POST-COLD WAR

From the 1990s

Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Operations

F - Z

Fleitz, Frederick H., Jr. Peacekeeping Fiascoes of the 1990s -- Causes, Solutions, and U.S. Interests. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002.

Warren, Intelligencer 13.2, notes that this work examines "the various military efforts at peacekeeping by the UN" from their beginning in 1956. "The meticulous research and documentation to be found in Peacekeeping Fiascoes is a tremendous help for those who wish to understand the UN and who worry about its future."

Gramer, George K., Jr. "Operation Joint Endeavor: Combined-Joint Intelligence in Peace Enforcement Operations." Military Intelligence 22, no. 4 (Oct.-Dec. 1996): 11-14.

"Contributing to the intelligence frustration in the theater was the proliferation of intelligence entities by nations and agencies.... In Sarajevo, there were at least ten national intelligence centers primarily dedicated to providing intelligence releasable only to their own nations.... Human intelligence (HUMINT) was clearly the number one collector in theater.... NATO-releasable SIGINT reporting consistently was a day late and a dollar short.... Imagery intelligence (IMINT) ... was [generally] sufficient and satisfactory." However, an excess of tactical reconnaissance assets were deployed in theater, and "the resultant products were often less than satisfactory."

Hearns, Michael. "'Blue Helmet Dark Glasses,' Peacekeeping and Intelligence in the 21st Century." Defence Forces Review (2006): 101-107.

Johnston, Paul. "No Cloak and Dagger Required: Intelligence Support to UN Peacekeeping." Intelligence and National Security 12, no. 4 (Oct. 1997): 102-112.

The United Nations has been reluctant to engage in "intelligence" activities, and this has led to difficulties in knowing what is going on in operational situations. The author argues that intelligence is about the efficient management of information, and, in the case of the United Nations, information it may already possess.

Thomas Quiggin, "Response to 'No Cloak and Dagger Required: Intelligence Support to UN Peacekeeping,'" Intelligence and National Security 13, no. 4 (Winter 1998), 203-207, takes issue with Johnston's assertion that the UN's greatest intelligence problem was at the operational level. For Quiggin, the "greatest failure of the UNPROFOR mission was, quite arguably, at the strategic level in New York."

Kiras, James D. "Intelligence, Peacekeeping and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles." Peacekeeping and International Relations 24, no. 6 (Nov.-Dec. 1995).

Kreib, Mark W. [LCDR/USN] "Intelligence Support to Peacekeeping Operations." Naval Intelligence Professionals Quarterly 18, no. 1 (Jan. 2002): 14.

Laipson, Ellen B. "Information-Sharing in Conflict Zones: Can the USG and the NGOs Do More?" Studies in Intelligence 49, no. 4 (2005): 55-64.

"Greater awareness of what NGOs have to offer and ways in which government could share data more effectively at relatively low cost (in terms of time and security risk) would be a modest, but valuable, contribution to post-conflict engagements."

Ogilvie-White, Tanya. "Nuclear Intelligence and North-South Politics." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 24, no. 1 (Spring 2011): 1-21.

"Despite the logic of systematically developing a full-fledged IAEA intelligence unit, many member states would strongly resist moves in this direction." Nonetheless, "a significant ad hoc expansion of IAEA intelligence apparatus has occurred since 1991."

Ramsbotham, David [Sir]. "Analysis and Assessment for Peacekeeping Operations." Intelligence and National Security 10, no. 4 (Oct. 1995): 162-174.

The author examines "the role of intelligence analysis and assessment in support of peacekeeping operations in a changing world." He focuses on what he perceives to be the intelligence needs of the United Nations in three types of peacekeeping missions: "preventive action, conflict resolution (whether traditional peacekeeping or peace enforcement), and post conflict reconstruction (or peace-building)."

Runions, Bradley. "American and British Doctrine for Intelligence in Peace Operations." Peacekeeping and International Relations 24, no. 6 (Nov.-Dec. 1995): 14-15.

Shetler-Jones, Philip. "Intelligence in Integrated UN Peacekeeping Missions: The Joint Mission Analysis Centre." International Peacekeeping 15, no. 4 (Aug. 2008): 517-527.

Shpiro, Shlomo. "Intelligence Services and Political Transformation in the Middle East." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 17, no. 4 (Winter 2004-2005): 575-600.

"An analysis of five decades of intelligence involvement in Middle East peace efforts provides some insights into the role of intelligence services in peacemaking. When the efforts of intelligence services were confined to local, clearly defined problems, they provided useful service in conflict management.... But when intelligence services became involved in wider, permanent settlement negotiations, their contribution was limited.... Based on the Middle East experience, intelligence services seem to play a far more effective role in conflict management than in conflict resolution."

Smith, Hugh. "Intelligence and UN Peacekeeping." Survival 36 (Autumn 1994): 174-192.

Swenson, Russell G., ed. Intelligence for Multilateral Decision and Action. Washington, DC: Joint Military Intelligence College, 1997.

Macartney, Intelligencer 9.1, identifies this work as "a super collection of first-person accounts of lessons learned in what's been called the 'internationalization of US intelligence,'" that is, the use of classified U.S. intelligence products in such situations as multinational peacekeeping operations. The authors are MA candidates at the JMIC, who are veterans of recent coalition operations.

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