POST-COLD WAR

2000s

General

C - F

 

Carroll, Thomas Patrick. "The Case Against Intelligence Openness." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 14, no. 4 (Winter 2001-2002): 559-574.

"There are three major problems with the Openness program: One is an underestimation of the risks and costs, and the other two are overestimations of the probable benefits."

Clift, A. Denis. "From Semaphore to Predator: Intelligence in the Internet Era." Studies in Intelligence 47, no. 3 (2003): 73-79.

"The Internet era brings an on-rush of changes, both revolutionary and subtle, to the work of intelligence -- changes in the doctrine and practice of collection, analysis, and dissemination; and changes in the mindsets and relationships between intelligence and law enforcement, intelligence and the policymaker, and intelligence and the military commander."

Cogan, Charles. "Hunters not Gatherers: Intelligence in the Twenty-First Century." Intelligence and National Security 19, no. 2 (Summer 2004): 304-321.

The author "highlights three aspects of the US security problem." First, "the United States is not ... properly centralised[] to conduct the intelligence operations that are required to meet the security threats" of the 21st century. "Second, because of the built-in distrust of government that is central to US political culture and tradition, we are relatively weak in the domain of internal security. Third, intelligence is not a perfect world, indeed it is more imperfect than most other activities."

Cullather, Nick. "Bombing at the Speed of Thought: Intelligence in the Coming Age of Cyberwar." Intelligence and National Security 18, no. 4 (Winter 2003): 141-154.

"The intelligence community should share the historicists' concerns" that the wired military ("Battlespace") "tailors perception and decision to suit military requirements. In the mass of documentation on the RMA [Revolution in Military Affairs], there is little indication that the virtual battlespace will be visible to the president, cabinet, congress, or indeed any civilian."

Davies, Philip H.J. "Intelligence Culture and Intelligence Failure in Britain and the United States." Cambridge Review of International Affairs 17, no. 3 (Oct. 2004): 495-520.

From abstract: The intelligence systems of the United States and the United Kingdom "share very common methods, technologies and resources and have closely aligned political cultures and histories, and yet one can still find between them profound and consistent differences." The author uses for his discussion "selected examples of intelligence failure in the two systems, in the US case looking at the September 11 terrorist attacks and for Britain at the Falkland Islands invasion, followed by the common failure to generate accurate assessments of Iraq's capability in non-conventional weapons prior to March 2003."

Dean, Joshua. "Intelink: The Real Secret Spy Network." Government Executive, Apr. 2000, 64-67.

Includes comments from director of the Intelink Management Office James Peak and from Intelligence Systems Secretariat head and deputy, Steve Schanzer and Fred Harrision, from whom the idea of a private, classified Internet is said to have originated.

DeMars, William E. "Hazardous Partnership: NGOs and United States Intelligence in Small Wars." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 14, no. 2 (Summer 2001): 193-222.

"The convergence of NGOs and U.S. intelligence at the crossroads of small wars has rarely been ... harmonious.... Despite serious efforts in the 1990s to institutionalize it, the relationship has remained hazardous for all the partners -- NGOs, American intelligence, and the warriors themselves."

Deutch, John, Arnold Kanter, Brent Scowcroft, and Christopher Hornbarger. "Strengthening the National Security Interagency Process." In Keeping the Edge: Managing Defense for the Future, eds. Ashton B. Carter and Hohn P. White, 265-283. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001.

Devine, Jack. "Tomorrow's Spygames." World Policy Journal 25, no. 3 (Fall 2008): 141-151. [http://www.mitpressjournals.org] Intelligencer 17, no. 2 (Fall 2009): 17-24.

The former CIA ADDO takes a look at what he thinks the next 25 years will bring in the intelligence arena. For instance, he suggests that in response to the future's "more complex, interconnected environment, the American intelligence community will enter a period of consolidation as various agencies are further centralized under the leadership of a future secretary of intelligence." This is a good read, whether you agree or disagree with Devine's projections.

Doorey, Timothy J. [CAPT/USN] "Intelligence Secrecy and Transparency: Finding the Proper Balance from the War of Independence to the War on Terror." Strategic Insights 6, no. 3 (May 2007). [http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/]

"Americans have always been wary of professional intelligence services insisting that their activities remain secret.... Such secrecy seems at odds with the America’s democratic principles, specifically the need for openness and transparency in government affairs.... [T]he record of effective congressional oversight of the U.S. IC has been brief and uneven at best.... Yet cooperation between the executive and legislative branches is possible and remains necessary if we are to build and maintain the intelligence capabilities this nation desperately needs and deserves."

Drumheller, Tyler, with Elaine Monaghan. On the Brink: An Insider's Account of How the White House Compromised American Intelligence. New York: Carroll & Graf, 2006.

According to Bamford, Washington Post, 12 Dec. 2006, the author "describes his frustrating -- and ultimately unsuccessful -- efforts to warn senior CIA and White House officials that they were on the road to disaster" in Iraq. "[T]his is the first time the CIA official at the center of the ["Curveball"] controversy has told his story." Despite the CIA's censors, the book "shows how easy it was for a small cadre of senior intelligence officials, intent on war, to send the country into a bloody quagmire."

Peake, Studies 51.1 (Mar. 2007), comments that this work "is a firsthand account by a respected former CIA officer and thus should be taken seriously. The story he tells is sourced in the text." For West, IJI&C 20.3 (Fall 2007), the author's "account is a thoughtful, considered stilleto blade delivered into the heart" of the CIA's Directorate of Operations. Drumheller's "narrative is important, both in terms of intelligence history ... and in terms of the role played by professionals in seeking to offer politicians unbiased and accurate advice."

In his autobiography, George Tenet [At the Center of the Storm: My Years at the CIA (2007), pp. 376-383] takes pointed exception to Drumheller's assertions regarding his concerns about Curveball. Tenet stops short of accusing Drumheller of lying, but certainly makes it clear that multiple opportunities to raise concerns about Curveball, to the extent they existed at the time, were not acted upon.

Ennis, Michael E. [BGEN/USMC]

1. "The Future of Intelligence." Naval Intelligence Professionals Quarterly 16, no. 4 (Oct. 2000): 1-2.

The Intelligence Community "should focus more of its effort on ... 'operationalizing' intelligence -- that is, making it more usable, understandable, and accessible to its consumers, the operators and planners.... [T]he first step in operationalizing intelligence needs to be a physical integration of intelligence personnel within critical warfighting functions.... The second step ... is to build intelligence products with the end user (the operator/planner) in mind.... The last step ... is for the commanders to take a more active role in intelligence."

2. "The Future of Intelligence." Marine Corps Gazette, Oct. 1999, 46-47.

An earlier version of the above.

Erard, Michael. "Translation in the Age of Terror." Intelligencer 14, no. 2 (Winter/Spring 2005): 61-65.

This article discusses the potential of the National Virtual Translation Center, created in 2001 by the Patriot Act but not funded until 2003. The focus is on developing tools to assist translators in their work. The author writes with a host of caveats, such as, "if...," "hopes to...," and "could...."

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