Aan de Wiel, Jérôme. "French Military Intelligence and Ireland, 19001923." Intelligence and National Security 26, no. 1 (Feb. 2011): 46-71.
The author "suggests that the Deuxième Bureau's interest in Ireland was not continuous but essentially shaped by the evolving relations between France and Britain. Simply put, it was of an opportunistic nature."
Adamthwaite, Anthony P. "French Military Intelligence and the Coming of War, 1935-1939." In Intelligence and International Relations, 1900- 1945, eds. Christopher Andrew and Jeremy Noakes, 191-208. Exeter, UK: Exeter University Publications, 1987.
Alexander, Martin S.
1. "Did the Deuxième Bureau Work? The Role of Intelligence in French Defense Policy and Strategy, 1919-39." Intelligence and National Security 6, no. 2 (Apr. 1991): 293-333.
"Regarding the fall of France in 1940,... it is to shortcomings in French operational and training practices, rather than to intelligence, that questions need to be directed when reasons are sought for the military defeat."
2. "In Lieu of Alliance: The French General Staff's Secret Co-operation with Neutral Belgium, 1936-1940." Journal of Strategic Studies 14, no. 4 (Dec. 1991): 413-427.
3. and William J. Philpott. "The Entente Cordiale and the Next War: Anglo-French Views on Future Military Co-operation, 1928-1939." Intelligence and National Security 13, no. 1 (Spring 1998): 53-84. Also: In Knowing Your Friends: Intelligence Inside Alliances from 1914 to the Cold War, ed. Martin S. Alexander, 53-84. London: Frank Cass, 1998.
From Abstract: "Improved Franco-German relations made intelligence co-operation appear unnecessary [during the 1920s].... Only after 1935 did a resurgent Germany spark a revival of Franco-British staff talks. A renewed intelligence effort by Britain endeavored to estimate French armed strength, while France examined Britain's ability to send an expeditionary force to Europe."
1. "Codebreaking and Foreign Offices: The French, British and American Experience." In The Missing Dimension: Governments and Intelligence Communities in the Twentieth Century, eds. Christopher Andrew and David Dilks, 33-53. Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1984.
2. "Déchiffrement et diplomatie: Le cabinet noir sous la troisième république." [Decipherment and Diplomacy: The Black Chamber in the Third Republic] Relations internationales 5 (Spring 1976): 37-64. [Kahn, I&NS 23.2 (Apr. 2008)]
3. "France and the German Menace." In Knowing One's Enemies: Intelligence Assessment Before the Two World Wars, ed. Ernest R. May, 127-149. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984.
Aubin, Chantal. "French Counterintelligence and British Secret Intelligence in the Netherlands, 1920-40." In Battleground Western Europe: Intelligence Operations in Germany and The Netherlands in the Twentieth Century, eds. Beatrice de Graaf, Ben de Jong, and Wies Platje, 17-47. Amsterdam: Het Spinhuis, 2007.
Castellan, Georges. Le réarmament clandestin du reich, 1930-35 vu par le 2e bureau de l'etat-major français. Paris: Plon, 1954.
Forcade, Olivier. La République secrète: Histoire des services speciaux français de 1918 a 1939. [The Secret Republic: History of French Special Services from 1918 to 1939] Paris: Nouveau Monde éditions, 2008.
Kahn, I&NS 23.2 (Apr. 2008), notes that the author argues that "during the interwar period intelligence was primarily a function of the military, and that the secret wars against Germany and the Soviet Union largely drove French intelligence."
Galtier-Boissiere, Jean. Mysteries of the French Secret Police. London: S. Paul, 1938. [Wilcox]
Garder, Michel. La guerre secrète des services spéciaux français, 1935-1945. Paris: Plon, 1967.
Gauché, Henri-Maurice. Le deuxième bureau au travail, 1935-1940. Paris: Dumont, 1955.
Alexander, I&NS 6.2/293, states that "nothing has yet superseded Gauché as the benchmark for the pre-1940 history of military intelligence in France."
Imlay, Talbot. "Allied Economic Intelligence and Strategy during the 'Phoney War.'" Intelligence and National Security 13, no. 4 (Winter 1998): 107-132.
Imlay's article "examines the efforts of French and British intelligence services to assess the German economy before and during the opening stage of World War II." The author attributes the shift to a long war strategy to the difficulties in finding certainty in the Allied knowledge of the German economy.
1. France and the Nazi Menace: Intelligence and Policy Making, 1933-1939. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.
Young, I&NS 16.3, finds that this work is a "fine piece of scholarship" written with "enviable lucidity." The author "surrounds his data with ideas" as he explores the ways in which perceptions "are generated, nourished, and altered." Jackson's "overall appraisal of French intelligence work is complimentary." For Irvine, H-Diplo, and Intelligencer 12.1, Jackson's work is "a first rate piece of historical writing." The author's research "is impeccable. His writing displays an exemplary degree of expositional clarity." And he integrates his findings about French intelligence into a broader context.
2. "French Intelligence and Hitler's Rise to Power." Historical Journal 41, no. 3 (Sep. 1998): 795-824.
3. "French Military Intelligence and Czechoslovakia, 1938." Diplomacy and Statecraft 5, no. 1 (1994): 81-106.
4. "Intelligence and the End of Appeasement, 1938-1939." In French Foreign and Defence Policy 1918-1940: The Decline and Fall of a Great Power, ed. Robert Boyce, 232-258. London: Routledge, 1998.
5. and Martin S. Alexander, trs. "Note Concerning the Consequences that Follow, from a Military Point of View, from Germany's Renunciation of the Locarno Treaty." Intelligence and National Security 22, no. 4 (Aug. 2007): 537-545.
This note, dated 8 April 1936, represents the Deuxième Bureau's assessment of the impact of Germany's marching into the Rhineland on 7 March 1936.
Peter Jackson, "A Look at French Intelligence Machinery in 1936," Intelligence and National Security 22, no. 4 (Aug. 2007): 546-562, provides an informative view of "the workings of France's intelligence apparatus and the precise role of intelligence in the making of foreign and defence policy during this period." Martin S. Alexander, "The Military Consequences for France of the End of Locarno," Intelligence and National Security 22, no. 4 (Aug. 2007): 563-572, supplies an analysis of the 1936 document and its political, diplomatic, and strategic implications.
6. and Joseph Maiolo. "Franco-British Intelligence Co-operation in Europe before the Second World War." In Franco-British Defence Co-operation, 1919-1939, eds. M.S. Alexander and B. Philpott. London: Macmillan, 2002.
7. and Joseph Maiolo. "Strategic Intelligence, Counterintelligence and Alliance Diplomacy in Anglo-French Relations before the Second World War." Militärgeschichtliche Zeitschrift 65, no. 2 (2006): 417-461.
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