takes issue with the author's secret agenda or conspiracy premise, arguing that "Project Paperclip was a national policy developed and implemented by duly authorized, responsible agents of the United States government, including cabinet officers, who consulted with and obtained the approval of the president of the United States."
Judt, Matthias, and Burghard Ciesla, eds. Technology Transfer out of Germany after 1945. Reading: Harwood, 1996.
Lane, Charles. "Book Details U.S. Protection of Former Nazi Officials." Washington Post, 14 May 2004, A2. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]
A book, U.S. Intelligence and the Nazis, released on 13 May 2004 by historians who have been reviewing declassified government documents for the government sheds "new light on the secret protection and support given to former Nazi officials and Nazi collaborators by U.S. intelligence agencies in the years following World War II. The book ... is based on 240,000 pages of FBI records, 419 CIA files on individuals and 3,000 pages of U.S. Army information detailing the Army's postwar relationship with former officers of the German Wehrmacht's intelligence service."
Lardner, George, Jr. "CIA Files Confirm U.S. Used Nazis After WWII." Washington Post, 28 Apr. 2001, A10. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]
According to details contained in 10,000 pages of 20 CIA "name files" released on 27 April 2001, "U.S. intelligence agencies used a rogue's gallery of Nazi war criminals after World War II to help cope with the new threats posed by the Soviet Union and its communist allies.... The collaboration was mainly with middle-ranking Nazis, men with obscure names but often deadly backgrounds."
Lasby, Clarence G.
Project Paperclip: German Scientists and the Cold War. New York: Atheneum, 1971. 1975. [pb]
For Pforzheimer, this is an "interesting look at the U.S. intelligence effort to find and exploit German scientists and technicians as World War II drew to an end and immediately thereafter." Constantinides points out that "this is largely a treatment of the overt side of the story. The covert or intelligence side needs to be researched to produce a fuller picture of the total effort."
Lee, Christopher. "CIA Ties with Ex-Nazis Shown: Anti-Communist Effort Is Detailed in Agency Records." Washington Post, 7 Jun. 2006, A21. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]
"The CIA organized Cold War spy networks that included former Nazis and failed to act on a 1958 report that fugitive Nazi war criminal Adolf Eichmann was living in Argentina, newly released CIA records show. The records were among 27,000 pages of documents made public [on 6 June 2006] at the National Archives."
According to Steven Aftergood, Secrecy News (from the FAS Project on Government Secrecy), 7 Jun. 2006, initial assessments of the documents were prepared by four historians for the Interagency Working Group (IWG) on Nazi War Crimes, which was created by Congress in 1998:
Timothy Naftali, "New Information on Cold War CIA Stay-Behind Operations in Germany and on the Adolf Eichmann Case." Available at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/eprint/naftali.pdf.
Robert Wolfe, "Gustav Hilger: From Hitler's Foreign Office to CIA Consultant." Available at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/eprint/wolfe.pdf.
Richard Breitman, "Tscherim Soobzokov." Available at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/eprint/breitman.pdf.
Norman J.W. Goda, "CIA Files Relating to Heinz Felfe, SS Officer and KGB Spy." Available at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/eprint/goda.pdf.
Loftus, John J. The
Belarus Secret. New York: Knopf, 1982.
Wilcox: "Account of some 300 Byelorussian anti-communist 'Nazis' brought to US after WWII to spy on USSR."
Milano, James V. [COL/USA
(Ret.)], and Patrick Brogan. Soldiers, Spies, and the Rat Line: America's
Undeclared War Against the Soviets. Washington, DC: Brassey's, 1996.
Ruffner, "CIC Records...," CSI Bulletin 11 (Summer 2000), notes that while "Milano was not a member of the 430th CIC Detachment [in Austria] ..., he was responsible for the unit's activities from 1945 until 1950. As the chief of the Operations Branch of the G-2, or Intelligence Section, of the headquarters of the United States Forces in Austria, Milano worked closely with the officers and special agents of the 430th CIC Detachment.... [This work] fleshes out many of the vignettes in CIC's official history."
According to Friedman, Parameters, Summer 1997, this book "describes how U.S. military intelligence personnel ... became at first indirectly and then directly involved in providing cover and escape mechanisms for some former adversaries. It is a cautionary tale and one that should be kept in mind by future generations of military intelligence officers caught up in changing political situations."
Kruh, Cryptologia 20.3, comments that the author "recounts the exciting, sometimes rowdy, and, at times, amusing adventures of some of the first espionage efforts of the postwar era.... It is a riveting true story of the real world of intelligence during a precarious period of the Cold War."
To Cutler, Proceedings, Apr. 1996, Milano's "secret operations designed to thwart the Soviet occupation forces in Austria" were "[h]ighly successful in some ways," but introduced "unforeseen complications in others.... This so-called 'rat line' unwittingly served as the means of escape for the 'Butcher of Lyons,' Klaus Barbie. Laced with humor and insightful revelations, this memoir serves as an unusual account of heretofore closely guarded methods and secrets."
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