Kahn, David. "An Historical Theory of Intelligence." Intelligence and National Security 16, no. 3 (Autumn 2001): 79-92.
The author puts forward three "principles that a theory of intelligence should offer": (1) "Intelligence optimizes one's resources" (O'Brien Principle); (2) intelligence "is an auxiliary, not a primary, element in war"; (3) "intelligence is essential to the defense but not the offense." [WhatIsIntel?]
Kahn, David. Hitler's Spies: German Military Intelligence in World War II. New York: Macmillan, 1978. London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1978.
According to Pforzheimer, Hitler's Spies is "based on personal interviews and on extensive research of documentary material. Its focus is on German Army and high command intelligence, with little on air and navy intelligence.... [It] is particularly weak on German counterintelligence." Constantinides says there is "no better summary of the overall dismal record of failures that German intelligence left." Nevertheless, there are "significant omissions as well as less significant ones.... [O]ne cannot use the adjective 'comprehensive' in describing the book." [WWII/Eur/Ger/Canaris & Gen]
Kahn, David. "How Good Intelligence Falls on Deaf Ears." New York Times, 27 Mar. 2004. [http://www.nytimes.com]
"Intelligence will always be incomplete; it will often run counter to what people want it to say. Leaders, however, are paid to overcome these obstacles. They can only lead when they deal with reality -- and then take steps to help us plan for the worst." [GenPostCW/00s/Gen]
Kahn, David. "How I Discovered World War II's Greatest Spy," Cryptologia 34, no. 1 (Jan. 2010): 12-21.
On the identification of Hans-Thilo Schmidt as the source of the information that eventually allowed the Poles to break the German Enigma. [OtherCountries/Poland.Enigma]
Kahn, David. How I Discovered World War II's Greatest Spy and Other Stories of Intelligence and Code. Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 2014,
From "Foreword" (p. XII): this work is a "collection of essays, all o]previously published but never before collected in a single volume." [WWII/Gen]
Kahn, David. "Intelligence." American Committee on the History of the Second World War Newsletter 11 (Dec. 1973): 6-8. [Petersen] [WWII/Gen]
Kahn, David. "The Intelligence Failure of Pearl Harbor." Foreign Affairs 70, no. 5 (Winter 1991-1992): 136-152.
Kahn suggests that dependence on Magic may have blinded U.S. officials to warnings contained in non-Sigint intelligence. [WWII/PearlHarbor/Gen]
Kahn, David. "Intelligence Lessons in Macbeth." Intelligence and National Security 24, no. 2 (Apr. 2009): 275-276.
"More than any other of Shakespeare's plays, Macbeth involves intelligence." [?]
Kahn, David. "Intelligence in World War II: A Survey." Journal of Intelligence History 1, no. 1 (Summer 2001). [http://www.intelligence-history.org/jih/previous.html]
From abstract: "Kahn provides an overview of the strengths and weaknesses, successes and failures of various intelligence activities and their impact on the outcome of World War II.... During the war, the Anglo-Americans increasingly intensified their intelligence activities while the more hierarchically organized German services proved to be less and less efficient. Intelligence ... unquestionably played a decisive part in winning the war."[WWII/Gen]
Kahn, David. "Intelligence Studies on the Continent." Intelligence and National Security 23, no. 2 (Apr. 2008): 249-275.
The scholarship of David Kahn never ceases to amaze. Here, he reviews the literature on intelligence coming out of France, Germany, and Spain. [France/RefMats; Germany/RefMats; OtherCountries/Spain; RefMats/Bibs/Gen]
Kahn, David. Kahn on Codes: Secrets of the New Cryptology. New York: Macmillan, 1983.
Petersen: "Collected articles."
Kahn, David. "Modern Cryptology." Scientific American 215 (Jul. 1966): 38-46. [Petersen]
Kahn, David. "A New Source for Historians: Yardley's Seized Manuscript." Cryptologia 15, no. 4 (Oct. 1991): 273-294.
Sexton calls this article an "excellent ... explanation of why American authorities failed to anticipate the Pearl Harbor attack." [WWII/PearlHarbor]
Kahn, David. "Number One From Moscow." Studies in Intelligence 5, no. 5 (Fall 1961): A15-A28.
Kahn discusses the cryptographic system used to encipher a message to Col. Rudolf Abel's assistant, Reino Hayhanen. The author refers to it as "the finest and most advanced mnemonic cipher ever made public." [Russia/SovSpies/Abel]
Return to Kahn Table of Contents
Return to Cryptography Table of Contents