Paseman, Floyd L. "Private Military Companies: Mercenaries By Any Name." Intelligencer 15, no. 2 (Fall/Winter 2006-2007): 23-27.
Paseman, Floyd L. "Private Military Companies: Mercenaries By Any Name." Intelligencer 15, no. 2 (Fall/Winter 2006-2007): 23-27.
The title of this article points to the author's main theme: "My contention is that not only should th[e] temptation to use 'private military companies' (PMCs) to 'outsource war' be resisted, but also that the facade" of PMCs "needs to be exposed for what they really are -- mercenaries by any name."
Petersen, J. K. Understanding Surveillance Technologies: Spy Devices, Privacy, History, & Applications. Rev. & exp. ed. Boca Raton: Auerbach, 2007.
According to Peake, Studies 51.4 (2007), this work "is intended as a college-level guide for those working in law enforcement, forensics, military surveillance, covert operations, counterintelligence, and journalism and politics. It is well-illustrated, and, though there are no endnotes, each chapter has many references. A very valuable reference."
Petro, James B. "Intelligence Support to the Life Science Community: Mitigating Threats from Bioterrorism." Studies in Intelligence 48, no. 3 (2004): 57-68.
The author offers an overview of the debate "about the potential openly published research findings have to enable BW or bioterrorism..., and it summarizes the most recent discussions among bioscience researchers. In addition, it offers some options the Intelligence Community (IC) can consider to help the life science community continue its work effectively, while safeguarding national security." (footnote omitted)
Posner, Richard A. Uncertain Shield: The U.S. Intelligence System in the Throes of Reform. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006.
Clark comment: It is not necessary to agree with every conclusion that Judge Posner reaches in Uncertain Shield to appreciate and respect the intellectual vigor behind his analysis. He sweeps widely across multiple disciplines -- from organizational theory, to economics, to mathematics, to constitutional analysis -- to show how wrong the 9/11 and WMD commissions were in their analyses and conclusions and how wrongheaded the rush to pass the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 really was.
Moskowitz, Studies 50.3 (Sep. 2006), says that the author "brings a fresh and welcome perspective to hoary intelligence issues, drawing on mathematics, economics, and organizational theory, but it is [his] intelligence and common sense that keeps you reading." Posner's "book is full of telling judgments about the process, the people, and the sheer ignorance that brought us the reorganization of the Intelligence Community in 2005."
For Reveron, DIJ 15.1 (2006), much of Posner's criticism of the FBI is flawed and/or out of date. The reviewer argues that Posner's research "better reflects the pre-9/11 or Louis Freeh FBI than today's FBI.... Things have been changing at the FBI, and Posner does not capture these changes in his critique."
Richelson, IJI&C 20.2 (Summer 2007), seems to feel that the author has failed to develop fully too many of the cases he presents to buttress his arguments. However, Posner presents "a challenging look at the problems facing U.S. intelligence ... without a simple reliance on conventional wisdom and preconceived notions about how to deal with those problems."
Another IJI&C reviewer, Chapman, IJI&C 20.2 (Summer 2007), sees Uncertain Shield as "a wild ride." The reviewer sides with Posner in his defense of the CIA on the 9/11 issue, but believes "Posner's defense of the pre-Iraq war intelligence ... flies against the wind." Chapman finds the idea of a possible domestic intelligence agency "a slippery road to travel." And putting such an agency under the Department of Homeland Security, as Posner suggests, would be "one more agency under" a DHS "that's [already] so obese it can't move."
Lowenthal, IAFIE News 1, no. 2 (Winter 2008), calls this "a guide on 'how to' appraise what is happening, make a prognosis on where the process is going, consider various aspects that might be encountered along the way, and offer constructive well poised input." At times, however, the work "suffers from bouts of convolutions -- undoubtedly reflective of the difficulties in analyzing 'how to' do something."
Poteat, S. Eugene. "The Use and Abuse of Intelligence: An Intelligence Provider's Perspective." Diplomacy and Statecraft 11 (2000): 1-16.
Quinn, James
L., Jr. "Staffing the Intelligence Community: The Pros and Cons of
an Intelligence Reserve." International Journal of Intelligence
and Counterintelligence 13, no. 2 (Summer 2000): 160-170.
"Before an effective [civilian] IC reserve can be created, numerous issues must be resolved, including centralization, scope, training, and counterintelligence. Most importantly, costs must be resolved before final decisions can be made."
Ratcliff, R. A. Delusions of Intelligence: Enigma, Ultra, and the End of Secure Ciphers. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006.
Freedman, FA 86.1 (Jan.-Feb. 2007), calls this a "superb work of forensic history." The author explores the reasons why the Germans were so surprised when the story of Ultra finally became public in the mid-1970s. "Reading the book requires attention to organizational structures and the principles of cryptanalysis, but it is well worth the effort."
For Peake, Studies 51.1 (Mar. 2007), even the author's "illustrations and thorough documentation ... provide[] no basis for concluding communications cannot be secure in the future."
Goulden, Intelligencer 15.2 (Fall/Winter 2006-2007) and Washington Times, 15 Oct. 2006, finds this to be "a sprightly account" that "is a splendid contribution to signals intelligence." It "covers much new material" and is "[h]ighly recommended as a fi[n]e cloak-and-dagger read."
To Kruh, Cryptologia 31.3 (Jul. 2007), the author has written an "excellent" and "exceptionally informative book." Gallehawk, Cryptologia 32.1 (Jan. 2008), finds "some loose or inaccurate descriptions of technical matters, and indeeed, some omissions." Nonetheless, it "is a major addition to the existing literatrure on code breaking" during World War II.
Rathmell, Andrew. "Towards Postmodern Intelligence." Intelligence and National Security 17, no. 3 (Autumn 2002): 87-104.
"While the concept of postmodern Intelligence may not, by itself, adequately characterise all facets of the contemporary Intelligence environment, the term does provide a valuable conceptual framework within which change can be managed and Intelligence sources and methods can be adapted to a new era."
Ritter, Scott. Iraq Confidential: The Untold Story of the Intelligence Conspiracy to Undermine the UN and Overthrow Saddam Hussein. New York: Nation Books, 2005.
Peake, Studies 50.2 (2006), comments that "Ritter’s story of the problems experienced by the inspection team is interesting but not new. His depiction of the primacy of his role in the events is surprising and unlikely to be accepted by others familiar with the situation.... Iraq Confidential should be read with caution."
Return to Post-Cold War 2000s General Table of Contents