Aussaresses, Paul [Gen.] The Battle of the Casbah: Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism in Algeria, 1955-1957. New York: Enigma, 2002.
Aussaresses, Paul [Gen.] The Battle of the Casbah: Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism in Algeria, 1955-1957. New York: Enigma, 2002.
Chapman, IJI&C 16.2, says that the author's memoir "provides a shocking look into this almost forgotten part of history. [Aussaresses] tells of the horrible torture methods he personally used on suspected FLN militants. But he does not give a clue as to the Algerian side of the story."
For Clayton, I&NS 18.1, the author's apologia for his actions is "unconvincing." In addition, "[c]onversations of over 45 years ago are reported verbatim"; and "trivia is mixed with matters of the utmost seriousness."
See also Michael Ignatieff, "The Torture Wars," The New Republic, 22 Apr. 2002, 40-43.
Bocca,
Geoffrey. The Secret Army. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1968.
Wilcox: "Account of the French secret army in Algeria after World War II."
Bonnet, Yves, and Pascal Krop. Le Grandes Oreilles du Président. [The President's Big Ears] Paris: Presses de la Cité, 2004.
Kahn, I&NS 23.2 (Apr. 2008), notes that this work "describes the extensive eavesdropping activities of French President François Mitterrand."
Faligot, Roger.
"France, Sigint and the Cold War." Intelligence and National
Security 16, no. 1 (Spring 2001): 177-208.
Under Alexandre de Marenches in the 1970s, the SDECE absorbed the previously independent Sigint organization, the Radioelectronic Communication Group (GCR). The French also moved closer to the UK-USA pact while avoiding actually joining. Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, the French have been active in developing new national Sigint capabilities.
Guisnel
Jean, and Bernard Violet. Services secrets. Le pouvoir et les services
de renseignement sous la présidence de François Mitterand.
Paris: La Découverte, 1988.
Kemp,
Percy. "The Fall and Rise of France's Spymasters." Intelligence
and National Security 9, no. 1 (Jan. 1994): 12-21.
"From 1989,... the French authorities initiated a series of reforms to address those structural problems which had beset the intelligence services since the end of the Second World War.... The French have ... been striving to develop their spatial collection abilities."
Lazar, Marc. "The Cold War Culture of the French and Italian Communist Parties." Intelligence and National Security 18, no. 2 (Summer 2003): 213-224.
"[T]he Cold War had a considerable impact in France and Italy, being relayed domestically by two powerful communist parties and amplifying already-existing conflicts in each of these societies. In France, as in Italy, the confrontation was violent, and developed into a kind of 'war culture'.... It permitted polemical and political passions to be unleased against ... 'the enemy'.... Yet, despite its intensity and continual stoking, this confrontation was always mastered and controlled by communists and non-communists alike."
Marion,
Pierre. La Mission Impossible: A la tête des Services Secrets. Paris: Calmann-Levy, 1991.
Clark Comment: The author headed the French counter-espionage agency, the Service de Documentation et de Contre-Espionnage (SDECE), for the 17 months following the coming of the Socialist government to power in June 1981.
According to Kieger, I&NS 7.3, Marion's "only real claim to fame" is to have changed the organization's name to Direction Générale de la Sécurité Extérieure (DGSE). This is the kind of "bleeding-heart and self-justificatory account to be expected of such a short-lived spy- master. But it does contain many nuggets of information on foreign secret services and their relations with their French counterpart."
Nordell, John
R., Jr. The Undetected Enemy: French and American Miscalculations at Dien Bien Phu. College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 1995.
According to Currey, Journal of Third World Studies, Fall 1999, Nordell "tells of French strategic, logistic, tactical and intelligence decisions that culminated in Navarre's determination to fight" at Dien Bien Phu. The author also "clearly shows the extent to which the U.S. government aided and abetted French planning."
Pennetier,
Jean-Marc. "Review Article: The Springtime of French Intelligence."
Intelligence and National Security 11, no. 4 (Oct. 1996): 780-798.
While reviewing three books by former intelligence officers and heads (Prieur, Paillole, and Silberzahn), the author makes some observations about French intelligence in general and the context of the three books specifically that are well worth reading.
Rochet, Jean.
Cinq ans à la tete de la DST, 1967-1972: La mission impossible. Paris: Plon, 1985.
According to Porch, I&NS 2.1, Rochet's five years at the head of the French equivalent of the FBI is "a remarkable period of longevity in the unstable world of the French Secret Service.... Rochet's message is that the DST is a poisoned chalice which any prefect careful of his career will avoid taking up at all costs."
Silberzahn,
Claude, with Jean Guisnel. Au coeur du secret, 1.500 jours aux commandes
de la DGSE, 1989-1993. Paris: Fayard, 1995.
Pennetier, I&NS 11.4, comments that Silberzahn's four years as DGSE head saw "a major shakeup of France's services." In this book, Silberzahn details the changes he made in the service, but seems "prone to exaggerate ... the impact of his actions." At other times, "he succumbs to banalities, giving the book the tone of a recruitment prospectus." Nevertheless, this book "gives the reader an invaluable occasion to study and assess an intelligence service in mutation."
Villatoux, Marie-Catherine, and Paul Villatoux. "Aerial Intelligence during the Algerian War." Journal of Strategic Studies 25, no. 2 (Jun. 2002): 65-78
From abstract: Aerial reconnaissance and intelligence gathering "had a highly significant role in supporting French military operations in Algeria.... Initially, however, the Air Force effort was handicapped" by a number of problems, including a lack of "sufficient suitable aircraft types. Gradually, improved aircraft and photographic techniques permitted systematic and detailed aerial mapping and intelligence work.... Better integration of air and ground forces, along with more coordinated command and control, arrived from 1959 onwards when an air general, Maurice Challe, became inter-service commander-in-chief in Algeria. This permitted an authentic and mostly effective combined-arms and joint service approach to the locating, tracking, engagement and destruction of Algerian nationalist bands."
Von Bülow, Mathilde. "Myth or Reality? The Red Hand and French Covert Action in Federal Germany during the Algerian War, 1956-61." Intelligence and National Security 22, no. 6 (Dec. 2007): 787 – 820.
From abstract: "This article argues that the attacks on West German territory were executed neither by vigilantes nor by renegade agents. Instead, they were carried out by the French foreign intelligence service SDECE with the full approval of the highest political authorities in Paris.... The article will show that the Red Hand served merely as a cover to detract from the state's resort to such violent and criminal means."
Zervoudakis, Alexander. "'Nihil mirare, nihil contemptare, omnia intelligere': Franco-Vietnamese Intelligence in Indochina, 1950-1954." Intelligence and National Security 13, no. 1 (Spring 1998): 195-229.
Abstract: "This article analyses French intelligence in Indochina at the height of the war (1950-54), and the contribution made by the [V]ietnamese in the intelligence effort. The effectiveness of this effort is demonstrated by the use of operational examples."
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