Mitrovich, Gregory. Undermining the Kremlin: America's Strategy to Subvert the Soviet Bloc, 1947-1956. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000.
For Legvold, FA 79.3 (May-Jun. 1999), the author's "massive research in the archives of the State Department, CIA, and the National Security Council ... adds considerably to the ... picture of the calculations and arguments inside the Truman and Eisenhower administrations.... One does not have to buy his overdrawn characterization that 'rollback' was the be-all of U.S. policy to appreciate the contribution he has made."
Schlesinger, Stephen. "Cryptanalysis for Peacetime: Codebreaking and the Structure of the United Nations." Cryptologia 19, no. 3 (Jul. 1995): 217-235.
The author argues that the United States used information obtained from the decrypted messages of some of the participating countries, including Allies, to target its diplomacy in support of the UN Charter. Schlesinger says that references to the secret messages in the diary of Secretary of State Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., make clear the importance of the messages to the U.S. effort. David Kahn calls this "one of the most important articles in the history of cryptology.... Only two cases are known in which cryptanalysis has significantly affected world events in peacetime." This is one of the two. (Ed. note, p. 217.)
Stern, Guy. "The Jewish Exiles in the Service of US Intelligence: The Post-War Years." Yearbook of the Leo Baick Institute 40 (1995): 51-62.
Calder: "Jewish exiles served with distinction ... in the post-war era in connection with the Nuremberg trials and establishment of German newspaper and radio media."
Stivers, William. "Was Sovietization Inevitable? U.S. Intelligence Perceptions of Internal Developments in the Soviet Zone of Occupation in Germany." Journal of Intelligence History 5, no. 1 (Summer 2005). [http://www.intelligence-history.org/jih/journal.html]
From Abstract: The author looks at "the way US-intelligence perceived internal developments in the Soviet zone in Germany until the end of the Berlin blockade in May 1949. His account shows that American intelligence analysts came to the correct conclusion that the Soviets had no master plan for Germany and that the fate of Germany was largely undetermined."
Stout, Mark. "The Pond: Running Agents for State, War, and the CIA." Studies in Intelligence 48, no. 3 (2004): 69-82. American Intelligence Journal 23 (2005): 17-27.
John "Frenchy" Grombach created the Pond in early 1942 and keep it operational for the next 13 years. The organization "spent most of its existence not as a government agency, but as a private sector organization, operating within real companies.... [footnote omitted] This practice contributed substantially to obscurity and security. However, three successive government agencies found that having such an independent intelligence operation -- and, worse yet, one run by a pugnacious, conspiratorial ideologue -- was more trouble than it was worth.... [T]he Pond's independence allowed it to play one American agency off against another, in this case particularly the FBI and the CIA. The Pond's exclusive ownership of its product meant that Grombach could disseminate to the FBI or other agencies information that the CIA might have been able to determine was bad."
Stuart, Douglas T. "Ministry of Fear: The 1947 National Security Act Historical and Institutional Context." International Studies Perspectives 4, no. 3 (Aug. 2003): 293-313.
Totrov, Yuri. "Western Intelligence Operations in Eastern Europe, 1945-1954." Journal of Intelligence History 5, no. 1 (Summer 2005). [http://www.intelligence-history.org/jih/journal.html]
From Abstract: The author, a former KGB officer, "demonstrates how the British co-operated with the newly formed CIA and critically contemplates a secret conflict, in which western strategists underestimated their counterparts and refused to acknowledge realities on the frontline. Instead of stopping and assessing their losses, even more personnel and money was poured into what was proved to be an intelligence trap by Eastern services."
U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. A City Torn Apart: Building of the Berlin Wall, at: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/historical-collection-publications/building-of-the-berlin-wall/index.html.
"[T]his collection covers the period of 1945 to the end of 1961. The ... documents, videos, and photographs show Berlin's journey from a battered post war region occupied by the Allies to a city literally divided.... This is a joint project with the National Archives and Records Administration-National Declassification Center and more materials can be found on the NARA website."
U.S. Department of State. Office of the Historian. Eds., C. Thomas Thorne, Jr., and David S. Patterson. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945-1950 -- Truman Series: Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment. Washington, DC: GPO, 1996.
Clark comment: The FRUS series represents the official documentary record of the major foreign policy decisions and diplomatic activities of the U.S. Government. This volume, compiled retrospectively to the other volumes in the chronological series, is an essential resource for those interested in the beginnings of the American intelligence establishment in the years immediately after World War II. The 419 documents that make up the FRUS volume are available electronically, at: http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/history/intel/index.html.
"Ancillary or supplementary documents" to the FRUS volume were released in October 1997: For a description of the background to the compilation and issuance of the Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment volume and the additional documents, see: U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, "Background to the Release of Documents on the Origins of the Intelligence Community" (1997) at http://secretary.state.gov/www/briefings/statements/annouce971024a.html.
Nelson, Diplomatic History 22.3, comments that this work "represents a tentative first step toward integrating intelligence activities into the history of American foreign relations." The question of who would control the new intelligence establishment "dominates the memoranda, meeting summaries, and correspondence" included here.
U.S. Department of State. Office of the Historian. Foreign Relations, 1945-1950: Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment -- List of Documents. Washington, DC: 1997. [http://secretary.state.gov/www/briefings/statements/doclist971024a.html]
This site provides a list of the 419 documents that make up the FRUS volume. This is an essential resource for those interested in the beginnings of the American intelligence establishment in the years immediately after World War II.
Valero, Larry A. "An Impressive Record: The American Joint Intelligence Committee and Estimates of the Soviet Union, 1945-1947." Studies in Intelligence 9 (Summer 2000): 65-80.
This is an excellent introduction to one of the least known of U.S. intelligence organizations during and immediately after World War II. Although the focus of the article is on JIC's early estimates regarding the USSR for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, broader coverage of JIC formation and operation provide a useful and interesting background.
Wallace, Robert Daniel [LTCOL/USA]. "Eberstadt, Dulles and NSC 50: The Impetus for CIA Evolution through 1953." Intelligence and National Security 26, no. 5 (Oct. 2011): 620-638.
From "Abstract": "This article examines the formation of the CIA, discusses [the Eberstadt and Dulles] reports, national policy changes enacted in response, and relevance to the US intelligence community's current operations."
Zacharias, Ellis M., and Ladislas Farago. Behind Closed Doors: The Secret History of the Cold War. New York: Putnam, 1950.
Wilcox: "Covert operations, subversion, propaganda."
Ziegler, Charles A. "Intelligence Assessments of Soviet Atomic Capability, 1945-1949: Myths, Monopolies and Maskirovka." Intelligence and National Security 12, no. 4 (Oct. 1997): 1-24.
The author makes an interesting, if not totally substantiated, argument that the belief among top U.S. policymakers that the atomic monopoly would last longer than it did was based less on "character flaws" and more "on the failure of US intelligence." That failure lay initially in not accounting for all the high-grade uranium remaining in Europe and, then, in not compensating for that mistake "by obtaining reliable information on Soviet atomic progress."
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