Treverton, Gregory F. "Intelligence: The Achilles Heel of the Bush Doctrine." Arms Control Today 33, no. 6 (Jul.-Aug. 2003): 9-11.[http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2003_07-08/treverton_julaug03]
The emerging Bush doctrine of national security is "[f]ocused on terrorism and weapons of mass destruction" and "is anticipatory, pre-emptive, and, if need be, unilateral. Yet the emerging doctrine is bedeviled at its core by legitimacy and capacity, including, critically, the capability of U.S. intelligence."
Treverton, Gregory F. "Intelligence and the 'Market State.'" Studies in Intelligence 10 (Winter-Spring 2001): 69-76.
Treverton sees the role of the nation-state changing, with the change in the role of the private sector being even more dramatic. Intelligence will need to share information with and be open to information from non-governmental entities.
Treverton, Gregory F. "Terrorism, Intelligence and Law Enforcement: Learning the Right Lessons." Intelligence and National Security 18, no. 4 (Winter 2003): 121-140.
This is a balanced discussion of the differences between intelligence and law enforcement, and of the changes emerging in the way in which these two disciplines are viewed since 11 September 2001. Treverton does not offer up trite answers to the dilemma of finding the right balance between security and privacy, but seeks to clarify the questions we need to be asking.
Treverton, Gregory F., and Wilhelm Agrell, eds. National Intelligence Systems: Current Research and Future Prospects. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009.
According to Peake, Studies 54.4 (Dec. 2010), the contributors to this volume include both academics and former professional intelligence officers from a number of Western countries. "They have made a thoughtful contribution that illustrates the extent to which intelligence in international relations today has changed." Lamanna, I&NS 26.4 (Aug. 2011), sees this as "an excellent collection of essays."
Tsang, Steve, ed. Intelligence and Human Rights in the Era of Global Terrorism. Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2007.
Peake, Studies, 54.4 (Dec. 2010), notes that this volume has 13 articles by "senior academics and government officials ... from six Western countries." The "articles are strong on what needs to be done in general," but "the authors do not seem to recognize that the intelligence services are themselves well acquainted with the problems and have implemented solutions."
Turner, Michael A. "A Distinctive U.S. Intelligence Identity." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 17, no. 1 (Spring 2004): 42-61.
"[T]he U.S. intelligence identity reflects the ambiguity that Americans have about secret intelligence. United States citizens want the intelligence function to serve the national interest, but in ways that are palatable to the country's democratic sensibilities. Ultimately, this kind of identity, though providing the basis for important intelligence work, becomes also a prescription for intelligence failure."
Philip H.J. Davies, "Intelligence Culture and Intelligence Failure in Britain and the United States," Cambridge Review of International Affairs 17, no. 3 (Oct. 2004), comments that "it is very hard to tell whether Turner's US intelligence identity really is distinctive without some kind of comparative data against which to demonstrate that distinctiveness. As a result, whether Turner's characterisation is accurate or not, it contributes very little that is new to our understanding of intelligence in America."
Turner, Michael A. Why Secret Intelligence Fails. Dulles, VA: Potomac Books, 2005.
From publisher: The author "argues that the root causes of failures in American intelligence can be found in the way it is organized and in the intelligence process itself.... Rather than focusing on case studies, the book takes a holistic approach, beginning with structural issues and all dysfunctions that emanate from them." Peake, Studies 49.4 (2005), says that the author provides "a good summary of the elements of the intelligence profession and [raises] a number of issues that should stimulate thinking. But we never learn just why secret intelligence fails."
U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. The Strategic Investment Plan for Intelligence Community Analysis. Washington, DC: 2001. [https://www.cia.gov]
Villadsen, Ole R. "Prospects for a European Common Intelligence Policy." Studies in Intelligence 9 (Summer 2000): 81-94.
The author argues that "European intelligence cooperation is likely to improve in fundamental ways, although not without overcoming difficulties such as sovereignty, interoperability, and the relationships already established with NATO and the US."
Voelz, Glenn J. "Contractors and Intelligence: The Private Sector in the Intelligence Community." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 22, no. 4 (Winter 2009): 586-613.
"[T]he time has arrived for the government to move beyond viewing its commercial augmentation as an ad hoc resource without having clear strategies and policy for its use. The IC must instead adopt a doctrinal approach with improved management protocols and procedural safeguards in order to better integrate commercial augmentation into total workforce planning."
Weller, Geoffrey R. "The Internal Modernization of Western Intelligence Agencies." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 14, no. 3 (Fall 2001): 299-322.
The author surveys post-Cold War changes that have affected the internal workings of the civilian intelligence agencies of the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia. He touches on recruitment policies, increasing representativeness, personnel policies, management practices, and physical modernization.
Wettering, Frederick L. "The Internet and the Spy Business." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 14, no. 3 (Fall 2001): 342-365.
"In addition to the theft of personal [and business] secrets, the Internet has made it much easier to target and recruit potential spies and securely communicate with them. The Internet has become a real boon to the spying profession."
Willis, Henry H., Genevieve Lester, and Gregory F. Treverton. "Information Sharing for Infrastructure Risk Management: Barriers and Solutions." Intelligence and National Security 24, no. 3 (Jun. 2009): 339-365.
From "Abstract": "While infrastructure protection is usually viewed as a public responsibility, infrastructure risk management actually requires a high degree of cooperation between the public and private sectors, particularly in the sharing of information about risks to infrastructure.... While the US government has established many mechanisms for sharing information, barriers remain that inhibit both the private and public partners from obtaining the information needed to protect infrastructure."
Zegart, Amy. "American Intelligence -- Still Stupid." Los Angeles Times, 17 Sep. 2006. [http://www.latimes.com]
Five years after the 9/11 attacks, "all our worst intelligence deficiencies remain. Intelligence is spread across 16 agencies that operate as warring tribes more than a team. The CIA is in disarray. And the FBI's information technology is stuck in the dark ages. There are more intelligence agencies to coordinate than ever but still no one in firm charge of them all. In 2004, Congress established the post of director of national intelligence. Rather than integrating intelligence, however, the job's creation has triggered huge turf wars. For the last two years, while the office of the intelligence director has been fighting over who briefs the president and who staffs assignments, the Pentagon has quietly expanded its intelligence activities at home and abroad."
In a slick, sarcastic, and accurate turn of phrase that will probably be picked up and used again (perhaps by me), Zegart refers to the CIA as "the agency formerly known as Central."
Zegart, Amy B. "'CNN with Secrets': 9/11, the CIA, and the Organizational Roots of Failure." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 20, no. 1 (Spring 2007): 18-49.
The author finds the roots of intelligence failure in three organizational deficiencies (attributed primarily to the CIA but extending to the Intelligence Community as well): "(1) structural weaknesses dating back decades that prevented the Intelligence Community (IC) from working as a coherent whole; (2) perverse promotion incentives that rewarded intelligence officials for all the wrong things; and (3) cultural pathologies that led intelligence agencies to resist new technologies, ideas, and tasks."
Zegart, Amy B. "September 11 and the Adaptation Failure of U.S. Intelligence Agencies." International Security 29, no. 4 (Spring 2005): 78-111.
Zinni, Tony [GEN/USA (Ret.)], and Tony Koltz. The Battle for Peace: A Frontline Vision of America's Power and Purpose. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007.
Borene, Intelligencer 15.2 (Fall-Winter 2006-2007), refers to this work as "a stinging criticism of the White House handling of Operation Iraqi Freedom and of our 'stove-piped' national security infrastructure. Acting constructively, Zinni also presents fresh ideas to improve the defiiencies he sees.... Zinni delivers a reformation plan to enhance interagency unity of effort and provide an expeditionary capability for the civil component of civil-military operations."
Return to Post-Cold War 2000s General Table of Contents