POST-COLD WAR

2010s

General

N - P

Nakashima, Ellen, and Joby Warrick. "Stuxnet Was Work of U.S. and Israeli Experts, Officials Say." Washington Post, 1 Jun. 2012. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

According to current and former U.S. officials, the Stuxnet computer virus "cyberattack against Iran's nuclear program was the work of U.S. and Israeli experts and proceeded under the secret orders of President Obama.... [T]he classified effort code-named Olympic Games ... was first developed during the George W. Bush administration and was geared toward damaging Iran's nuclear capability gradually while sowing confusion among Iranian scientists about the cause of mishaps at a nuclear plant....

"Olympic Games became a collaborative effort among NSA, the CIA and Israel, current and former officials said.... The CIA and Israelis oversaw the development of plans to gain physical access to the plant. Installing the worm in plant equipment not connected to the Internet depended on spies and unwitting accomplices ... who might connect an infected device to one of the systems, officials said."

See also David E. Sanger, "Obama Order Sped Up Wave of Cyberattacks Against Iran," New York Times, 1 Jun. 2012. This article is adapted from Sanger's Confront and Conceal: Obama's Secret Wars and Surprising Use of American Power (New York: Crown, 2012).

National Commission for the Review of the Research and Development Programs of the United States Intelligence Community. Report of the National Commission for the Review of the Research and Development Programs of the United States Intelligence Community. Washington, DC: 2013. Available at: http://www.fas.org/irp/eprint/ncrdic.pdf.gencCommunity. <

"U.S. technological superiority is diminishing in important areas, and our adversaries' investments in S&T -- along with their theft of our intellectual property, made possible in part by insufficient cyber protection and policies -- are giving them new, asymmetric advantages. The United States faces increasing risk from threats against which the IC could have severely limited warning, deterrence, or agility to develop effective countermeasures." See also, Greg Miller, "Panel: U.S. Spy Agencies Hampered by Poor Collaboration, Inadequate Cyberdefense," Washington Post, 5 Nov. 2013.

Nemeth, Erik. "Collecting Cultural Intelligence: The Tactical Value of Cultural Property." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 24, no. 2 (Summer 2011): 217-238.

"Political violence that targets sites of cultural heritage and the looting of artworks [footnote omitted] that potentially fund insurgencies have tactical implications for regional security.... Cultural intelligence has the potential to inform foreign policy in ways that mitigate the political risks of the art market and counter the tactical exploitation of historic structures and religious monuments in acts of political violence."

Nolte, William M. "Valuing Intelligence: Opening a Conversation." Intelligence and National Security 26, no. 5 (Oct. 2011): 616-619.

"[T]he question of how democratic publics and their representatives evaluate intelligence remains unresolved. This is true as applied to evaluation both in terms of (a) the performance of intelligence services and (b) in the process of determinaing the level of resources to be expended on intelligence."

O'Harrow, Robert, Jr. "The Outsourcing of U.S. Intelligence Raises Risks among the Benefits." Washington Post, 9 Jun. 2013. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

The leak of NSA "secrets by an intelligence contractor ... was probably an inevitable consequence of the massive growth of the U.S. security-industrial complex."

Omand, David [Sir]. "Into the Future: A Comment on Agrell and Warner." Intelligence and National Security 27, no. 1 (Feb. 2012): 154-156.

"[F]or the democracies, the days of the Cold War 'secret state' have given way to those of 'the protecting state' and their intelligence communities will have to reflect that in their relationship with the public."

Pillar, Paul R. Intelligence and U.S. Foreign Policy: Iraq, 9/11, and Misguided Reform. New York: Columbia University Press, 2011.

According to Johnson, Proceedings 137.12 (Dec. 2011), the author argues that "reform" of the U.S. intelligence structure "do[es] not necessarily improve intelligence." In fact, "[t]hey may worsen matters," as was the case with the creation of the DNI. Freedman, FA 91.1 (Jan.-Feb. 2012), says Pillar "provides a vigorous and hard-hitting insider's account." To Burcalow, Military Review (Mar.-Apr. 2013), "Pillar’s book is extremely detailed and informative, providing a better understanding of just how hard it is to be an intelligence professional in a world where all that matters is being wrong . . . once."

George, Studies 55.4 (Dec. 2011), finds the author's "treatment of his subject sophisticated and informative as well as personal. It is also provocative. Indeed, readers will be struck by the strident tone that Pillar ... uses." The reviewer notes that "if the politicization was as blatant as [Pillar] asserts, it seems as though there would have been more internal uproar." For Schwab, IJI&C 25.4 (Winter 2012-2013), this work "succeeds primarily as a memoir by a former top-level intelligence officer.... Pillar writes clearly and forthrightly."

Pillar, Paul R. "Think Again: Intelligence." Foreign Policy (Jan.-Feb. 2012). [http://www.foreignpolicy.com]

"On major foreign-policy decisions,... whether going to war or broadly rethinking U.S. strategy in the Arab world..., intelligence is not the decisive factor. The influences that really matter are the ones that leaders bring with them into office: their own strategic sense, the lessons they have drawn from history or personal experience, the imperatives of domestic politics, and their own neuroses.... Intelligence can help manage uncertainty.... It can distinguish true uncertainty from simple ignorance by systematically assembling all available information, but it cannot eliminate uncertainty and it cannot prevent all surprises, including some big ones."

Poreba, John. "Neutralizing China's Student-Spy Network." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 25, no. 2 (Summer 2012): 260-291.

"The nature and vulnerabilities of China's student-spy network present unique opportunities to improve cooperation between universities and security personnel, despite their long history of mutual suspicion."

Priest, Dana, and William M. Arkin. Top Secret America: The Rise of the New American Security State. New York: Little, Brown, 2011.

Aftergood, Secrecy News, 1 Sep. 2011, says that this work "illuminates various facets of our secret government.... Despite the sobering subject matter, Top Secret America actually makes for lively reading.  It is full of the authors' remarkable insights, anecdotes and encounters." Chapman, IJI&C 25.4 (Winter 2012-2013), finds that the authors "did an excellent job of investigation."

For Peake, Studies 56.1 (Mar. 2012) and Intelligencer 19.2 (Summer-Fall 2012), the argument that "the intelligence establishment is too big ... was part of the public discussion long before Priest and Arkin wrote this book. The numbers they present may be new to some, but the for those familiar with government," they are simply raising "perennial and unanswered questions. Solutions in specific cases where downsizing is shown to be necessary would [be] helpful. But examples have eluded the authors, and readers are left with a colorful conception of an oft-mentioned problem without any way of judging how serious it is. Not very helpful."

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