See also, "The ALSOS Mission and Heisenberg"
Dabringhaus, Erhard. Klaus Barbie: The Shocking Story of How the U.S. Used This Nazi War Criminal as an Intelligence Agent. Washington, DC: Acropolis Books, 1984.
According to Ruffner, "CIC Records...," CSI Bulletin 11 (Summer 2000), "[t]he news of [former German SS officer Klaus] Barbie's arrest [in Bolivia in 1983] and his image on American television led to his recognition by one of his former CIC handlers.... Dabringhaus contacted NBC News and reported that he had worked with Barbie while serving as a CIC officer in Germany in 1948." In this book, he is "recall[ing] his CIC role years afterwards, colored by the knowledge that his actions had affected history for better or worse."
De Graaff, Bob. "What Happened to the Central Personality Index?" Intelligence and National Security 7, no. 3 (Jul. 1992): 317-326.
Much of the credibility of this unfootnoted article is undermined by the author's closing speculation where he links up Guy Liddell, "ever more seen as a Russian mole in MI5," as "one of the godfathers" of the CPI. The central point made in the article is that the CPI preceded and formed the backbone of the later Central Register of War Criminals and Security Suspects (CROWCASS), which is given attention in Christopher Simpson's Blowback (1988).
Douglas, Gregory. Gestapo Chief: The 1948 Interrogation of Heinrich Müller. 3 vols. San Jose, CA: R. James Bender, 1995, 1997, 1998.
Clark comment: It is probably safe to assume that this work is at heart a fabrication, although how much of it comes from the whole cloth and how much from documents obtained under the Freedom of Information Act is difficult to determine.
It is, thus, easy to be surprised that M.R.D. Foot, I&NS 12.2, gives Douglas' work sufficient credibility to state: "If [this book is] true, it upsets many received ideas [including that Müller was killed in Berlin in April 1945]; if false, it helps to poison the wells of historical truth." Douglas seems to play loosely (Foot writes of "carelessness") with easily knowable facts. This habit "does not encourage belief" when the author provides what purports to be a transcript of a telephone conversation in which Churchill tells Roosevelt that a Japanese fleet is moving across the Pacific.
In a review of the second volume, Foot, I&NS 13.2, seems more willing to go beyond being merely skeptical. He states that the book "seems to have been written with internal American politics almost as much on its editor's mind as the European atrocities it recounts -- its tone is as passionately anti-Roosevelt as the previous volume's was anti-Churchill; its bias denies it credence."
Similar to Foot in his review of the first volume, Kruh, Cryptologia 21.4, seems overly solicitous to only advise that readers "proceed with caution because hard evidence is not available to verify every revelation." Problem areas include the purported Churchill-Roosevelt telephone conversation, the claim that Hitler escaped from Berlin to Barcelona, and assertions that the deaths at Auschwitz numbered no more than 100,000 and were primarily due to typhus and other diseases. Kruh, Cryptologia 23.1, reviews volume three, again with only a brief notation that "hard evidence is not available to support many of Muller's controversial assertions."
Peake, Studies 48.1/102/fn13, comments that "[t]he documentary evidence he [Douglas] purports to have remains his secret. Th[e] facsimile documents he includes in his books are said by experts to be of his own making and cannot be found in the National Archives."
See R. Mohan Srivastava, Phillip L. Kushner, and Thomas K. Kimmel, "A Diplomatics Analysis of a Document Purported to Prove Prior Knowledge of the the Attack on Pearl Harbor," Intelligence and National Security 24, no. 4 (Aug. 2009): 586-611. The authors conclude that the purported Churchill-Roosevelt transcript in Gestapo Chief "is almost certainly a forgery, one likely produced by someone whose native language was English and not German."
[Dulles, Allen W.] "The Present Situation in Germany: Digest of a Meeting with Allen W. Dulles at the Council on Foreign Relations, December 3, 1945." Foreign Affairs 82, no. 6 (Nov.-Dec. 2003): 4-8.
This piece from the archives of the Council on Foreign Relations is not intelligence related, but is an interesting artifact from this time period.
Feigin, Judy. The Office of Special Investigations: Striving for Accountability in the Aftermath of the Holocaust. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Dec. 2006. [Available at: http://documents.nytimes.com/confidential-report-provides-new-evidence-of-notorious-nazi-cases?ref=us#p=1]
From New York Times description: "An internal history of the United States government's Nazi-hunting operation provides gripping new evidence about some of the most notorious Nazi cases of the last three decades. The Justice Department kept the 600-page report secret for the last four years, releasing a heavily redacted version last month to a private research group that sued to force its release. A complete version was obtained by The New York Times."
1. "German Scientists, United States Denazification Policy, and the 'Paperclip Conspiracy.'" International History Review 12, no. 3 (Aug. 1990): 441-465.
2. "Project Paperclip: German Scientists, American Policy, and the Cold War." Diplomatic History 14, no. 3 (1990): 343-365.
In these articles, the author argues that "Project Paperclip was a national policy developed and implemented by duly authorized, responsible agents of the United States government, including cabinet officers, who consulted with and obtained the approval of the president of the United States." Gimbel, I&NS 7.3.
Hunt, Linda. Secret Agenda: The United States Government, Nazi Scientists, and Project Paperclip, 1945 to 1990. New York: St. Martin's, 1991. Secret Agenda: The U.S. Government and Nazi Scientists. London: St. Martin's, 1991.
Gimbel, I&NS 7.3, takes issue with the author's secret agenda or conspiracy premise, arguing that "Project Paperclip was a national policy developed and implemented by duly authorized, responsible agents of the United States government, including cabinet officers, who consulted with and obtained the approval of the president of the United States."
Jacobsen, Annie. Operation Paperclip: The Secret Intelligence Program to Bring Nazi Scientists to America. New York: Little, Brown, 2014.
For Watkins, Studies 58.3 (Sep. 2014), this "detailed and highly readable account ... could have been improved if the author had focused on a shorter list than the 89 individuals profiled and maintained more topical continuity."
Judt, Matthias, and Burghard Ciesla, eds. Technology Transfer out of Germany after 1945. Reading: Harwood, 1996.
Lardner, George, Jr. "CIA Files Confirm U.S. Used Nazis After WWII." Washington Post, 28 Apr. 2001, A10. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]
According to details contained in 10,000 pages of 20 CIA "name files" released on 27 April 2001, "U.S. intelligence agencies used a rogue's gallery of Nazi war criminals after World War II to help cope with the new threats posed by the Soviet Union and its communist allies.... The collaboration was mainly with middle-ranking Nazis, men with obscure names but often deadly backgrounds."
Lasby, Clarence G. Project Paperclip: German Scientists and the Cold War. New York: Atheneum, 1971. 1975. [pb]
For Pforzheimer, this is an "interesting look at the U.S. intelligence effort to find and exploit German scientists and technicians as World War II drew to an end and immediately thereafter." Constantinides points out that "this is largely a treatment of the overt side of the story. The covert or intelligence side needs to be researched to produce a fuller picture of the total effort."
Lee, Christopher. "CIA Ties with Ex-Nazis Shown: Anti-Communist Effort Is Detailed in Agency Records." Washington Post, 7 Jun. 2006, A21. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]
"The CIA organized Cold War spy networks that included former Nazis and failed to act on a 1958 report that fugitive Nazi war criminal Adolf Eichmann was living in Argentina, newly released CIA records show. The records were among 27,000 pages of documents made public [on 6 June 2006] at the National Archives."
According to Steven Aftergood, Secrecy News (from the FAS Project on Government Secrecy), 7 Jun. 2006, initial assessments of the documents were prepared by four historians for the Interagency Working Group (IWG) on Nazi War Crimes, which was created by Congress in 1998:
Timothy Naftali, "New Information on Cold War CIA Stay-Behind Operations in Germany and on the Adolf Eichmann Case." Available at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/eprint/naftali.pdf.
Robert Wolfe, "Gustav Hilger: From Hitler's Foreign Office to CIA Consultant." Available at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/eprint/wolfe.pdf.
Richard Breitman, "Tscherim Soobzokov." Available at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/eprint/breitman.pdf.
Norman J.W. Goda, "CIA Files Relating to Heinz Felfe, SS Officer and KGB Spy." Available at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/eprint/goda.pdf.
Loftus, John J.
1. The Belarus Secret. New York: Knopf, 1982.
Blumenthal, NYT, 28 Dec. 1982, says the author charges that Nazi-collaborators from the Byelorussian puppet government were admitted into the United States after World War II. He places the blame for this on Frank Wisner who was seeking recruits for "a secret anti-Communist force ... to foment unrest behind the Iron Curtain." However, "there is a question as to whether the author in his zealousness may not have overstated some of his material."
2. America's Nazi Secret. Waterville, OR: TrineDay, 2010.
Peake, Studies 55.3 (Sep. 2011), finds that this apparently expanded version of The Belarus Secret is so dominated by "bizarre, spurious charges and messy judgments" that "[i]t is undeserving of serious attention."
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