AFCEA [Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association] Intelligence Committee. "Intelligence, Technology, and Integration." Defense Intelligence Journal 15, no. 1 (2006): 31-41.
This article "provides an overview of the challenges and problems faced by the [Intelligence Community] in technology development and acquisition. It also provides a high-level view of the ways in which these challenges and problems might, over time, be addressed and overcome."
Aldrich, Richard J. "Beyond the Vigilant State? Globalization and Intelligence." Review of International Studies.35, no.4 (Oct. 2009): 889-904.
Andrew, Christopher. "Intelligence in the Cold War: Lessons and Learning." In Agents for Change: Intelligence Services in the 21st Century, ed. Harold Shukman, 1-22. London: St. Ermins, 2000.
Andrew, Christopher. "Intelligence, International Relations and 'Under-theorisation.'" Intelligence and National Security 19, no. 2 (Summer 2004): 170-184. And in Understanding Intelligence in the Twentieth-First Century, eds. Len V. Scott and Peter Jackson, 29-41. London: Routledge, 2004.
"[I]ntelligence is more deeply and visibly embedded in the conduct of international relations today ... than ever before in peacetime.... The vitual exclusion of SIGINT from the history of post-war international relations has distorted understanding of the Cold War in significant ways.... [T]he majority of those who use th[e] phrase [intelligence failure] seem to have no coherent idea of what it means."
Arkin, William M. Code Names: Deciphering U.S. Military Plans, Programs and Operations in the 9/11 World. Hanover, NH: Steerforth Press, 2005.
From http://www.codenames.org: "From 'Able Ally' to 'Zodiac Beauchamp,' this book identifies more than 3,000 code names and details the plans and missions for which they stand.... The emphasis [is] on names that are current since the end of the Cold War, are of historical importance, and are not otherwise in the public domain."
According to Dana Priest, "Book of U.S. Code Names Challenges Secrecy: Author Hopes to Undermine Agencies' Ability to Make Decisions in the Dark," Washington Post, 23 Jan. 2005, A7, "Arkin gleaned his list of code names from Pentagon and intelligence agency documents he has obtained, and from similar briefings he has read and copied, or discussed with longtime sources."
Eric Schmitt, "Commandos Get Duty on U.S. Soil," New York Times, 23 Jan. 2005, finds that the Web site for Arkin's book mentions publicly for the first time the existence of "a small group of super-secret commandos" standing "ready with state-of-the-art weaponry to swing into action to protect the presidency" during Inauguration week.... These commandos, operating under a secret counterterrorism program code-named Power Geyser,... belong to the Joint Special Operations Command."
Killebrew, Parameters 36 (Summer 2006), comments that "[w]hether the reader agrees with Arkins motives or not, the information contained inside Code Names makes for a fascinating read for any national security specialist. So far as can be ascertained, the data are correct and detailed.... Code Names is a valuable reference for military planners and for US (or foreign) security professionals."
For Donnini, Air & Space Power Journal 22.4 (Winter 2008), this is not a book to sit down and read cover to cover. It is in essence "a gigantic index.... Dedicated readers, including students of national security policies, will look for specific topics in small doses or cover sections of interest in a measured, incremental approach."
Berkowitz, Bruce. "Spying in the Post-September 11 World." Hoover Digest 2003, no. 4 (30 Oct. 2003). [http://www.hoover.org/publications/hoover-digest/article/6728]
"[T]he September 11 intelligence failure was really a new problem, reflecting the emergence of a new kind of threat. Solving this new problem requires a new kind of solution. Most of the proposals offered so far would not provide this new solution and likely would not have prevented the September 11 intelligence failure.... Threats such as Al Qaeda -- and rogue states that use terrorist tactics -- present a new problem for intelligence organizations, as do narco-traffickers and states that use covert networks to develop weapons of mass destruction.... [W]here the old intelligence problem required organizations to focus in order to separate signal from noise, the new intelligence problem depends more on intelligence organizations' agility, their ability to adapt and deal effectively with a changing threat."
Berkowitz, Bruce D. "War Logs On: Girding America for Computer Combat." Foreign Affairs 79, no. 3 (May-Jun. 2000): 8-12.
Berntsen, Gary. Human Intelligence, Counterterrorism, and National Leadership: A Practical Guide. Dulles, VA: Potomac, 2008.
Masten, Military Review (Mar.-Apr. 2009), says that "Berntsen's work fails to achieve" its goal of serving as a guide for incoming presidents and White House staffs so they may master human intelligence and counterterrorism operations. The book is "an opinion piece more than a serious critique of the current situation. It provides the reader only a biased, cursory look at HUMINT and counterterrorism." In addition, the author oversimplifies "major global issues regarding terrorism and narcotrafficking," and proposes "shortsighted solutions." The reviewer concludes that this work "lacks objectivity, has been poorly researched, and suffers from glaring omissions."
Another view is provided by Dowling, AIJ 27.1 (Fall 2009), who finds that "this brief book is a good introduction to a wide range of problems likely to remain critical for years to come. Even when one disagrees with the author's arguments, their clarity and balance deserve careful consideration."
Bird, Nancy E. "Vietnam: Lessons for Intelligence in Wartime." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 20, no. 2 (Summer 2007): 317-326.
"Examples from Vietnam ... show how obstacles, then as now, can limit the influence of intelligence in the policymaking process."
Borch, Fred L. "Comparing Pearl Harbor and '9/11': Intelligence Failure? American Unpreparedness? Military Responsibility?" Journal of Military History 67, no. 3 (Jul. 2003): 845-860.
Abstract: "Claims by some commentators that '9/11' was an intelligence failure like Pearl Harbor, that the United States was unprepared for '9/11' like she was for the Japanese attack on Hawaii, and that, like Pearl Harbor, the military was not ready to defend against al Qaeda's terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon are incorrect. On the contrary, an analysis of the two events reveals that they are more dissimilar than alike."
Bowman, M. E. "Dysfunctional Information Restrictions." Intelligencer 15, no. 2 (Fall-Winter 2006-2007): 29-37.
The author looks at the underlying theory and structure of the formal classification system, as well as "undefined caveats" designed to control unclassified information, and concludes that the system "has become dysfunctional in the face of current needs of national security." What is needed is "an updated philosophy of information restriction and disclosure."
Bowman, M. E. "The Fall of the Wall: Peace Dividend or Inheritance Tax." Intelligencer 16, no. 1 (Spring 2008): 27-35.
"[T]he world remains poitically organized on a system nearly 400 years old, but the threats to that order are 21st century -- which is to say, transnational and multi-national."
Bowman, M. E. "The Legacy of the Church Committee." Intelligencer 14, no. 1 (Winter-Spring 2004): 27-34.
The system of legislative and regulatory compromises that followed the Church Committee investigations "has served the nation well for more than two decades." However, "terrorism represents an unprecedented confluence of phenomena that belies the traditional separation of law enforcement and intelligence.... What we have seen thus far in the war on terrorism is unlike any other domestic crisis response in our history. Authorities have been broadened to meet the new challenge, but there have been no concessions of [the] rights" of U.S. Persons.
Bruneau, Thomas C. "Controlling Intelligence in New Democracies." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 14, no. 3 (Fall 2001): 323-341.
"Democratic consolidation requires restructuring the economy and bringing the armed forces under civilian control. Probably the most problematic issue in civil-military relations is control of the intelligence apparatus."
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