Materials arranged chronologically.
Clayton, Ross, and Dan M. Haverty. "Modernizing Homeland Defense and Security." Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management 2, no. 1 (2005). [http://www.bepress.com/jhsem/vol2/iss1/7]
Lichtblau, Eric. "Nominee Is Hard Charger on Legal War on Terror." New York Times, 12 Jan. 2005. [http://www.nytimes.com]
For nearly two years after the 9/11 attacks, Michael Chertoff "was the Bush administration's point man" in the U.S. campaign against terrorism. He "now takes on a new and equally daunting challenge as President Bush's selection to lead" the DHS.
Mintz, John. "Nominee Criticized Over Post-9/11 Policies." Washington Post, 12 Jan. 2005, A10. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]
Michael Chertoff, President Bush's nominee to be DHS secretary, "is widely hailed for his intellectual heft and tireless work habits as a federal prosecutor and judge. But he also faces criticism as an architect of some of the most controversial elements of the Bush administration's domestic war on terrorism" that followed the 9/11 attacks.
Graham, Bradley. "Military Expands Homeland Efforts: Pentagon to Share Data with Civilian Agencies." Washington Post, 6 Jul. 2005, A1. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]
"A new Pentagon strategy for securing the U.S. homeland calls for expanded U.S. military activity not only in the air and sea ... but also on the ground and in other less traditional, potentially more problematic areas such as intelligence sharing with civilian law enforcement.... In the area of intelligence, the strategy speaks of developing 'a cadre' of Pentagon terrorism specialists and of deploying 'a number of them' to 'interagency centers' for homeland defense and counterterrorism."
Lipton, Eric. "Homeland Security Chief Announces Overhaul." New York Times, 14 Jul. 2005. [http://www.nytimes.com]
Speaking to department employees on 13 July 2005, DHS Secretary Michael Chertoff announced "he was reorganizing his sprawling department to better prevent -- or at least react to -- a terrorist attack.... [T]he secretary said ... he plans to appoint a new intelligence chief ... and an assistant secretary for cyber and telecommunications security." Other steps "will be the hiring of a chief medical officer to help plan for the thousands of casualties that might result from a biological, chemical or nuclear attack. An under secretary for policy will also be named, as will a director of operations coordination."
Freedman, Lawrence. "The Politics of Warning: Terrorism and Risk Communication." Intelligence and National Security 20, no. 3 (Sep. 2005): 379-418.
The author identifies substantial difficulties in trying to use a system of alert levels to warn the public about the risk of terrorist attacks.
Waterman, Shaun. "Intelligence Offices Remain Separated." Washington Times, 24 Oct. 2005, A11. [http://www.washingtontimes.com]
Charlie Allen, DHS's chief intelligence officer, has said in an interview that the department "is still not close to integrating the 10 separate intelligence offices run by its 22 component agencies." Vulture, NIPQ 22.1 (Jan. 2006), comments that Allen has "the daunting task of defining the department's role in the increasingly crowded field of U.S. intelligence agencies and managing a hodge-podge of 'nontraditional' intelligence-gathering operations." [emphases in original]
Hulnick, Arthur S. "Indications and Warning for Homeland Security: Seeking a New Paradigm." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 18, no. 4 (Winter 2004-2005): 593-608.
"[N]ew methods for warning of a terrorist attack need to be developed. The old I&W system, which is still useful in watching for changes that affect the U.S., doesn't need to change, but recognition is necessary that it doesn't work against terrorism.... [F]or the foreseeable future, the warning paradigm is not likely to emerge from the DHS itself, but will instead have to wait until changes and reforms in the broader U.S. intelligence system are put into place."
Stein, Jeff. "Allen's Wrench at Work on Homeland Intelligence." Congressional Quarterly, 23 Nov. 2005. [http://www.cq.com]
DHS "still does not have a centralized integrated database of its own intelligence.... The man coaxed out of retirement [in September 2005] to hammer together DHS's intelligence shop" is Charlie Allen, who spent 47 years at the CIA. "[A]ccording to a senior DHS consultant on intelligence issues, Allen is already bumping up against powerful DHS fiefdoms," particularly "existing intelligence channels" that fall under the Homeland Security Operations Center run by retired Marine Gen. Matthew Broderick.
U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Office of Inspector General. "DHS Has Not Implemented an Information Security Program for Its Intelligence Systems." OIG 06-13. Dec. 2005. [Available at: http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/interweb/assetlibrary/OIG_06-13-Dec05.pdf.
"[W]e identified a major concern with DHS' management structure for the department's intelligence systems. We also identified issues regarding DHS' inventory of its SCI [Special Compartmented Information] systems, the certification and accreditation of its intelligence systems, POA&Ms [Plan of Action and Milestones], incident detection and response, and information security training and awareness. In addition, we detected a number of system security weaknesses based on our vulnerability assessments. We recommend that DHS establish a single, comprehensive, and inclusive information security program for its intelligence systems."
Glasser, Susan B., and Michael Grunwald. "Department's Mission Was Undermined From Start." Washington Post, 22 Dec. 2005, A1. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]
"Nearly three years after it was created in the largest government reorganization since the Department of Defense," the DHS story "is one of haphazard design, bureaucratic warfare and unfulfilled promises.... To some extent, the department was set up to fail. It was assigned the awesome responsibility of defending the homeland without the investigative, intelligence and military powers of the FBI, CIA and the Pentagon; it was also repeatedly undermined by the White House that initially opposed its creation. But the department has also struggled to execute even seemingly basic tasks, such as prioritizing America's most critical infrastructure."
Return to DHS Table of Contents